Collective and Individual Rationality: Some Episodes in the History of Economic Thought by Denis, Andy
Collective and Individual Rationality: 
 
Some Episodes in the History of Economic Thought 
 
 
 
Andrew Martin Paul  DENIS 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for  
PhD in Economics 
 
 
 
City University, London 
 
 
 
Department of Economics 
School of Social and Human Sciences 
 
 
 
December 2001 
 
 2 
 
This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my father, 
 
Paul Justin Denis (1924-1982). 
 
 3 
 
Contents 
 
 
Lists of tables and figures           5 
 
Acknowledgements            6 
 
Declaration on consultation and copying         7 
 
Abstract             8 
 
Key to symbols and abbreviations used in the thesis        9 
 
1 Introduction          10 
1.1 Preamble          10 
1.2 Reductionism and holism: a response to Mario Bunge    12 
1.3 Policy prescription and social philosophy:  
reducibility and the invisible hand     19 
1.4 The structure of the thesis       28 
 
2         34 
2.1 Barry and Hardin: rationality at two different levels?    34 
2.2         36 
2.3 Iterated and n-player games       40 
2.4         43 
2.5 Collective and individual rationality      46 
2.6 Hobbes and Rousseau        48 
2.7 Conclusion         50 
 
3        52 
3.1 Introduction         52 
3.2 The conditions         53 
  Condition O        54 
  Condition U        54 
  Condition P        54 
  Condition D        54 
  Condition I        55 
3.3 Proof of the theorem        55 
3.4 Scope for relaxing the assumptions      57 
3.5 The libertarian response        61 
3.6 Little: the argument against the existence of an SWF    64 
3.7 Searle and Little        68 
3.8     70 
3.9 Conclusion         74 
 
4 The Invisible Hand of God in Adam Smith      76 
4.1 Introduction         76 
4.2 Bibliographical note        78 
4.3         81 
4.4 Weltanschauung       86 
 4 
4.4.1 All is for the best in this world and  
    we should accept our lot with joy    86 
4.4.2 Why, then, bother with considerations of morality?   89 
4.4.3 Every cloud has a silver lining      92 
4.4.4 Review       101 
4.4.5 The invisible hand     102 
4.5      114 
4.5.1 
th
 Century Philosophes 114 
4.5.2 Nature and the natural in Smith    118 
4.5.3      124 
4.6 Conclusion       128 
 
5 Friedrich Hayek: a Panglossian evolutionary theorist   131 
5.1 Introduction        131 
5.2  Hayek and Smith      133 
5.3 Holism and reductionism in Hayek    136 
  5.3.1 Shenfield on collectivism and holism in Hayek   136 
 5.3.2 Hayek and holism     145 
5.4 Hayek and evolution      147 
  5.4.1 Darwinian evolution      147 
 5.4.2 Hayekian evolution     158 
  5.4.3 The assumed optimality of evolved institutions  160 
5.4.4 Group selection      167 
5.4.5 Have Sober and Wilson rescued group selection? 179 
5.5 -individualism      181 
5.5 Conclusion       187 
Appendix: Bibliographical note      188 
 
6   191 
6.1 Introduction        191 
6.2      192 
6.3 Keynes and holism      200 
6.4      205 
6.5 Did Keynes reject laissez-faire?      212 
Appendix: Bibliographical note      215 
 
7 Conclusion        218 
 7.1 Retrospective: Keynes and providentialism   218 
 7.2 Results and prospects      222 
 
Glossary         224 
 
References and bibliography       234 
 
 
 5 
 
 
 
 
Lists of tables and figures 
 
 
Tables  
 
 
1   Payoff matrix for a one-       36 
2 Payoff matrix for a one-shot coordination game with ordinal payoffs       40 
3 Preferences of the three sets of agents, V1, V2 and V3         56 
 
 
Figures 
 
1 V1, V2 and V3       59 
 
 6 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
I should like to thank my advisor, Geoffrey Kay, and my wife, Mary Denis, for their 
unfailing support and encouragement during the production of this thesis.  The 
inspiration for the thesis originated in work completed in the late 1980s as a student on 
the excellent MA course in Political Economy at the then Middlesex Polytechnic; I 
should like to record my debt to the teaching staff on that course, in particular the late 
Geoffrey Pilling.   
 
I should like to thank the following for their encouragement and/or for insightful 
criticism of various points in the thesis: Erik Angner, William Barber, Stephan Böhm, 
John Broome, Mario Bunge, Pete Clarke, Paul Coleshill, John Cowley, William Dixon, 
Sheila Dow, Denis Glycopantis, Denis Gray, Alfons Grieder, the late Peter Holl, Allan 
Isaac, Steve Miller, Simon Price, Joan Safran, Joe Sen, Adrian Seville, Ron Smith, Ian 
Steedman, Richard Sturn, Julian Ullman, Jack Vromen, and Rachael Walker.   
 
Papers based on various parts of the thesis have been presented at the Economics 
Department and Interdisciplinary seminars in the School of Social and Human Sciences 
at City University, and conferences of the European Society for the History of Economic 
Thought (ESHET), the European Economics Association, the Association for Heterodox 
Economics (AHE), and the Leeds Postgraduate Economics Annual Conference. I should 
like to thank the many scholars, too numerous to list, who have participated in these 
discussions. 
 
As is detailed at the appropriate points in the thesis, papers based on the material 
embodied in it have been submitted to various journals and I should particularly like to 
thank the editors, and several anonymous referees, for the Journal of Socio-Economics, 
Constitutional Political Economy, and History of the Human Sciences, for their helpful 
comments.   
 
A debt of gratitude is owed to my students on the final year undergraduate option in 
History of Economic Thought at City University, London.  Their responses to the 
material of this thesis, as it developed, have been extremely helpful: I should like to thank 
them for their enthusiasm, commitment and challenging criticism.   
 
Finally, I should like to thank John Cowley and Jessica Holding for the invaluable gift of 
books which had belonged to the late Arthur Clegg and John Cameron, respectively.   
 
The views expressed and errors committed here, are, of course, entirely my own and not 
to be associated with any of the above.   
 
 
 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Declaration on consultation and copying 
 
 
The following statement is included in accordance with the Regulations governing the 
Research Studies Handbook, 2000: 
Appendix ii, (xxx), paragraph 5(e)): 
 
I grant powers of discretion to the University Librarian to allow this thesis to be 
copied in whole or in part without further reference to me.  This permission 
covers only single copies made for study purposes, subject to normal conditions 
of acknowledgement.   
 
  Andy Denis
 8 
 
 
 
Abstract  
 
 
This thesis argues for the fundamental importance of the opposition between holistic and 
reductionistic world-views in economics.  Both reductionism and holism may 
nevertheless underpin laissez-faire policy prescriptions.  Scrutiny of the nature of the 
articulation between micro and macro levels in the writings of economists suggests that 
invisible hand theories play a key role in reconciling reductionist policy prescriptions with 
a holistic world.   
 
theorem in soci
collective irrationality coordination problems lead to.  The source of the dilemma is 
identified as the combination of interdependence in content and independence in form of 
the decision making process.  Arrovian impossibility has been perceived as challenging 
traditional views of the relationship between micro and macro levels in economics.  
Conservative arguments against the possibility in principle of a social welfare function 
are criticised here as depending on an illicit dualism. 
 
The thesis then reviews the standpoints of Smith, Hayek and Keynes.  For Smith, the 
social desirability of individual self-
god who has moulded us so to behave, that the quantity of happiness in the world is 
always maximised. 
 
Hayek seeks to re-establish the invisible hand in a secular age, replacing the agency of a 
being based on the exploded notion of group selection, cannot underpin the desirability 
of spontaneous outcomes.   
 
I conclude by arguing that Keynes shares the holistic approach of Smith and Hayek, but 
without their reliance on invisible hand mechanisms.  If spontaneous processes cannot be 
relied upon to generate desirable social outcomes then we have to take responsibility for 
achieving this ourselves by establishing the appropriate institutional framework to 
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Key to symbols and abbreviations used in the thesis 
 
 
Symbols 
 
The delta symbol ( ): X means the change in X, where X = C or M. 
The prime symbol ('):   X' means X plus X, where X means C or M. 
 
AD  aggregate demand 
C  commodity 
i  the rate of interest 
M  money 
MEC  marginal efficiency of capital 
MPC  marginal propensity to  
  consume 
 
 
Abbreviations of source titles
1
 
 
Astronomy  
-129 
COL  Hayek (1960) 
EPS  Smith (1980) 
CRS  Hayek (1979) 
CWXIII Keynes (1973b) 
CWXX Keynes (1981) 
CWXXI Keynes (1982) 
CWXXVII Keynes (1980) 
EP  Keynes (1972a) 
GT   Keynes (1973a) 
IEO  Hayek (1948) 
KES  Hayek (1983) 
LLL  Hayek (1982) 
Mandeville Hayek (1967b) 
NSP  Hayek (1978a) 
RTS  Hayek (1944)  
SIP  Hayek (1967a) 
Sup   Keynes (1979) 
TBT  Hayek (1978b) 
Times   
Keynes (Keynes, 1937a, b, 
reprinted in Hutchison, 1977) 
TM  Keynes (1971) 
TMS   Smith (1976/1759) 
TSO  Hayek (1952) 
WN  Smith (1976/1776)
 
 
Other abbreviations 
 
AI  artificial intelligence 
ESS evolutionarily stable 
strategy 
GE  general equilibrium  
PC  predicate calculus  
SWF  social welfare function 
                                               
1 For details of works by Keynes, Hayek and Adam Smith, please refer to the bibliographical notes 
attached to the relevant chapters: Section 4.2 for Adam Smith, and the appendices to Chapters 5 and 6 
for Hayek and Keynes respectively.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction: Holism versus reductionism in economic thought
2
 
 
 
1.1 Preamble  
 
question  perhaps the fundamental question  for economics.  How do (micro level) 
agent interests and behaviours interact to generate (macro level) social outcomes?  Are 
those outcomes desirable, or should society as a whole, in the form of the state, intervene 
to modify them?   This thesis will investigate these questions and explore the answers 
that have been given by some characteristic economic thinkers.  The thesis thus forms 
part of an investigation into the views of various writers on the articulation between 
micro and macro levels in economics, between individual actions and social outcomes, 
between individual and collective rationality.   
 
The thesis begins, in this chapter, with an introduction to some of the fundamental 
methodological issues underlying the remainder of the work.  A consideration of two 
problems in twentieth-century political economy  
impossibility theorem  will then establish the currency of these themes in contemporary 
group evolutionary theory of Friedrich Hayek.  The question addressed is, What is the 
mechanism by which these writers supposed that individual (micro) rationality translated 
into collective (macro) rationality?  In conclusion, an alternative twentieth-century 
response to this issue, that of John Maynard Keynes, will be considered.   
 
This structure is dictated by the following considerations.  Firstly, the issues of micro and 
macro, of disjuncture and emergence, of reductionism and holism, and of a providential 
                                               
2 An article based on this chapter is at point of writing under consideration with the Journal of Socio-
Economics as Denis (2001a). 
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or indifferent world, are ones which continually re-emerge in political economy.  The two 
issues with which I start the thesis establish that point by reference to two controversies 
of the second half of the 20
th
 t to be of 
fundamental significance for the rest of the thesis.  Arrovian impossibility is not directly 
of the same level of significance, but does play a useful role here, both in illustrating 
some of the themes of the thesis, and in highlighting just why 
contrast, is so important.   
 
The bulk of the thesis, the most important two chapters, consider the invisible hand 
mechanisms of Smith and Hayek.  Given the topic of the thesis, the articulation of micro 
actions and macro outcomes, it was essential to consider the invisible hand, firstly in its 
original, and secondly in its modern incarnations.  In this way we may see what is 
enduring and what has changed in the presentation of this theme by providentialist 
political economists.  An important finding of these chapters is that both Hayek and 
Smith reject the reductionist approach adopted, for example, by modern monetarist and 
new classical writers in favour of a holistic methodological approach.  Finally, the 
chapter on Keynes is required in order to show what happens when a holistic 
methodological approach is accompanied by an explicit rejection of the invisible hand: in 
an indifferent, non-providential world we ourselves are obliged to take responsibility for 
the unintended consequences of our actions.   
 
The present chapter introduces the thesis by means of a consideration of a recent paper 
Firstly, I argue, with Bunge, that schools of thought in economics may be characterised 
according to their stance on a key methodological opposition: that between holism and 
reductionism.  Secondly, I argue that this choice of standpoint has important 
consequences for policy prescription.  Arguing against a simplistic correlation of 
reductionism and laissez faire, the case is made for two kinds of methodological 
underpinning for laissez-faire: firstly, reductionist and, secondly, holist plus invisible hand 
mechanism.  On the basis of these methodological preliminaries, the chapter concludes by 
outlining the subsequent structure of the thesis.   
 
1.2 Reductionism and holism: a response to Mario Bunge 
 
 12 
alternative to individuali
which makes a number of telling points and is evidence of a growing discomfort with the 
reductionism of the neoclassical school currently hegemonic within the discipline of 
economics.  However, there are two major points which need to be made with respect to 
point is that the relation between policy prescription and philosophical standpoint in 
would lead one to believe.   
 
The first of these points  terminology and 
mine  is considered in this section, which then proceeds to make some initial comments 
on the significance for political economy of the opposition between reductionism and 
holism.  The next section looks in more detail at the second question, that of the 
relationship between methodological standpoint and policy prescription in political 
economy.   
 
sciences: the two most influential, individualism and holism, being fatally flawed, with 
only the minority approach of systemism offering a viable way forward.  The first two are 
inadequate  
error of its own, while the third, systemism, manages to synthesise the other two, 
accepting the criticism each makes of the other.   
 
3
):   
 
he two most influential approaches to the study and management of social 
overlooks the bonds among people, and holism, because it plays down or even enslaves 
individu
(156-157) 
 
                                               
3 Unqualified page numbers in this section and the next refer to Bunge (2000). 
 13 
Systemism, apart from being defined negatively with respect to individualism and holism, 
is either a 
system or a component of a system and every system has peculiar (emergent) properties 
 
 
Now, there is nothing in these formulations which is contentious
4
, and the points made 
are valuable ones.  However, I think greater clarity can be obtained by stating the matter 
depend fundamentally upon the properties of the relata, the substrate-level entities which 
entity independent of the properties of its material substrate.  This, however, is not the 
way that the term holism will be employed in this thesis.   
 
We are equally justified in complaining, with Bunge, that what he refers to as 
relationships between agents, the fact 
that individuals are only nodes in systems of such relationships, and the emergence of 
properties at the macro, or system level.  But, when we do so, we are taking a position 
on an opposition which has implicitly or explicitly underlain a vast amount of 
methodological discourse in economics and elsewhere: that between holism and 
reductionism, Bunge is 
implicitly defining a non- or anti-
, which I refer to as holism.  Essentially, reductionism involves 
a strategy of interpreting the things we see in the world, and, in particular, economic 
phenomena, as congeries of substrate-level entities; and holism is the attempt to 
understand these phenomena as a whole or system, with emergent properties not enjoyed 
by constituent components.  The terms holism and reductionism as used in this thesis 
may be defined as follows:   
 
Reductionism: the view that an entity at one level can be understood as a 
congeries, an aggregate of entities at a lower, substrate level, that 
the properties and behaviour of higher level entities can be 
                                               
4 Apart, perhaps, from a certain tendency to hyperbole: 
both debatable and an unnecessary claim for the point being made.   
 14 
understood in terms of the properties and behaviour of its 
constituent lower level parts, taken in isolation. 
 
Holism: the view that phenomena at one level can be understood as 
emergent at that level, that a higher level entity can be understood 
as a product of the interrelationships between its component 
parts.   
 
Correspondence relating to previous manifestations of this chapter suggests that some 
discussion is in order at this point.  Firstly, the question has been raised (Bunge, personal 
epistemological standpoints.  As stated, both definitions are epistemological  
imply that a phenomenon can be understood in a particular way precisely because that is 
the way it is.  In that vein, as well as being explicitly epistemological, the definitions 
would be implicitly ontological.  However, that further step is unnecessary for present 
purposes.   
 
Secondly, the exact definitions of the terms are as controversial as everything else in the 
debate between the supporters of each point of view.  The above definitions are my own, 
and are as unlikely to please as any others
5
.  Correspondents, responding to earlier 
papers on this theme, have criticised this or that statement about reductionism or holism 
 but, because their criticism was on the basis of other definitions than those set out 
above, they failed to engage with the points that I am making
6
.   I submit that what is 
critical here is that holism and reductionism so defined can be shown to characterise two 
living trends in economic thought and to throw up interesting and enlightening questions 
about the nature of those trends.   
 
                                               
5 
(1987: 217-
-52, 371-72). 
6 It would, of course, be open to critics to object to my fallible attempts to set out a logically coherent 
opposition in sympathy with the literature I had consulted.   
 15 
General 
Theory, clearly advocates a holistic approach: 
 
general theory.  I mean by this that I am chiefly concerned with 
the behaviour of the economic system as a whole .... And I argue that important mistakes 
have been made through extending to the system as a whole conclusions which have been 
GT: xxxii7) 
 
Keynes sets out very clearly here what he takes to be the distinguishing feature of the 
two approaches: that, on the one hand, we can derive correct conclusions from the study 
of micro
to macroeconomic phenomena leads to error, and, on the other, that the correct 
approach is (what we would now call) a systems approach, aiming to examine the 
the approach he is criticising here, derives from a difference, between the two levels, in 
what it is legitimate to take as parametric or given (Keynes, 1973: 293). 
 
Robert Lucas, on the contrary, is a very clear spokesman for the trend in economics 
which favours a reductionist methodology.  The following is taken from the final 
paragraph of his Models of Business Cycles: 
 
n macroeconomic theory seem to me 
describable as the reincorporation of aggregative problems such as inflation and the 
- ply disappear from use and the 
Marshall and Walras, of economic theory.  If we are honest, we will have to face the fact 
that at any given time there will be phenomena that are well-understood from the point of 
view of the economic theory we have, and other phenomena that are not.  We will be 
tempted, I am sure, to relieve the discomfort induced by discrepancies between theory and 
facts by saying that the ill-understood facts are the province of some other, different kind 
 
 
Here we have a clear expression of the desire to reduce macroeconomics to 
microeconomics, and a characterisation of the Keynesian approach as an illegitimate 
8
  
                                               
7
 Throughout the present thesis, emphasis in passages cited is as in the source unless its addition is 
explicitly noted.     
8 Simon Price (personal communication) has argued vigorously against labelling Lucas a reductionist.  
 16 
 
Both the passages cited occur in contexts  a preface, and the concluding paragraph of a 
book  where the authors are standing back from the detail of the theories that they are 
presenting, and indicating what they regard as the underlying general features of their 
approaches.  What they choose to highlight in both cases is their selection of a holist or 
reductionist approach.  This, I think, establishes, at least a prima facie case, that the 
issue is worth looking at and potentially useful in understanding the controversy between 
various schools of thought in the history of economics.   
 
*     *     * 
 
Some examples can be given to show how this controversy continually emerges in 
economics: 
 
deploymen -
interest, methodological individualism, a hallmark of neoclassical economics, is 
abandoned.  In its place is a more holistic and integrated view of society as an integral 
dependence of all macroeconomics on microeconomic principles is essential for the 
(cited in Nelson, 1984: 576).  So Dore and Boland agree that the reductionist standpoint 
  is an essential component of neoclassical economics.  
In a similar vein, Schotter, right at the beginning of a book on Free Market Economics, 
says tha
else, Schotter feels it important to establish the reductionist standpoint of libertarianism. 
 
                                                                                                                                         
Identifying partial and general equilibrium (GE) approaches with reductionism and holism, respectively, 
he points out that Lucas has been extremely active in importing GE thinking into macroeconomics.  
While the latter point is undeniable, the identification between GE and holism is far more questionable.  
A GE model incorporating the salient points of analysis explored in Chapter 6, below, would indeed 
 but such a model is, of course, very far indeed from what Lucas is 
trying to develop.   
 17 
Kevin Hoover, on the other hand, in a special edition of The Monist 
 
 
reduction of macroeconomics to 
macroeconomics in various ways, it cannot succeed in its goal of replacing 
 
 
Feeling it necessary to point out that an example she wants to use for purposes of 
illustration, although couched in reductionist terms, could be replaced by a more holistic 
regularities by reference to capacities and relations that can only sensibly be attributed to 
institutions or to the economy as a whole, with no promise of reduction to features of 
 
 
Nelson (1984) is an interesting case since at first he seems enthusiastic about the 
possibility of reducing macro to micro in economics: 
 
scale phenomena dealt with in 
macroeconomics must be the results of the total effects of the small scale phenomena dealt 
with in microeconomics.  Therefore, one might expect that bridges could be built by 
merely adding up the microeconomic laws describing the microphenomena to obtain the 
macroecono
macroeconomics to microeconomics would not be plagued with the kind of ontological 
-74). 
 
His conclusion, 
593).  Cross a
search for finer-grain microfoundations and instead [to] study how complex economic 
565). 
 
Finally, Hayek, who spent much of his life criticising the linked errors of 
macroeconomics, economic statistics and socialism, was  amongst the most trenchant of 
theory as the only KES
 18 
microeconomics which enables us to understand the crucial functions of the market 
KES General Theory] 
did not refer so much to any detail of the analysis as the general approach followed in the 
whole work.  The real issue was the validity of ... macro- TBT: 100).  As we 
shall see, however, the citation of these passages by no means settles the question of 
n the methodological issue of reductionism versus holism.    
 
*     *     * 
 
-systemism-holism 
is a profound one, the opposition between individualist, on the one hand, and non- or 
anti-individualist approaches, on the other, is of more fundamental interest for the 
purposes of this thesis, and, secondly, that for the remainder of this thesis the 
reductionism, and the non-individualist 
approach as holism.   Further, I have proposed definitions of reduction and holism and 
tried to show that the opposition between them is a living issue in economics.  The next 
section takes up the issue of the association, which can be seen to emerge here, and 
which is asserted by Bunge, between methodological premises and policy prescription.  
 
1.3 Policy prescription and social philosophy: reducibility and the invisible hand 
 
A pattern seems to emerge from the examples cited: apparently there is a tendency for 
libertarians and those on the right of the spectrum of policy views within economics, 
such as Lucas, to appeal to reductionist methodological premises, while those on the left, 
those like Keynes adopting a more interventionist stance, are more likely to invoke 
holistic underpinnings for their theoretical pronouncements.  Bunge takes up this point, 
sm, is one of benign 
neglect.  By contrast, the totalitarian cultural policy, which is based on holism, is one of 
-
radical individualists oppose all social planning in the na
holists swear by top-
rights [sc those of the common people].  In either case, the powerless individual, whether 
 
 19 
account social values (ignored by individualism) as well as individual values (ignored by 
 
 
But there is a paradox
9
  here.  We have just seen that there seems to be an association 
between a laissez-faire policy prescription and a reductionist methodology.  
Nevertheless, starting with Adam Smith{ XE "Smith, Adam" }, a profoundly influential 
trend, epitomised by writers such as Friedrich Hayek and Armen Alchian, has proposed 
10,11
 (De Vany, 1996: 427), in which 
12
.  
This emergence seems flatly to contradict the association between laissez-faire and 
reductionism just noted.  This section will explore that puzzle.   
 
 
 
dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.  We address ourselves, not to their 
humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities, but of their 
WN I.ii.213) 
 
Even here, in this well-known and apparently simple statement, there is something 
mysterious about the relation between micro and macro levels.  The butcher, brewer and 
baker do not care about the dinners they provide, so that, in some sense, the desirable 
social outcome of feeding the members of society is achieved in spite of rather than 
because of the motives and behaviours of the food providers.  The articulation between 
                                               
9 
expectations about the association, or otherwise, between reductionism and holism, on the one hand, and 
the various possible policy prescriptions, on the other.   
10 Mario Bunge (personal communication) correctly points out that the invisible hand is not a theorem 
but a postulate: citing works in which it is referred to as a theorem is not to be taken as endorsement of 
that usage.  
11 De V
general equilibrium, subject to all the usual caveats of general equilibrium theory (De Vany, 1996: 427).  
See also Mirrlees (1997: 1311-1312). 
12
 The reference is to Adam Ferguson (1767) An Essay on the History of Civil Society p187. 
13 ter ii, paragraph 2 of 
the Wealth of Nations).   
 20 
the motivation and behaviour of agents at the micro level and macro outcomes is not 
even at first blush a trivial or straightforward question.  It seems odd that the trend which 
laissez-faire 
policy prescription, which as we have seen seems itself to be associated with 
emergence 
is precisely what distinguishes the holist from the reductionist approach. 
 
The question therefore arises, whether the invisible hand theorem is consistent with the 
32-
procedure  part of his philosophical critique of libertarian thinking  is as follows.  
h he defines as 
follows, each illustrated by a statement from a libertarian
14
 
logical dilemma arises from the mutual incompatibility of the two theses: 
 
The reducibility thesis: the fully developed market economy can be understood as the 
sum or aggregate of its discrete components, the individual bilateral exchanges at the 
preferences, it cannot be evil unless those preferences are thems
15
   
 
The invisible hand thesis -satisfaction 
(ie, unrestricted market forces leave agents better off than any alternative economic 
environment) because an invisible hand transmutes our self-interested behaviour into 
creatures, the solid basis, the life and support of all trade and employment without 
exception is evil
16
 
                                               
14 Or at least libertarian-approved: Mandeville has been claimed by Hayek as a libertarian thinker 
(Hayek, 1966). 
15 The reference is to Keith Joseph and Jonathan Sumption (1979) Equality London: John Murray, p 78.  
to cite an instance of a claim is not in any 
distaste.   
16 The reference is to Bernard de Mandeville in Philip Harth (ed) (1970) Bernard Mandeville: The Fable 
of the Bees London: Penguin.  This contains The Fable of the Bees or Private Vices Made Publick 
 21 
 
So reductionism says that evil only comes of evil, while the job of the invisible hand is 
specifically to transmute evil into good
17
.  For Sir Keith the aggregate outcome cannot 
be evil as long as the preferences it is based on are innocent; for Mandeville, on the 
contrary, the aggregate outcome cannot be good unless the preferences underpinning it 
are evil, vicious, selfish.  Thus Haworth is able to conclude that the libertarians cannot 
abandon one of its central t  
 
attention to the association, alluded to earlier, between methodological standpoint and 
policy prescription.  There are policy implications of the choice between reductionism 
and holism.  And, indeed, the consequences for policy implied by the approach selected, 
so far from being a mere scholium, are the tail which wags the methodological dog
18
.  If 
one adopts the systems approach and recognises that the unintended collective outcomes 
of an unplanned, uncoordinated mass of individual actions may have far from desirable 
features, then the obvious implication is to see whether there is anything we can do about 
it.  The absence of an invisible hand invites the intervention of the very visible hand of 
state intervention.  The reductionist approach, on the contrary, says that, assuming 
individuals can be counted on to do the best they can for themselves given the constraints 
                                                                                                                                         
Benefits 
(1724) Mandeville published after the Fable was arraigned before the Grand Jury of Middlesex as a 
public nuisance. 
17 A correspondent finds this statement confusing: I seem to him to be conflating positive and normative 
x
moral value, if any, of property x is irrelevant when considering whether the possession of property x by 
some macro-level entity or phenomenon requires or contradicts the possession of property x by the 
substrate-
the two theses adduced by Howarth.  So Joseph says that the macro level outcomes have exactly he same 
character as the substrate they are based in, while Mandeville says they have exactly the opposite 
character.   
18
 Of course, this is not a tight, one-to-one relationship: as Ian Steedman (personal communication) 
points out, very different policy prescriptions may in various ways be made consistent with similar 
methodological standpoints.   
 22 
they face, the aggregate outcome of those individual actions will also be the best 
available: state intervention in the economy is nugatory. 
 
There are two possibilities: we could be living in a world where the reductionists are 
right or one where the holists are right.  Needless to say, I think we reside in the latter.  If 
we lived in the former, the macro level would simply reflect the micro level.  There 
would be nothing for an invisible hand to do.  The individual would be directly social, or, 
what comes to the same thing, there would be no separate category of the social.  
Individual utility maximisation would directly be social welfare maximisation: the 
distinction between them would be meaningless.  Likewise, macro irrationality would be 
just a summary of micro irrationality: unemployment would either be a product of 
the product of a rational desire for leisure
19
, and, hence, itself rational.  In general, 
individuals could with confidence be left to get on with it without supervision or 
intervention.  A reductionist world would be a laissez-faire world. 
 
If, on the other hand, we were to inhabit, as in my opinion we do, a holistic world
20
, then 
reductionists would (and do) have a problem.  It is fairly obvious that higher level entities 
are not simply aggregates of their micro components: water does not behave as an 
aggregate of hydrogen and oxygen; steam, liquid water, and ice do not consist of tiny 
gaseous, liquid and solid molecules; nor do chairs consist of hard, green, ugly or 
you would be very lucky if a small change in your program led only to a small change on 
your screen.  Tiny programming errors typically lead to wild and unpredictable results 
levels.  The problem faced by the reductionist is how to reconcile this fact  of an 
obvious disjuncture between levels  with the reductionist laissez-faire policy 
prescription.  Libertarians face severe difficulties sustaining a logically consistent 
reductionism in a holistic world.   
                                               
19 As the Duke of Edinburgh memorably asserted on the Jimmy Young Programme, and as Robert Lucas 
still believes (1987: 66-67) 
20
 
of thing.  Clearly this is expression is a figure of speech, shorthand for a world in which a holistic 
standpoint would be appropriate.  
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The invisible hand is one potential solution to this problem.  There are two possibilities.  
Either one can ignore the disjuncture between levels, and adopt a thoroughgoing 
reductionist methodology and policy stance  this seems to be line taken by Joseph, 
Lucas and Friedman
21
  or with Hayek and Adam Smith one can  accept that disjuncture, 
and so adopt a methodological holism, but at the same time postulate a mechanism 
reconciling that methodological holism with a laissez-faire policy reductionism.  Such a 
mechanism is an invisible hand mechanism.  The invisible hand allows us to say, granted 
that social outcomes are not logically bound to reflect individual behaviour in an 
aggregative, summary manner, nevertheless a mechanism exists which ensures that in 
practice they do so.  The invisible hand is what allows us to think, and act, in a 
reductionist way in a holistic world: it underpins reductionism by tacitly conceding 
holism.  Laissez-faire is vindicated, we are inveigled into tying the visible hand behind 
our back, if we can be persuaded that the invisible hand will do its job instead, and do it 
better.  
 
What I am suggesting, therefore, is the following: the laissez-faire policy prescription 
does, indeed, embody a reductionist standpoint.  However, there is more than one way of 
sustaining that standpoint methodologically.  One can believe, or at least act as if one 
believes, that the world truly is reductionist in relevant ways and that supposed macro-
level pathology is simply the summation of micro-level behaviour which may or may not 
be pathological.  Laissez-faire is a reductionist policy prescription in the sense that it 
issues from a reductionist methodological standpoint.  Or one can accept that the world 
is holistic and hence that macro-level pathologies might in principle be emergent at that 
level, but postulate the existence of an invisible hand mechanism which ensures that the 
reductionist policy prescription of laissez-faire is nevertheless valid.  The latter strategy 
combines methodological holism with policy reductionism.   
 
*     *     * 
 
                                               
21 Although few of us attain to consistency, and it is always possible to find holistic-sounding 
formulations in reductionist writers  the difficulty lies in interpreting them.   
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 following the terminology I adopt, 
read reductionism) of the neoclassical economists are well taken
22
.  But the simple, one-
to-one relationship between this reductionist standpoint and a laissez-faire policy 
t exist.  Compare the standpoints of 
independent households  
also Haworth, 1994: 8).  For Hayek, on the contrary, foci in 
CRS: 59).  So, on the definitions proposed earlier, Hayek 
subscribes to a very clearly holistic, and Friedman to an equally clearly reductionist 
methodological standpoint. Yet they still both endorse the same basic framework for 
policy prescription: laissez-faire.  And in bracketing Smith with the neoclassicals in the 
reductionist camp (148), Bunge is simply in error  as we shall see in Chapter 4.  
 
Writers such as Smith and Hayek are methodologically very distant from the crude 
reductionism of Joseph, Lucas and Friedman.  They tacitly recognise a holistic world by 
invoking invisible hand mechanisms.  For Smith the invisible hand is literally the hand of 
an omniscient and omnipotent deity desiring nothing other than the maximisation of 
human welfare.  For Hayek, writing in a more secular age, the invisible hand mechanism 
takes the form of an evolutionary process based on the exploded group selection theory 
of VC Wynne- pts to distinguish his own stance from that of 
Keynes, his anxiety to head off a line of thought leading from the holistic or systems 
thinking premises he shared with Keynes to an interventionist policy prescription, lead 
him to make the crudely reductionistic statements about macroeconomics and 
microeconomics which we noted earlier.   
 
The resolution, then, to the puzzle identified at the beginning of this section is as follows.  
We can understand the contradictory association between an appeal to reductionist 
methodological underpinnings and an assertion of a holistic invisible hand mechanism on 
the basis of a dual foundation.  The first part is a factual hypothesis about the nature of 
the world we actually inhabit, namely, the systems view of the world, the hypothesis that 
the world is a holistic one with all that this implies about the scope and potential for 
collective intervention in the economy.  The second part concerns the laissez-faire policy 
                                               
22 Although it may well be a rhetorical error blandly to dismiss monetarist macroeconomics as akin to 
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prescription of the reductionist camp, a policy prescription which both depends on and 
supports the reductionist methodological stance.  Taking the two points together, we can 
see that some mechanism has to be introduced to mediate between a holist world and a 
reductionist policy prescription: the invisible hand does the job.  The invisible hand, 
whatever its precise content, whether it comprises the hand of a deity as in Smith, or the 
result of an evolutionary process as in Hayek, allows us to assert that, in practice, the 
world can be treated as if it were reductionist.  The logical inconsistency which Howarth 
has correctly identified is an internalisation of the inconsistency between reductionist 
laissez-faire programme and holistic world.  It is illogical because it is attempting to do 
what is ultimately impossible, namely to reconcile the irreconcilable.   
 
The alternative to both of these approaches is to combine recognition of the holistic 
nature of the world we live in with acceptance that there is no invisible hand.  In this 
view, rational individual self-seeking behaviour is by no means either the necessary or the 
sufficient micro substrate for the desirability of social outcomes.  Rather, behaviour must 
be directly social if desirable social outcomes are to be obtained.  According to Keynes, 
for example, egotistical activity uncoordinated by the state may lead to inefficient 
outcomes.  The price system aggregates rational individual actions but the aggregate is 
an unintended outcome as far as those individuals are concerned.  There is no particular 
reason why unintended outcomes should necessarily be desirable and often they are not.  
Individuals take responsibility for maximising their own welfare, given what everyone 
else is doing, but somebody
23
 has to take responsibility for organising the aggregate 
outc
own ... the invisible hand is merely our own bleeding feet moving through pain and loss 
CWXX: 474).  
 
Marx, on the other hand, takes the argument a stage further by arguing, on the contrary, 
that there is, indeed, a design which is not our own, a design without a designer.  Like 
unlike Hayek, because it is not our own design, it is alien to us.  In the absence of 
directly social activity, atomistic behaviour spontaneously arranges itself into a self-
                                                                                                                                         
faith healing (156)! 
23 Specifically, a universal class in a position to act on behalf of society as a whole.   
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individual humans thus becomes dominated by an interest alien to that of the individuals 
comprising it. 
 
*     *     * 
 
The conclusion of this section, therefore, is that while reductionist approaches may be 
safely dismissed, embracing holism is no guarantee of getting it right.  There is holism 
and there is holism.  Methodological holism combined with the deus ex machina of an 
invisible hand mechanism can still sustain the inappropriate and unwarranted reductionist 
policy prescription of laissez-faire.  The bulk of this section has concerned the holism-
reductionism dyad, at the cost of ignoring the distinction between what Bunge calls 
ct the reductionist assumption 
that the properties of entities are just aggregates of the properties of substrate entities, 
but we also reject the assumption that the pattern of relationships constituting a system is 
substrate-neutral and in some sense logically prior to the properties of the substrate 
entities.   
 
The implication is that writers in the invisible hand tradition, such as Smith and Hayek, 
adopt precisely this assumption.  As far as Smith is concerned, the case is made in 
Chapter 4, where the invisible hand is interpreted as literally the hand of an omniscient, 
omnipotent and benign deity.  As far as Hayek is concerned, the issue is dealt with in 
Chapter 5, where I argue that, for Hayek, macro level objects are understood as 
independent entities in their own right, owing nothing to their material bases in individual 
behaviour.  In both cases the overall macro-level pattern is divorced from the need for a 
mechanism, such that micro level incentives are consistent with behaviour which sustains 
that pattern.   
 
The consequence of this analysis is that the association between methodological 
standpoint and policy prescription asserted in Bunge (2000) can be challenged.  There is 
 and laissez-faire, on the one hand, nor 
both 
and 
from material foundations in self-seeking substrate activity) are associated with laissez-
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faire
policy prescriptions from mild to radical intervention. 
 
the 
methodology of economics  
article, however, can be faulted for an over-simplification and misunderstanding of the 
relation between methodological premises and policy consequences.  There do exist 
reductionist free marketeers of the kind Bunge describes: the pronouncements of 
Friedman, Lucas and Sir Keith Joseph fit this pattern.  But to lump holists such as Smith 
and Hayek in with them, is both mistaken and allows us to ignore the fundamentally 
ideological  role of invisible hand mechanisms in allowing economists to retain some 
approximation to efficiency as their default notion of how the capitalist economy actually 
works.   
 
1.4 The structure of the thesis 
 
From what has been said above, it is clear that a major part of the thesis must be 
concerned with the problem of the invisible hand.  It is mandatory, then, to return to the 
locus classicus of the invisible hand in the writings of Adam Smith.  This will occupy a 
followed, in Chapter 5, by a close examination of the position of a leading twentieth 
century invisible hand theorist, Friedrich Hayek.  The thesis concludes with an 
examination of the consequences of adopting a holistic perspective while rejecting 
engagement in the economy.  Before turning explicitly to the invisible hand itself, 
however, I examine two episodes in twentieth century political economy where 
developments within game theory and the theory of social choice were perceived as 
 
 
Within modern neoclassical economics controversy has been aroused by the discovery of 
appears to show that it is impossible to devise a procedure which can be relied upon to 
aggregate individual preferences into clear and acceptable collective preferences.  And 
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leads in general to collectively desirable outcomes  not just as a theoretical possibility 
but as a plausible description of a pervasive phenomenon.  Considerable energy has been 
with the supposition of a ubiquitous and benevolent invisible hand.   
 
One response to such difficulties, however, has been to jettison the idea of collective 
rationality altogether.  Libertarian writers such as IMD Little, argue that only individuals 
can think or prefer one thing to another, and concepts of collective rationality and social 
preference are therefore devoid of meaning.  The question as to whether a collection of 
individuals, a society, can have interests and preferences distinct from those of the 
individuals of which it consists, has parallels with two related questions in psychology, 
philosophy and computer science, namely, (a) how brains can be conscious when 
individual neurons are not, and (b) whether artificial intelligence is possible in principle.  
Both questions relate to the validity of the computational theory of mind. 
 
agents when such dilemmas arise: that decision-making is interdependent in content but 
independent in form.  The decision affects others but is taken as if it only affected the 
individual decision-maker.  In Chapter 3 attention is turned to the problem of Arrovian 
impossibility, and, in particular, to the criticism of Arrow by libertarian thinkers.  Taking 
IMD Little as a principal exponent of this view, a parallel is drawn between his rejection 
of the notion of a social welfare function and the rejection, by writers such as John 
Searle, of the possibility of artificial intelligence. Chapters 2 and 3 take the form of an 
extended review of Barry and Hardin (1982).   
 
What, then, do we learn, with respect to the issues outlined above, from these two 
dilemma and Arrovian impossibility to the reductionist programme.  The conclusion 
drawn is that both are, in fact, incompatible with the reductionist programme, but that 
conflicting interests of the agents involved, whereas the Arrow theorem is based only on 
conflicting interests, and (b) to the tension between social content and private form of 
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the decision making process.  Secondly, the chapters draw attention to a particularly 
extreme liberal response to these challenges, and provide an explanation of why that 
response is wrong. 
 
pose considerable difficulties for the reductionist programme.  In part this is an empirical 
24
 and non-single-peaked preferences 
in the world?  One possible approach for the reductionists is to say that these do not in 
fact occur
25
.  However, I am not aware of any major attempt to put this argument and 
therefore will ignore it here.  A second possibility is to pick holes in the argument, trying 
ll in the fact that independent choice behaviour by 
rational agents should sometimes lead to Pareto-
defect] is the solution of the Pr
unsuccessfully, been made to circumvent the two propositions.  The point is that there is 
no absolute or logical paradox involved, but both Arrovian impossibility and the 
 the sense in which the Good Samaritan is a paradox.  Belief in the possibility 
of automatic mechanisms which aggregate (a) individual preferences to achieve a 
consistent notion of what is socially desirable, and (b) individual actions to achieve 
socially desirable outcomes, is incompatible with these two results.   
 
A third approach, taken by the more extreme proponents of laissez-faire, is to deny 
collective rationality and social welfare, to deny, that is, that any meaning can be attached 
to these phrases.  According to this view, only individuals can be rational or have 
preferences.  The lesson of Chapters 2 and 3 is that this tactic, which illegitimately 
privileges a particular level, that of the individual agent, is fundamentally untenable.   
 
                                               
24 ie, one shot games and multi-player iterated games: just those versions where reciprocity cannot lead 
to the cooperative solution.  
25 Binmore (1994) and Axelrod (1984) are based on repeated two-player games, and much of what they 
say ceases to apply once n-player (n > 2) games are admitted.  
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Chapter 4 is devoted to an examination of the invisible hand in the work of the writer 
who invented the term.  Adam Smith is revered as the father of modern economics.  I 
shall argue that analysis of his writings, however, reveals him to be a representative of 
the 18
th
 
preoccupied with the need to preserve order in society. His scientific methodology 
emphasises reconciliation with the world we live in rather than investigation of it.  He 
invokes a version of natural law in which the universe is a harmonious machine 
administered by a benign deity.  Nobody is uncared for and, in real happiness, we are all 
substantially equal.  No action is without its appropriate reward  in this life or the next.  
The social desirability of individual self-
that is, by the hand of a god who has moulded us so to behave, that the quantity of 
happiness in the world is always maximised. 
 
In Chapter 5 attention turns to a prominent twentieth century exponent of the invisible 
hand.  While Adam Smith proposed that individual self-seeking would lead to socially 
kindly god, Friedrich Hayek seeks to re-establish the invisible hand in a secular age, 
replacing the agency of a deity with an evolutionary mechanism.  A process akin to 
natural selection ensures that individual behaviours leading to undesirable social 
inconsistent in his deployment of this evolutionary mechanism: only its  for him  
benign effects are acknowledged, while its undesirable consequences are blamed on a 
culture of state intervention.   
 
What is the specific contribution which these two chapters make to the overall thesis?  I 
argued, earlier in this introductory chapter, that the notion of an invisible hand is 
fundamentally ambivalent: at once it sustains reductionism, and the laissez-faire policy 
prescription implied by it, while tacitly conceding the holist case: social order is 
emergent.  What we want to know is, precisely how this automatic mechanism operates; 
how the invisible hand is to reconcile individual behaviours in the interest of the greater 
good of society. 
 
In Smith and Hayek we see two allied but distinct answers to this question.  In the 
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God has a very simple structure, indeed he is reduced almost to a cipher.  Repeatedly and 
unambiguously we are told that, at least for practical purposes, God has a utility function 
of one argument: total human happiness
26
.  The machine grinds out the summation with 
perfect accuracy for ever.  It is the totality which is always primary for Smith; individuals 
are assigned very subordinate roles.  Deprived of any real freedom or autonomy, they are 
human welfare.   
 
Is Smith then in the reductionist or holist camp?  I argued above that the role of the 
invisible hand is to reconcile the reductionist programme with a holistic world.  This is 
certainly the case for Smith.  Smith admits a holistic world.  His imagery is, in tune with 
his times, mechanical rather than organic: the world is a great machine rather than an 
organism.  
invisible hand allows him to assume that the maximisation of human happiness takes 
place automatically  all we need to do is give each other enough space for the invisible 
hand process to work itself out.  Macro level rationality is the spontaneous reflex of 
micro level rationality. 
 
 with the 
modification that a form of evolution is to replace the deity as the mechanism driving the 
invisible hand.  Not only the allocation of resources between competing ends, but also 
the institutional environment within which that allocation process takes place, are subject 
to variation and selection.  Only those allocations and institutions most conducive to 
human welfare survive this weeding and sifting process.  Once again, the reductionist 
programme is reconciled with a holistic world.  Social order, and other properties of the 
macro level, are emergent at that level, but they are born perfect and fully-formed.  We 
have no need to intervene at the macro level.  Social welfare is again maximised 
automatically by individual utility maximisation. 
 
                                               
26  
this utilitarian character, while God himself has additional objectives, such as enjoying virt
account.   
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What this, at first blush more plausible, account omits is how individual self-seeking 
behaviour leads to institutions and allocations which are just what society requires.  
Indeed, just as in Smith individual interests were pre-reconciled by God, so that 
aggregation was unproblematic, so, too, Hayek admits that this will only work for 
interests that are already reconciled.  He then goes on to build his entire system on the 
wholly unjustified assumption that, indeed, they are thus reconciled. 
 
The thesis concludes with a presentation of the policy stance of John Maynard Keynes 
and an examination of its links with his underlying social philosophy.  The argument is 
that Keynes shares the holistic approach of Smith and Hayek, but without their reliance 
on invisible hand mechanisms.  If spontaneous processes cannot be relied upon to 
generate desirable social outcomes then we have to take responsibility for achieving this 
ourselves.  Individual self-seeking behaviour will lead to socially desirable outcomes only 
if the institutional framework is right.  Setting up the institutional framework in which 
 or, what comes to the same thing, abolishing the 
existing institutional framework which atomises individuals  implies large-scale 
collectivisation of the economy.   
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Chapter 2 
27
 
 
 
2.1 Barry and Hardin: rationality at two different levels? 
 
The purpose of this chapter and the next is to show that the issue of the articulation 
between the micro and macro levels does present problems for contemporary economics.  
An appropriate place to begin our investigation of the problems facing the neoclassical 
view of the micro-macro articulation of levels is a book of readings (Barry and Hardin, 
1982) on precisely this subject, Rational Man and Irrational Society? edited by Brian 
Barry and Russell Hardin, political scientists at the University of Chicago.   
 
and collective decisio
book are therefore concerned with the micro-macro dichotomy: the failure of rationality 
at the micro level, the level of the individual agent, to guarantee rationality at the macro 
level, the 
which rational individuals, attempting to do the best they can for themselves, do worse 
than if they had tried to do the best they could for all the agents taken together.  Arrovian 
impossibility shows that there is no rule which can always aggregate individual ordinal 
preferences into social preferences without producing some perverse result, such as that 
the social ordering is just a restatement of the ordering of a particular individual, or that 
the society is indifferent between every alternative presented to it.  Both results have 
been regarded as shocking and as deeply damaging to liberal notions of economic and 
political processes.  They have been held to exemplify a contradiction between individual 
                                               
27 An earlier version of this chapter appeared as Denis (1996a).  
 34 
thought to throw up problems for the concep
28
). 
 
Barry and Hardin are supporters of the libertarian view that, if there is a conflict between 
individual and collective rationality, we should keep the former and drop the latter.  Their 
response to the supposed dichotomy between collective and individual rationality is to 
assert that it is based on an illicit extension of the concept of rationality from the 
assumptions that its relation t
practical problem challenging us to construct institutions which avoid it. 
 
y should be seen as a reaction to the discovery that 
the concept of rationality cannot be extended indefinitely to solve all problems of conduct 
 much is expected of the notion of rationality.  There is no a 
priori reason to expect that, if people have very diverse ways of conceiving the bases for 
ranking some states of affairs above others, it will be possible to aggregate these 
 
 
And a similar po
not v
the 
There is more than an echo of the Kantian procedure about this.  Kant argued that 
and that the purpose of philosophy, therefore, was to seal off those areas where this was 
al channels: 
 
science [sc metaphysics], which checks its tendencies towards dialectic, and ... prevents 
the ravages which a lawless speculative reason would infallibly commit ... [T]he supreme 
office of censor which it [metaphysics] occupies, assures to it the highest authority and 
importance.  This office it administers for the purpose of securing order, harmony, and 
                                               
28 Unqualified page numbers in this chapter and the next refer to Barry and Hardin, 1982. 
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well-being to science, and of directing its noble and fruitful labours to the highest possible 
aim  -81) 
 
In the same way, Barry and Hardin note that thinking consistently about the aggregation 
of individual preferences and behaviours leads to paradoxes  contradictions between 
micro- and macro-level rationality.  Instead of seeking an intellectually satisfying 
resolution of the paradox, we are advised to drop the issue: there is obviously something 
wrong with the concept of collective rationality so we had better stop using it and turn 
instead to the practical problems of constructing institutions.  An intellectual problem is 
replaced by a practical one. 
 
As we shall see, however, Barry and Hardin differ from Kant  and, as we shall see, from 
Adam Smith  in that K
rationality to society as a whole, we cannot ask whether society is acting rationally to 
maximise its happiness and the idea of human happiness in the aggregate itself becomes 
vacuous.   
 
2.2  
 
Table 1   
Payoff matrix for a one-  
 
 
 
In the payoff matrix shown in Table 1, above, the cells indicate the ordinal payoffs to the 
two players, X and Y.  Each of the four outcomes is ranked between 1 and 4 for each 
player, with 1 meaning most preferred by that player.  The payoff for X is presented first 
in each cell.  Hence the top left cell shows the payoffs if both cooperate, and the top right 
  X  
  Cooperate Defect 
Y  
Cooperate      2, 2  1, 4 
Defect      4, 1  3, 3 
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cell those if X defects and Y 
this outcome is X ost desired outcome and Y X co-
operates and Y defects, the outcome, represented in the bottom left cell, is reversed.  If 
both players cooperate they both get their second best outcome and if both defect they 
get their third best outcome.  These ordinal preferences can be illustrated by any 
cardinalisations which preserve the rankings.  There is no need for any symmetry or 
equality of the cardinal utilities attached to each outcome for the two players.  
 
A one-shot, two-p
Table 1.  We make the following two assumptions:   
 
(1) The payoffs indicated accurately capture the preferences of the players.  In other 
words, any fellow feeling, moral views, pleasure in cooperating per se, etc, are all 
already included in the ranking. 
 
(2) Each player is rational: he actually behaves in the way which maximises his own 
utility. 
 
Often a third assumption is specified: that moves are simultaneous  in the sense that 
each p
formally unnecessary: we shall see shortly that each player has a dominant strategy to 
defect  and this is entirely robust to relaxations of the simultaneity assumption.   
 
Suppose Y cooperates.  The best that X can do is to defect: he gets his first rather than 
his second best outcome.  Suppose now that Y defects.  The best that X can do is still to 
defect: by doing so he will now get his third rather than fourth best outcome.  So X has a 
dominant strategy: whatever Y does, he does best by defecting.  Since Y is in exactly the 
same position, he also has a dominant strategy to defect.  Yet if we compare the 
outcomes on the main diagonal (ie those outcomes where the players make the same 
move) we can see that if both defect, both get a less desired outcome than if both had 
cooperated.   
 
There are four possible outcomes: CC, CD, DC and DD, where DC, for example, means 
that X defects and Y cooperates.  Three outcomes (CC, CD and DC) are Pareto-efficient, 
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as any change to another outcome would make at least one player worse off.  Only DD is 
Pareto dominated: a change to CC would benefit both players.  The one-
dilemma selects the single Pareto-inferior outcome.  Unlike the other three outcomes, 
DD can also be seen as a Nash equilibrium: it is the only outcome in which each player is 
doing the best he can, given the actions of the other player. 
 
relied upon to 
acts rationally and pursues his own self-interest, the societal outcome is worse than if 
each individual does not.  In short, the invisible hand of individual maximization seems to 
game realistically portrays situations that arise in society  and inspection and 
introspection would indicate that it describes a situation all too frequently met with in 
real life  then socially inferior outcomes will be the norm.   
 
the assumptions gives rise to a host of similar games generating sub-optimal outcomes.  
If moves are sequential instead of simultaneous, for example, appropriate adjustment of 
the payoffs available gives us the centipede game  a game which can never get started
29
 
even though both players would benefit from playing (Kemp and Philp, 1996).  The 
-type macro-irrationality can be illustrated by reference to 
two points made by Schelling, the author of Reading 5.  The first point simply draws 
attention to the fact that clashes between micro and macro conceptions of rationality 
 
 
in his own best 
interest given what everybody else is doing, yet all could be better off if the all made 
opposite choices ... [W]e should probably identify as the generic problem, not the 
s in which equilibria 
achieved by unconcerted or undisciplined action are inefficient  the situations in which 
everybody could be better off, or some collective total could be larger, by concerted or 
 
                                               
29 A correspondent correctly points out that formally the game does get started in that the first player 
faces a decision whether to play or not, and if he decides not to play, that is his move (and the last one of 
the game), so by not playing, he has played and the game did get started (and terminated 
instantaneously).  I submit that my use of words is more transparent. 
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As an example, he refers to the problem of what to call the time: whether we choose to 
discussion, namely, that Schelling draws attention to the problem intrinsic to the 
coordination problem.  We may note, to 
anticipate a later discussion, that a coordination problem is exactly what arises when a 
decision is interdependent in content but independent in form.  The decision has social 
consequences but is taken as if it had only individual consequences.  If the individuals 
concerned could coordinate their decision-making  so that the payoff matrix could be 
changed to reflect the choices of just one (aggregate) player amongst two (or more) 
actions  
problem of coordination ... arises in those situations in which there is more than one set 
equilibrium rightly prevalent in economics, that of Nash equilibrium, then, as pointed out 
above, there is only one equilibrium: DD.  Gauthier is using equilibrium in a looser sense 
in order to include the idea of the socially desirable outcome as an equilibrium.  The 
is not an equilibrium.) 
 
The decision on what to call the time is a classic case of a nominal variable having real 
of time thus: 
 
more important that we all have the same time than what time it is.  But that does not 
mean it is a pure coordination game, if we understand by that one in which all equilibria 
are equally good.  Without organisation we will be locked in standard time all the year 
 
 
A simple payoff matrix for a coordination game, such as what to call the time, or which 
side of the road to drive on, might be set out as follows.  The assumptions made here are 
the same as for the two player, one-shot game made above, with the addition of the 
simultaneity assumption.  Whether a one-shot, 2-player game has any real significance 
will be addressed shortly.   
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Table 2   
Payoff matrix for a one-shot coordination game with ordinal payoffs 
 
 
 
In the payoff matrix above, X and Y do not care whether to use GMT or BST so long as 
both use the same time system.  The outcomes on the main diagonal where they both use 
the same time-naming convention are their equal first choices, and the off-diagonal 
outcomes their equal third choices.  If players only communicate by means of their 
moves, and they face a one-shot game, then they face a probability of 0.5 that they will 
coordinate successfully.   
 
The key point about these games  the one-shot, 2-
coordination games  is the failure of reciprocity: there is no way in a one-
dilemma game that either player can influence the behaviour of the other.  Without 
reciprocity we cannot have coordination.   
 
2.3 Iterated and n-player games 
 
In the case of an iterated game   the decisions 
taken by players in any period can now be related to decisions made by the other player 
in the previous iteration.  Each player now has to consider what it stands to lose in the 
future if it defects now and if that defection causes the other player to defect in the 
future.  If either (a) the rate at which the player discounts future benefits is very high, or 
(b)  for 
practical purposes, we still have a one-shot game.  Assuming this is not the case, 
cooperation becomes a viable strategy.  The problem is that one does not know the 
 own 
moves.  It has been claimed on the basis of experimental evidence (Hofstadter, 1985 Ch 
  X  
    GMT   BST  
Y  
GMT    1, 1    3, 3 
BST    3, 3    1, 1 
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29 and Axelrod, 1984, 1990 Ch 2) that the best strategy is one, such as TIT-FOR-TAT, 
 defection and 
thereafter forgives by returning to cooperation
30
.  These last two are necessary  
worse) and therefore can treat the game as a one-shot.  To resolve the pri
dilemma, the supergame must extend into the indefinite future to avoid the problem of 
backward induction.  If the players know when it is going to end, they will defect on the 
final game, they will 
defect in the penultimate game, and in the one before that.  The iteration unravels back to 
the present and defection becomes the dominant strategy once more.  The technical name 
 
 
With two-player iterated games with high probability of future rounds and shallow 
discounting of the future, however, there is a real basis for cooperation.  Robert Axelrod 
makes this scenario the entire basis for a theory of The Evolution of Co-operation in the 
biological 
open to a very laissez-faire interpretation.  If social problems which might otherwise 
legitimise state intervention are characterised by indefinitely iterated 2-
dilemmas, then we can expect rational agents to learn to cooperate with each other, 
rendering state intervention unnecessary.  
 
One way out of the quandary of the pr
number of periods.  One way back into it, however, is to extend the number of players: 
 
-person single play game, commonly 
should cooperate in iterated play.  In general, in an n-person single-
dilemma, defection is narrowly rational.  In iterated play it may not be.  Whether it is 
n 
becomes very large, it is increasingly implausible that cooperation will be narrowly 
rational even in iterated play.  Hence, in the dynamic analysis, narrow rationality can lead 
less likely as n incr -34) 
 
                                               
30 These contentions by Axelrod, et al, have been severely criticised by Ken Binmore (1994: 194-203).  
s have themselves been criticised by Matt Ridley (1996: 72-73). 
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assumption that by doing so you will influence your antagonist to cooperate, thereby 
obtaining more desired outcomes for both players.  Cooperation depends on reciprocity.  
But as n becomes large, it becomes impossible to influence the behaviour of other 
two can be large enough to forestall cooperation, as the paper by Rapoport (Reading 3) 
- single defector 
gets the largest payoff and the single cooperator suffers the most severe punishment, it is 
all but impossible for all three to 
 
 
The players face two problems: how to discriminate between players whom one wishes 
own behaviour can perceptibly reward or punish other players.  A competitive market, 
n producers, where 
n is very large, and each producer would like all producers together to reduce output but 
is not prepared to reduce output unilaterally.  In spite of it being an iterated game, 
cooperation cannot emerge because every producer would want to defect and there is no 
mechanism to punish just defectors. 
 
too optimistic: two-player 
games certainly do exist, but there is no reason to believe that many of the important 
institutional dilemmas faced by humanity are not more realistically modelled as multi-
player games.  In the key issues addressed by Keynes (Chapter 6 of this thesis), for 
example, agents must decide whether to save or to spend and whether to hold their 
assets in the form of bonds or money.  These decisions clearly impact on many other 
agents and constitute multi-player iterated games.  Such situations cry out for state 
intervention  for example, to alter the payoff matrices by means of appropriate penalties 
for defection and incentives for cooperation.  In the sequel, therefore, references to 
derstood without distinction as one-
shot, two-player games, finite iterated games, or n-player iterated games; that is, as just 
those situations where the dilemma is manifest. 
 
 42 
n 
interest between the two players.  But this common interest cannot be implemented 
because of its fragmentation into two atomistic players.  The agents act irrationally from 
the collective point of view because they are compelled by the structure of the game to 
make their decisions at an inappropriate lower level of aggregation.   
 
As an aid to perspective, before looking at the issues of interest, where the micro-macro 
dichotomy poses problems for human society, I will make some prefatory remarks on 
individual and collective rationality in a natural world context.   
 
2.4  
 
-155).  For the purposes of argument, 
Dawkins postulates some aggregate over-
what it is that is being maximised in the natural world.  His conclusion to this exercise in 
reverse engineering is that there is no such over-
observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no 
Dawkins, 1995: 
155). 
 
This does not mean that the world is senseless or chaotic: on the contrary, the structure 
and behaviour of the entire organic world can be explained by reference to a single 
principle, the survival of DNA.  Each gene is a maximiser of a utility function with one 
their descendants are the genes we expect to see in the world.  The animals we are 
Dawkins, 1995: 127). 
 
This individual, self-interested rationality leads to incoherent, purposeless behaviour as 
soon as higher levels of aggregation are considered: 
 
to be well designed to kill antelopes.  The teeth, claws, eyes, nose, leg muscles, backbone 
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designing cheetahs was to maximize deaths among antelopes.  Conversely [in the case of] 
an antelope we find equally impressive evidence of design for precisely the opposite end: 
the survival of antelopes and starvation among cheetahs.  It is as though cheetahs had been 
995: 122-123) 
 
Even at the level of a single species, or groups within a species, the attempt by 
individuals to maximise the number of their descendants leads to inefficiency.  Dawkins 
takes the example of the elephant seal.  In the elephant seal the females are monopolised 
by 4 percent of the males in a harem system.  The sex ratio is about 50:50 even though 
96 percent of the males make no contribution, and, indeed, consume more than half the 
en a little attention to the 
economic efficiency of the community would dispense with the bachelors.  Instead, there 
 
 
However, if males were in a minority, it would be to the advantage of an individual to 
have male offspring: the expected number of offspring of males is greater than that of 
females.  Thus individuals who tended to have male offspring would be selected for until 
the sex ratio was equal again.  An unequal sex ratio is not an evolutionarily stable 
strategy.  But the consequence is massive inefficiency: 
 
devoting themselves to useful work, squander their energy and strength in futile struggles 
as concerned with rearing children.  If males diverted into useful channels the energy that 
they waste competing with each other, the species as a whole would rear more children for 
 
 
ated 
precisely a multi-
not that genes make individual organisms or groups of organisms behave in ways  in 
some sense  contrary to their own interest, though that may be the case.  The essence of 
the problem is that genes, individually maximising their future replication, do not 
collectively maximise their future replication.  If  somehow  the elephant seal genes 
could cooperate instead of blindly competing with each other, the population could 
support a skewed sex ratio and make far more efficient use of its resources.  The 
population would be more successful within the species and the species within its overall 
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environment.  The probability of any randomly selected gene in the gene-pool surviving 
into subsequent generations would be increased.  But they cannot do it.  Individually 
rational behaviour by genes leads, in this as in many other cases, to collective behaviour 
which is irrational for those same genes.   
 
To put it another way.  Genes want to survive.
31
  Individual behaviours are selected 
which maximise the transmission of the DNA responsible for those behaviours into the 
future.  But the only evolutionarily stable strategy for the DNA is to do the best it can, 
given what all the other DNA is doing.  However, at the collective level, the DNA is not 
not 
In particular, if 96 per cent of males in the species is redundant, then it would be better 
for the species to dispense with them.  The ideal sex ratio is 2:50, or 200/(2+50) per cent 
= 3.85 per cent males
32
.  Individually it is rational to invest in male offspring if the 
percentage of males falls below 50 per cent.  Collectively it is rational to invest in males 
only if it falls below 3.85 per cent.  Choosing female offspring with a probability of 
0.9615 is cooperation and choosing female offspring with a probability of 0.5 is defection 
cooperated they would all enhance their replication over the Pareto-inefficient Nash 
equilibrium.  In the case of partial cooperation, however, the cooperators would 
individually do worse than if there were no cooperation, and the defectors better.  Hence 
cooperation cannot arise gradually, and if, somehow, it did arise, it would be vulnerable 
to invasion by defectors.  Cooperation is not an evolutionarily stable strategy. 
 
This section, therefore, illustrates a natural-world case where agents act rationally at an 
individual level, but irrationally at the aggregate level  because the decision making is 
independent in form but interdependent in content.  It also gives substance to the view 
                                               
31 -329).   
32 4% of males are productive, and males constitute 50% of the population, therefore, for each hundred 
elephant seals 4% of 50%, or 2 males should be retained to mate with the 50 females.  So the ideal sex 
ratio is 2:50.  The 2 males as a percentage of the population of 52 (50 females plus 2 males) is 
approximately 3.85%.  As a decimal fraction this is 0.03846; taking this away from unity to get the 
desired probability of female offspring gives us the figure of 0.9615. 
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which could be a gene or a species, a person or an institution, a nation or even a 
civilisation. 
 
2.5 Collective and individual rationality 
 
We are now in a position to look in more detail at the Barry and Hardin view of 
essentially that collective rationality does not exist  the term is an unwarranted 
opens with these comments: 
 
he circumstance that the question 
out that in the context of non-constant-
attention, namely individual rationality, which 
prescribes to each player the course of action most advantageous to him under the 
circumstances, and collective rationality, which prescribes a course of action to both 
players simultaneously.  It turns out that if both act in accordance with collective 
rationality, then each player is better off than he would have been had each acted in 
 
 
It is true that Rapoport immediately spoils this with references to ethical considerations, 
either the rankings 
of the two players already impound all considerations of morality, or 
impounding them changes the rankings, releasing the players from any dilemma.  But 
Rapoport is correct in asserting the contradictory claims of rationality operating at two 
different levels.   
 
 
 
 
is an irrefutable case here for saying that means-end rationality requires one to play the 
noncooperative strategy in a one-
 
 
They then refer to the 
to morality which follow it.  After some discussion of ethical considerations and the 
Kantian categorical imperative, they sum up as follows: 
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the forbearance of others ... that if you know the other prisoner has not confessed you 
need not be identified with the pursuit of self-
 
 
rom the individual point of 
view in the one-  
accurately represents utility payoffs it is irrational to cooperate because of some external 
moral principle.  But that is not the point.  The point is that Rapoport was correct to 
distinguish between individual and collective rationality and to point out the conflict 
between the two.  It is a simple fact that the individually rational outcome, DD, is Pareto 
inefficient, that is, it is socially irrational. 
 
out the consequences to the individual players of acting on its strictures: 
 
-interested individual is for the other player to fo
choosing that option rather than being left free.  But the 
(384) 
 
In this last statement Barry and Hardin effectively concede the case they have been 
contesting, namely, that there is indeed a conflict between individual and collective 
rationality.  And, more precisely, that there is no spontaneous mechanism or institution to 
 
-interested actor, except inasmuch as he will hope 
 
 
Again Barry and Hardin miss the point.  The point is that collective rationality is 
individually rational choice is DD, the collectively rational choice is CC, and since there 
can be no mechanism for the collective interest to be realised other than through the 
actions of individuals, the latter is not achieved. 
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2.6 Hobbes and Rousseau 
 
author of Readi
dilemma-type situations poses problems for the identification of rationality with 
individual utility-maximisation, Gauthier seeks to draw out a distinction between two 
kinds of ration
distinguishes between interdependent and independent action, which he identifies with 
activity in civil society and in the state of nature respectively.  The rational modes of 
behaviour appropriate to these contexts are individual utility-maximisation in the state of 
tional persons with full knowledge will perform actions leading to an optimal 
 
 
33
 that agreement alone is insufficient to move from the 
state of nature to civil society, and that force is required to underpin such agreement: 
 require each person to 
But Gauthier disagrees with Hobbes.  Hobbesian man, socialised only by force, despite a 
change in appearances, actually remains in the state 
real difference between the state of nature and civil society must be a difference in man, 
e of nature to civil society produces in 
man a very remarkable change, in substituting justice for instinct in his conduct, and 
34
  Hence, for Gauthier, civil 
morality. 
 
                                               
33 The reference is to Hobbes (1651) Leviathan Ch 14, 15, 17 
34 Jean-Jacques Rousseau Du contrat social (1762) I, viii; trans Gauthier.   
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The problem with this is that Rousseau does not say, in the passage cited, that the 
transition from state of nature to civil society is accomplished by a change in morality, 
but, on the contrary, that the change in morality he refers to is achieved by the transition 
from the state of nature to civil society.  The change in morality is a result, not a cause.  
avoided in a society with the moral values which Gauthier endorses (and I with him), 
because the payoffs attached to the different outcomes would not have the form of a 
represe
and there is no way that players can escape from the dilemma by incorporating a further 
moral dimension into their decision making.  Thus Barry and Hardin are able to use 
 
 
what Gauthier calls constrained maximising (eg playing the cooperative move in a 
is rational maximising of any sort in the absence of genuine 
interdependence between the choices of the parties, that is to say in the absence of a real 
 
 
ilemma setting interdependent?  Clearly, Barry 
reciprocity.  When that sort of 
interdependence is present, when there is reciprocity, then there is no 
Equally clearly, however, there is some element of interdependence at work here.  When 
one player makes a decision, that decision has consequences for the other player.  There 
is an externality at work: the private costs and benefits of each possible move, those 
affecting the individual player, do not fully reflect the social costs and benefits, those 
affecting both (or all) players.  Again, without this condition, there would be no dilemma: 
each p
can summarise the problem by saying that decision-
game is interdependent in content but not in form.  The decision affects others but is 
taken as if it only affected the individual decision-maker.   
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economic transaction that agents make can be said to have some element of this 
substantial interdependence combined with formal independence.  While it is possible to 
imagine a barter transaction in which no-one other than the two agents involved had any 
interest, every transaction involving money must necessarily impact on other agents 
throughout the economy  at the very least influencing the demand for money.  The 
scope for macroeconomic externalities is thus considerable.  We have already seen that 
situations where there is a coordination problem and consequent sub-optimal outcome.   
 
But it is also the case that if the problem lies with decision making that is interdependent 
in content but independent in form, then the solution implies bringing form and content 
back into mutual accord.  It is difficult to see how this can be done by removing the 
substantial interdependence.  That would seem to involve a shift to a Robinson Crusoe 
economy  without even the company of a Man Friday.  Removing the formal 
independence on the other hand  given the ubiquity of partially overlapping and partially 
conflicting interests which lie at the heart of the human condition  must surely imply 
very widespread intervention in and detailed supervision of the workings of the economy 
by central authority. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have sketched out a number of propositions.  In particular, that 
coordination problems are endemic in both the natural and social worlds and that the 
collective irrationality such problems lead to is epitomised by the prisoners dilemma.  The 
mistaken application of the concept of rationality to a sphere where it has no meaning, 
but from the correct insight that behaviour in prisoners dilemma-type contexts is 
dilemmas and, more broadly, in coordination problems in general, is the combination of 
independence in form and interdependence in content of the decision making process.  A 
group of agents having a common interest may be unable to implement that interest if it 
is fragmented into a number of parts, each of which is compelled to make decisions at an 
inappropriate lower level of aggregation.  Finally, if correct, this argument implies a 
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search for solutions in the direction of extensive supervision of the economy by central 
authority.  The next chapter, on Arrovian impossibility, continues the discussion begun 
here. 
 
 51 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 m
35
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 the view that individual rationality of 
economic agents will, in general, lead to collective rationality at the level of the economy 
as a whole.  I also argued that the attempt to explain away the problem, by attributing it 
to a mistaken extension of the concept of rationality from the individual to the collective 
sphere, was ultimately untenable.  In this chapter attention is turned to the problem of 
Arrovian impossibility, and, in particular, to the criticism of Arrow by libertarian thinkers.  
Taking IMD Little as a principal exponent of this view, a parallel is drawn between his 
rejection of the notion of a social welfare function and the rejection, by writers such as 
John Searle, of the possibility of artificial intelligence.  As in Chapter 2, a principal 
reference point is the collection of writings on Rational Man and Irrational Society 
edited by Barry and Hardin (1982).   
 
The background to the debate over the Arrow impossibility theorem is as follows.  
Consumers have preferences over the alternative consumption bundles with which they 
are faced.  Modern microeconomics is based on the idea that everything we need to 
know to discuss consumer behaviour can be obtained from ordinal rankings by the 
consumers of these alternative consumption bundles without any need to know how 
much they enjoy a bundle, or how much more they enjoy this bundle than that.  An older, 
cardinal, theory required that, in principle, these levels and differences in utility were 
measurable.  The liberal tradition had for long held that alongside all the particular 
interests in society, there was a general interest, the interest of society itself.  With the 
                                               
35 An earlier version of this chapter appeared as Denis (1996b). 
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cardinal utility theory this conception of a general interest received an obvious 
interpretation: Benthamite utilitarianism said just add up the utility levels of all the 
individuals in society and that total represents the welfare of the whole of society.  Then 
any policy can be judged according to how it increased or decreased that total of social 
welfare.  Significant difficulties with the measurement and interpersonal comparison of 
utility levels led to the abandonment  for the most part  of cardinal utilities and the 
adoption of the weaker, and hence more robust, ordinal theory.  Although it was now no 
longer obvious how to construct a social welfare function (hereafter SWF), it was 
assumed that this was merely a technical problem and that the task could still be 
accomplished in principle.  Arrow, however, in a number of publications, in particular the 
two editions of Social Choice and Individual Values (1951, 1963), showed that it was in 
principle impossible to derive any SWF purely from individual rankings of social 
alternatives which satisfied certain elementary criteria, such as consistency and non-
dictatorship.  This was a great shock and, indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to say 
that some theorists despaired at this result.  Plott sets the tone here in Reading 12 (of 
Barry and Hardin, 1982): 
 
e hole, 
researchers ... began digging in the ground nearby ... What they now appear to have been 
uncovering is a gigantic cavern into which fall almost all of our ideas about social actions.  
Almost everything we say and/or anyone has ever said about what society wants or should 
get is threatened with internal inconsistency.  It is as though people have been talking for 
years about a thing that cannot, in principle -32) 
 
tains that the Arrow 
results, and others like it in the theory of social choice, undermine the whole tradition of 
(230). 
 
A major purpose of this chapter is to evaluate this response.  
 
3.2 The conditions 
 
conditions O, U, P, D and I.  The argument proceeds via a reductio ad absurdam: we 
assume that all the conditions hold and then demonstrate that they lead to a 
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contradiction.  Relaxing any of the conditions removes the impossibility of deriving a 
SWF, but, in general, such SWFs will exhibit perverse features.  The conditions are 
expressed in many different ways in the literature and what follows is based on Barry and 
specified in this form are not genuinely primitive: condition O, for example, contains 
criteria of both uniqueness and transitivity.  Transitivity by itself could be expanded into 
two (or more) conditions.  The uniqueness criterion is replicated in Condition I, 
rendering the latter partly redundant. 
 
Condition O 
 
The SWF is a unique Ordering of the alternatives facing society based only on individual 
orderings.  An ordering is a consistent ranking.  In particular this implies transitivity for 
both preference and indifference.  If society prefers x to y and y to z, then it prefers x to 
z, and so on. 
 
Condition U 
 
The social choice rule must have Unrestricted domain: it must work for every logically 
possible combination of individual orderings.   
 
Condition P 
 
The social choice rule must be Pareto-efficient: if one individual prefers x to y and all 
other individuals either prefer x to y or are indifferent between x and y, then the SWF 
must prefer x to y.   
 
Condition D 
 
There must not be a Dictator, that is, a person whose preference of x for y is always (in 
every logically conceivable constellation of preferences) the social preference, for any x 
and y, regardless of the preferences of others.   
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Condition I 
 
The social ordering of any pair of alternatives x and y is a function solely of the individual 
orderings of x and y: it is Independent of irrelevant alternatives  individual orderings of 
x and z, for example.   
 
3.3 Proof of the theorem 
 
One further concept is needed: that of decisiveness.  If a group or individual is decisive 
over x and y, and prefers x to y, then society prefers x to y
preference may be
36
.  We also assume that society consists of a finite number of 
individuals.  The proof then proceeds by showing that (a) if there is an SWF which 
satisfies conditions O, U, P, and I (that is, all except non-dictatorship), then for some 
constellation of preferences there must be a decisive individual, and (b) if there is a 
decisive individual then he is a dictator.   
 
Consider any pair of alternatives, x and y, where society prefers x to y.  It cannot be the 
case that everyone in society prefers y to x, by condition P (Pareto).  There must be a set 
of decisive individuals.  If only one person prefers x then the set only contains one 
person; if everyone prefers x then the set of all the individuals in society is decisive.  
Normally, it will be a set of intermediate size, but that is irrelevant.  There will thus be a 
(non-empty) decisive set for each pair of alternatives where society is not indifferent 
between the two.  Consider the set of all of these decisive sets.  From the assumption 
that society consisted of a finite number of individuals, this set of decisive sets must have 
a smallest member, or a subset of equally large smallest members, in which case we pick 
any member of this subset.  We can show that there must be a possible pattern of 
preferences for which this smallest set of decisive individuals has only one member. 
 
We will suppose initially that this smallest decisive set, V, has more than one member, 
and show that this leads to a contradiction.  Suppose V is decisive over x and y, and that 
                                               
36 Decisiveness is not the same as dictatorship.  Decisiveness holds if there is one pair of alternatives 
and one individual or group such that the individual or group can make the choice between the two 
every 
pair of alternatives. 
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it (and hence society  because V is decisive) prefers x to y.  This must lead to a 
contradiction.  Since it consists of more than one member we can divide it into two parts, 
one, V1, consisting of one member and the other, V2, consisting of all the other members 
of V.  We also give the name V3 to the set of all the members of society not in V.  
Condition U, unlimited domain, tells us that the SWF must work for any logically 
possible pattern of preferences.  So we can pick any pattern of preferences we like.  
Suppose the pattern of preferences is that for V1, x > y > z
37
, for V2, z > x > y, and for V3, 
y > z > x.  For convenience of reference this information is set out in Table 3. 
 
Table 3   
Preferences of the three sets of agents, V1, V2 and V3 
 
Rank V1 V2 V3 S S' 
1 x z y x x 
2 y x z y 
} y, z 
3 z y x z 
 
 
Now, we know that V is decisive over x and y, so for society x > y.  this is shown in the 
column headed S.  But where does society rank z?  Suppose society preferred z to y.  
Only V2 prefers z to y  both V1 and V3 prefer y to z  so that would make V2 decisive.  
But V2 is one person less than V, the smallest decisive set, so that is not possible.  So 
society either prefers y to z (Column S) or is indifferent between y and z (Column S').  
Hence society must prefer x to z, given x > y and y z, by transitivity (condition O).  
These two alternatives (x > y > z, and x > y = z, are shown in columns S and S', 
respectively, of Table 3.  But now V1 is decisive since both V2 and V3 prefer z to x.  
However, V1 consists of only one person, so the assumption that the smallest decisive 
set, V, consisted of more than one person turns out to be self-contradictory.  We have 
shown, therefore, what was required, that there is a pattern of possible preferences such 
that there is a decisive individual.  That completes the first part of the proof.   
 
                                               
37  
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The second part of the proof shows that a decisive individual is a dictator.  Suppose A is 
decisive for x against y and that he also prefers x to z.  Also suppose, invoking condition 
U, that everyone prefers y to z.  Condition P says that society prefers y to z.  If every 
individual prefers y to z, it would certainly be Pareto-inefficient for the SWF to prefer z 
to y, or even to be indifferent between them.  Hence, x > y > z for society and so, 
invoking transitivity, x > z.  But condition I, independence of irrelevant alternatives, says 
that the social choice between x and z is independent of individual preferences over y.  
x is preferred to z by society if and only if A 
prefers x to z.  Hence, if A is decisive for x against y, we can replace y by any other 
alternative which A finds less desirable than x.  Similarly we can replace x by any 
alternative which A finds more desirable than y.  Hence for any possible pair of 
alternatives, A
showed that there was a possible set of preferences such that there was decisive 
individual.  Hence, for this pattern of preferences there is a dictator.  But this violates 
condition D, of non-dictatorship.  The concept of an SWF which simultaneously satisfies 
all five conditions is therefore inconsistent. 
 
What this shows is that there is a possible pattern of individual preference orderings such 
that a social ordering derived from them which satisfies the Pareto and independence 
conditions must be dictatorial if it is to be consistent. 
 
3.4 Scope for relaxing the assumptions 
 
All of the assumptions mentioned are invoked in the proof, so relaxing any will make it 
possible, in principle, for us to construct a SWF.  However, the conditions are generally 
regarded as quite minimal so the resulting SWFs are unlikely to be attractive.  If we are 
prepared to accept a dictator, for example, there is no problem in constructing an SWF  
but now the SWF has nothing social about it.  The SWF abdicates before the task of 
aggregating individual preferences.  Again, recall that we commenced the proof by 
considering any pair of alternatives, x and y, where society prefers x to y.  If we are 
unable to do this, because society is indifferent between every pair of alternatives, then 
we can derive a SWF, which, however, is completely vacuous: x = y for all x and y.  This 
is going to the opposite, but equally useless, extreme. 
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We assumed that society consisted of a finite number of individuals, and if we relax this 
assumption then the proof fails, for there need not be a smallest decisive set.  Or, to put it 
another way, if the smallest decisive set were infinitely large, removing one member 
would not leave a residue smaller than the original set.  Again the proof would fail.  
Since actually existing societies consist of a finite number of individuals, this is scarcely 
helpful.  To consider infinite societies we would 
not to be individual at all but rather infinitely subdivisible, or (b) to regard the individuals 
composing society to be not just those currently living but also the unborn and/or the 
dead  and even that would be problematic.  In neither case would it be possible to 
establish individual preferences, let alone aggregate them.   
 
SWFs violating condition P or transitivity are no more attractive than those already 
considered.  An SWF capable of choosing Pareto-inferior outcomes would clearly not be 
of transitivity would also lead to irrationality at the macro level.  Consider the set of 
preferences presented in Table 3, which was used in the proof of the impossibility 
U says that our SWF must apply to this set.  Suppose that we 
examine the three pairs of alternatives, x and y, x and z, and y and z, in turn, and adopt a 
simple majority voting rule.  We will obtain an SWF in which x > y > z > x, in each case 
by a two-to-one majority.  These are referred to as cyclical majorities.  Note carefully 
that this does not say that society is indifferent between the three outcomes  which 
might be unhelpful but would not be inconsistent.  What it says is that every outcome is 
preferred to both alternatives.  Permitting intransitivity means that such instances cannot 
be excluded.  In a formal system, once you can prove a contradiction you can prove any 
statement.  So the contamination of irrationality immediately spreads beyond these three 
alternatives: every possible alternative will be preferred to every other.  This is worse 
than the violation of condition P.   
 
Can we make more progress by relaxing condition U?  Considerable research effort has 
gone into attempts to obviate the impossibility result in this direction.  For example, we 
could require the SWF only to work where preferences are single-peaked.  This would 
eliminate the possibility of patterns of preferences such as that in Table 3, since, as can be 
seen from Figure 1, below, which plots rank in the individual orderings against outcome 
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for the three sets of actors, V1, V2 and V3, the set of individuals composing V2 were 
assumed to have dual-peaked  preferences.  Since the proof depended on this pattern of 
preferences, it will not hold if such preferences are not in the domain to be considered.  
However, the resulting SWF will have nothing to say about the cases where preferences 
are not single-peaked.  Now it is well-known that the latter, far from being an exotic 
theoretical possibility, is a practical problem of pandemic proportions.  No SWF of any 
interest can simply remain silent on these cases.  One way out would be to say that 
society is indifferent between all the outcomes in a preference cycle.  This is referred to 
 
 
Figure 1  
or the three sets of agents, V1, V2 and V3 
 
      R     V1         R      V2         R     V3   
               
      1           1           1     
      2           2           2     
      3           3           3     
               
    x    y    z      x    y    z      x    y    z  
 
In the proof of the impossibility theorem, the three groups of agents were assumed to have preferences as 
shown above.  The vertical axis shows the ranking the individual ascribes to each of the three outcomes, 
x, y and z, with 1 indicating the most preferred outcome. 
 
This procedure immediately runs into two major problems: (a) it violates yet another 
assumption, condition I, and (b) by doing this we have in any case restored condition U 
and, with it, impossibility.  The point here is that it is not possible to tell whether there is 
a preference cycle without checking preferences between other alternative pairs than the 
x and y without 
also knowing that between x and z, and y and z.  The social ordering of x and y is no 
condition U could be satisfied by a rule for one set of circumstances together with a rule 
for the remaining circumstances plus a rule for deciding when to apply which rule.  That 
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is exactly the situation which now obtains.  Let us rehearse the relevant part of the proof 
 
 
Suppose that the smallest decisive set, V, has more than one member, and that it is 
decisive for x against y.  This must lead to a contradiction.  Since it consists of more than 
one member we can divide it into two parts, one, V1, consisting of one member and the 
other, V2, consisting of all the other members of V.  We also give the name V3 to the set 
of all the members of society not in V.  Condition U, unlimited domain, tells us that the 
SWF must work for any logically possible pattern of preferences.  We first of all have to 
decide whether preferences are cyclical or not and then either treat as normal or invoke 
the new transitive closure rule, as appropriate.  Suppose, as before, that the pattern of 
preferences is that for V1, x > y > z, for V2, z > x > y, and for V3, y > z > x (see Table 3).  
Clearly we do here have cyclical preferences so we invoke the revised rule and say that 
society is indifferent between x, y and z.  But this contradicts our assumption that V is 
decisive for x against y.  Hence the initial assumption, that the smallest decisive set 
contained more than one member, turns out to be contradictory.  So there is still a 
pattern of preferences for which there is a decisive individual and, therefore, also, a 
dictator.  The proof still goes through. 
 
Condition I (together with the uniqueness criterion associated with it  and with 
condition O) has, of all the five conditions, provoked the most controversy, not to say 
confusion, in the literature.  The reason is, perhaps, that, at first blush, is seems utterly 
counter-intuitive to exclude the non-uniqueness which goes with cardinal individual 
-type 
-poor 
ordinal preferences, then, surely, it should work that much better with relatively 
information-rich cardinal preferences.  Again, Borda systems, which (pace Barry and 
Hardin p219) are neither purely ordinal nor cardinal, are more information rich than 
purely ordinal systems.  It seems perverse to rule out such procedures ab initio.   
 
To take this view, however, is to lose sight of what Arrow is trying to do.  The point is to 
demonstrate the possibility or impossibility of building SWFs on the basis of purely 
ordinal individual preference orderings.  It is no good showing that such an SWF is 
possible (or at least not proven impossible) if that possibility was due entirely to leaving 
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the door open for cardinal preferences.  That would defeat the object of the exercise. The 
SWF is impounding into the social ordering some extra information  either an arbitrary 
cardinal preferences.  Either way, for the ordinalist project to succeed, such influences 
must be excluded.  Again, the Borda system allows agents to reveal not just their 
ordering of two alternatives but also some information about the intensity with which 
that preference is held.  Preferences over third, fourth, etc, alternatives are not 
some grounds  albeit inconclusive  for 
believing that the individual who ranks x and y tenth and twentieth respectively, holds his 
preference for x over y with greater intensity than another individual, who ranks them 
16th and 15th, respectively, prefers y over x.  Borda impounds this partial evidence on 
cardinal preferences.  Again, if the SWF is only possible because Borda has not been 
excluded, the ordinalist project fails.  It is therefore essential for the conditions O and I 
to be retained.  Dilution here spoils the whole point of the exercise. 
 
3.5 The libertarian response 
 
We have already seen the seriousness with which many took the Arrow results.  Plott, in 
the breadth and depth of its consequences, on his interpretation.  To understand the 
extent of the concern Arrovian impossibility has stimulated, we need to get a feel for the 
scope of the al  
 
description of the amount of each type of commodity, the amounts of various types of work 
done by each individual, the production level of each firm, the type of government 
agencies and the services provided by each, etc ... The set of feasible options could be a 
 
 
As for the processes which might exist to make choices between the alternatives society 
is faced with,  
 
any other kind of process.  There is no need, for example, for the process to be directed in 
that some judge, administrator, or planner uses the defined social ranking to determine the 
best option and then directs its implementation.  The process could be any type of game, 
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The very comprehensiveness of the Arrow results has forced some writers into a 
fundamental re-evaluation.  Plott states the case for abandoning the very notion of social 
preferences: 
 
38 would claim that the concept of social preference itself 
must go.  Buchanan (1954a, b)39 was right in his original criticism of Arrow, that the 
concept of social preference involves an illegitimate transfer of the properties of an 
individual to the properties of a collection of individuals.  For me, the Arrow theorem 
demonstrates that the concept of social preference involves the classic fallacy of 
composition, and it is shocking only because the thoughts of social philosophers from 
which we have developed our intuitions about such matters are subject to the same 
 
 
ways in which this fallacious concept of social preference continually dogs our thought 
ea of a 
 
 
concepts like social needs, group wants, etc.  These are simply expressions of priorities 
and are thus rankings of options ... Take for example the concept of economic welfare.  To 
different options one attaches a number ... indicating the level of welfare.  Certain forms of 
cost-benefit analysis are attempts to operationalise such a formula.  But indicators of social 
welfare clearly imply a ranking of social options according to the numbers which indicate 
the levels of welfare.  The ranking satisfies all of our principles of social preference, and 
thus the [Arrow] theorem stands as a criticism of any such formula.  The only admissible 
-45) 
 
per se that the impossibility 
theorem rules out, but comparisons of alternative states of economic welfare based solely 
on ordinal  
 
values
preference (in the sense of a preference on the part of society rather than a preference of 
We can 
                                               
38 The reference is to 
Journal of Mathematical Sociology 2: 181-208. 
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sugge
false; it is much worse: it is an ideology containing the seeds of dictatorship.   
 
phers have 
interpreted this antagonism to be merely a superficial appearance masking a more 
essential harmony of interest.  This general interest is then identified with the state and 
used to delude individuals into conspiring against their own freedom to pursue their 
individual interests.  On the one hand we have an identification between the idea of the 
the general interest and dictatorship.  Hence Little is able to locate Arrow in an 
intellectual tradition leading from Rousseau via Hegel to modern totalitarianism: 
 
-puzzle of how one can both be free and be 
subject to law is a variant of the pseudo-puzzle of how duty and self-interest can be 
e, plainly, conflict must arise, at 
least in the absence of complete initial consensus, and since such consensus was obviously 
absent, they invented the doctrine of a metaphysical consensus.  When people actually (ie 
really) disagreed about some matter affecting the common interest, they were really (ie 
(1950: 15)40  ses to obey the general will shall be compelled to do so by the 
here (a step which Hegel took) to maintain that acceptance of the social order (or 
obedience to the state) is really only self-
danger of this approach.  Modern totalitarian philosophy may be not altogether unjustly 
father -79) 
 
Little is far from being isolated in these views.  We have already seen how close they are 
ngless term  an illicit extension of the 
                                                                                                                                         
39
 Journal 
of Political Economy 62: 334-
Journal of Political Economy 62: 114-123. 
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concept of rationality beyond its proper domain.  While Little tars Arrow with the brush 
of totalitarianism, Barry and Hardin subject him to criticism of a severity bordering on 
the intemperate in their Introductio
(249-51).   
 
It is Little, however, who can be taken as a representative of a trend, and it will therefore 
be worth examining his views in more detail.  Later in this thesis, in the chapter on Adam 
Smith, we shall see that the stick Little uses to beat Arrow, the claim, as Pope puts it, 
Smith himself 
and his followers.   
 
3.6 Little: the argument against the existence of an SWF 
 
Perhaps the first point to make is that Barry and Hardin misunderstand the context of the 
debate.  With cardinal utility theory it was straightforward  in principle  to construct an 
SWF: just add up all the individual utilities.  With ordinal utility this was no longer 
obvious, and the next step was simply to show whether it was or was not possible to 
construct an SWF within this paradigm.  Arrow showed that it was not.  Barry and 
Hardin, Little and Plott ignore this.  Thus, for Barry and Hardin,  
 
 one at a time.  
One must know the consequences before one can say whether one finds the set acceptable 
irrelevant alternatives, and we should refuse to be bullied by a priori arguments to the 
-66) 
 
I, as I 
nda.  If we 
leave it out and we find that an SWF is not in principle impossible, but that possibility is 
in fact a consequence of the possibility of obtaining more than bare ordinal information 
about individual preferences, then we simply have not answered the question we set out 
I.  
                                                                                                                                         
40 The reference is to Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1950) The Social Contract trans GDH Cole, New York: 
EP Dutton. 
 64 
A similar argument applies to the other four axioms.  They do not need to be accepted 
 whatever that might mean  they have to be taken all together or Arrow 
 perfectly legitimate  question he has set himself.   
 
SWF: (a) as a social decision procedure (legitimate), and (b) as a judgement about social 
theorem is an objection to social decision procedures, Little complains that it is too 
extreme  viable social decision procedures can and do exist, and (b) to the extent that 
an SWF is considered as a social preference, which according to Little cannot in principle 
exist, it is, he thinks, misleading and dangerous to talk about it as though it could.   
 
nt, therefore, is to argue that a SWF, if it means anything at all about 
opinion about what is good for society, not what 
the society wants: 
 
-  should on my 
view be regarded as a social ordering only in the sense that it orders states of society ... 
Instead of writing, with Bergson, W = W(U1, ..., Un), we can write Wi = Wi(U1, ..., Un) (i 
= 1, ..., n).  There is no need ... to introduce a further (social) welfare function of the form 
W = W(W1, ..., Wn).  We can deduce the whole effective corpus of welfare economics 
from, say, W10 = W10(U1, ..., Un)  
 
 
Because each individual ordering of the social alternatives is now to have the status of a 
candidate social ordering  a possible ordering for society  Little must now address the 
issue of whether, and to what extent, the welfare of others 
ordering: 
 
according to what he himself would get ... But of course there is no need to suppose this ... 
In fact, quite generally, we may suppose that they arrange all states in order of what they 
regard as ultimate desirability, taking everything they know and feel into account ... The 
-
well-known one of disc  
 
Actually, it is completely irrelevant, in the aggregation procedure assumed by Arrow, 
purely formal procedure aggregating individual preferences without regard to their 
 65 
construction or content.  Indeed, if we look at the outcome, there is a potential 
perversity here.  Suppose there are two individuals, A and B, with their own sets of 
preferences and that the possible outcomes are points in n-dimensional space (where n is 
the number of issues), designated by a, b and s, representing the two individual interests 
and the general interest respectively.  The Arrow impossibility theorem says that no 
ordinalist procedure can guarantee to find s.  Suppose that we have a constellation of 
preferences such that an SWF is, in fact, able to find s  the theorem by no means 
prohibits this.  If A and B represent their preferences accurately the outcome is s.  If, 
however, one party, say B, instead of representing just his own preferences, puts forward 
a compromise between his own and A
between s and a.  B 
consideration, B is left worse off and, possibly, there is a loss to society as well.  On the 
other hand, if B were to misrepresent his preferences as being further away from A
in fact they are, he would be rewarded for this by drawing the social outcome further 
towards b.   
 
Little makes use of his assumption that individual orderings impound opinions about 
what is good for society, as we shall see.  He points out, quite fairly, that an Arrovian 
SWF must be a formal procedure and hence capable of being mechanised.  He asks us to 
imagine a machine into which we feed all the individual preferences which the machine 
aggregates according to the formula in order to output a social preference printed on a 
card.  This result could not, he says, consistently be accepted by anyone whose own 
ordering differed from it.  To the potential objection that the individual orderings are just 
that, individual orderings, and therefore that anyone may accept the SWF as such 
ion 
does not, however, apply in the case under consideration, because in this most general 
version it is presumed that the individual orders take the welfare of others into 
 
 
I always did this (and how could I do anything else, since, remember, we are supposing 
everything I think significant!) then I should naturally have refused to accept the condition 
of non-dictatorship.  It is in the nature of value judgements that the only order which I can 
fully accept is one that coincides with my own, regardless of the orders of other people.  In 
-  
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There are two remarks to be made about this passage.  Firstly, there is an ambiguity here 
 
 
is 
the social ordering.  This Little cannot understand, since he is unable to conceive of a 
social ordering in the first place.  The second point is that the last sentence, and, indeed 
the whole drift of the article, is that, if they are to be consistent, everyone must wish to 
be a dictator.  This merely shows that the logical consequence of consistent individualism 
is solipsism.  It is also somewhat ironic, given his remarks linking Arrow and Hegel with 
totalitarianism. 
 
Let us return to the argument about mechanising the SWF.  Little begins by citing Arrow 
ges of abstract 
postulational methods is the fact that the same system may be given different 
decision-  
 
been fed into it.  What significance can we attach to the sentence on the card, ie, to the 
-order?  First, it is clear that the sentence, although it is a sentence 
employing ethical terms, is not a value judgement.  Every value judgement must be 
 judgement of values.  If there are n people filling in cards to be fed into the 
machine, then we have n value judgements, not n + 1.  The sentence which the machine 
produces expresses a ruling, or decision, which is different in kind from what is expressed 
by the sentences fed into it.  The latter express value judgement; the former express a 
ruling between these judgements.  Thus we can legitimately call the machine, or function, 
a decision-making process. 
 
asserting, in effect, that if the machine decided in favour of x rather than in favour of y, 
then x would produce more social welfare than y or simply be more desirable than y.  This 
is clearly a value judgement, but it is, of course, a value judgement made by the person 
who calls the machine a SWF.  Thus, in general, to call the machine a SWF is to assert 
we may suppose that the individual who calls the machine a SWF is one of those who has 
fed his own value order into it.  It is clear that this person must be contradicting himself 
-order coincides with his own ordering ... In other words it is 
inconsistent both to call the machine a social welfare function and to accept the condition 
of non-  
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I have already commented on the solipsism Little expresses in the final sentence of this 
passage.  He is simply incapable of raising his eyes above the limited horizon 
anyone accepting an SWF which was not identical with his individual ordering would be 
acting inconsistently.  He is not asked to accept it instead of his individual preferences, 
merely to understand that it is what society prefers.  But what is interesting about the 
passage is the assertion, as something so obvious, once stated, that it needs no 
supporting argument, that society cannot form and hold a preference.  Little says that 
there are n preferences not n + 1.  In fact, there are n + 1 preferences, considered 
formally: n personal preferences and one social one.  The latter cannot really be 
considered as extra, however: it has more the relationship of a whole to its individual 
parts.   
 
What is interesting here is the privileging of the level of the individual person and the 
denial that the society or the machine or, in general, the system, can have preferences or 
 particularly in his notorious 
 
 
 
3.7 Searle and Little 
 
In setting up his by now well-
objective is to attempt to discredit artificial intelligence (AI) theory and the 
computational theory of mind.  An AI program, for example one for reading stories in 
Chinese and answering questions about them, is a formal procedure and can be written 
down in English.  Searle, who knows no Chinese, asks us to imagine him in a sealed 
book of rules.  Chinese texts  a story and then questions about it, are passed under the 
door, although Searle has no knowledge of what they are.  He manipulates the symbols 
on the paper according to the instructions and passes the results back to the Chinese 
people on the other side of the door.  Unknown to him they are answers to the questions 
about the stories.  They are good enough to pass the Turing Test, that is, to convince his 
Chinese audience at least 50 per cent of the time that the room contains a native-
 68 
language Chinese spea  and this 
is the punch-line  even if we admit AI programs powerful enough to pass the Turing 
intelligent understand what they are doing.  
However good 
be intelligent because when we, humans, do something it means something to us  but 
when machines do exactly the same thing it means nothing to them.  The modern élan 
vital which is to distinguish, not the living, but the thinking being, is intentionality  
(Searle, 1980, 1984). 
 
Hofstadter, who, together with the philosopher Daniel Dennett, has gone to considerable 
 
 
the (incidentally) animate simulator [Searle]; rather it belongs to the system as a whole ... 
(Hofstadter and Dennett, 1982: 374-5) 
 
It would be out of place to go into more detail here on the original Chinese Room.  The 
Chinese Roo  
 
-cast in the Chinese Room format as follows.  It is 
Little, now, who is imprisoned in the room with a book of instructions and who has to 
process the characters on slips of paper which are pushed under the door.  Unknown to 
him the slips of paper are individual orderings, the book constitutes the SWF and the 
output which he pushes back under the door is the social ordering.  Now, just as Searle 
thought that no understanding was taking place as he personally did not understand any 
Chinese, Little can claim that no preferring is going on in the SWF Room, as he cannot 
perceive it.  Just as the answers Searle provides to the questions were not his answers 
are answers, let alone what they say) so the social 
preferences provided by Little are not his 
they are preferences, let alone what they say).  All Little experiences is (a) his own 
preference which has been submitted for pro
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the utter tedium of carrying out the mechanical processes dictated by the book of rules.  
The answer is the same: it is not to be expected that Little will experience himself 
preferring anything since the preference formulated in the SWF Room is not his 
preference.  The preference attaches to the whole system: all the individuals who are 
asked in some way to code their preferences, the formula for aggregating them, the room 
and its furnishings, Little (or the computer we would normally expect to do his job), and 
so on.  What is the special ingredient  
 whose absence prevents the output of the SWF Room from being a genuine 
preference?  Little does not tell us.  
 
In conclusion, therefore, we have seen that Little adopts an illicit dualism which 
privileges the level of the individual person.  His approach implies that there are two 
fundamentally diverse kinds of thing in the world: individual humans, which can prefer, 
and everything else, which cannot.  Systemists such as Hofstadter and Dennett have 
argued strongly that all sorts of systems  including genes and memes, and complexes of 
genes and memes, individual organisms and collectives of individual organisms, species 
and populations  can be sensibly thought of as having interests and hence as preferring 
one state of affairs to another.  For Little, however, the privileged status of the individual 
is simply an assumption without explanation. 
 
3.8 How serious a prob  
 
impossibility theorem by rejecting the concepts of social rationality and of a social 
welfare function.  I have also suggested that this rejection is ultimately untenable, as it 
illegitimately privileges the individual and adopts a dualistic standpoint.  We need now to 
say something about the seriousness of the challenge the impossibility theorem poses for 
the invisible hand theorem.   
 
In m
be locked into a situation where their individually rational behaviour leads to socially 
sub-optimal outcomes.  Further it shows that this occurs when there is interdependence 
but no reciprocity, when decision making is social in content but privatised in form.  
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which is guaranteed to produce an acceptable SWF, based only on ordinal individual 
preferences, for every conceivable constellation of preferences.  Is this so serious?   That 
depends on (a) whether the constellations of preferences encountered in reality are 
anything like the constellations that cause the Arrow problem, and (b) whether the 
restriction to ordinal preferences is a legitimate one.   
 
On (a), I have already explained, above, that the problem lies in non-single-peaked 
preferences, and that such preferences do occur widely in reality.  Non-single-peaked (or 
none.  Babies are indivisible, a fact that Solomon was able to use in judging a difficult 
case.  Indivisibilities are ubiquitous in a heterogeneous world.  Non-single-peaked 
preferences illustrated in Table 3 and Figure 1, above or in the example below.  Think of 
them as parties or candidates standing for election.  Voting would produce a two-to-one 
majority for x over y, for y over z and for z over x.  Majority voting cannot produce a 
much paradoxical about it.  All it says is that if people have different preferences, they 
may not be able to agree.  Indeed, one can imagine a simpler case: two agents, A and B 
have preferences over two alternatives regarding a £20 note, (i) that A has the £20, and 
(ii) that B has it.  Again, they will not agree.  Nothing very profound seems to be going 
on here.  The paradox of voting, and hence the Arrow theorem, which incorporates it, 
only illustrates the problems that arise when agents have conflicting interests; the bite in 
and converging 
interests.   
 
On (b), the seriousness of the challenge posed depends on how strictly neoclassical one 
is.  The neoclassical paradigm depends upon the assumption of ordinal and 
interpersonally non-comparable preferences.  Whether it is right to do so is debatable and 
has inspired a huge literature, and it would be inappropriate to take up this very 
controversial issue here. I will simply note that we do actually make interpersonal 
comparisons so frequently and unselfconsciously as to invite the speculation that the 
brain contains special organs for that very purpose.  If I bang my finger with a hammer, 
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and you lose your leg in a road traffic accident, few would hesitate to say who was likely 
to be worse off, or who had suffered the larger decrement in happiness.  But for those 
neoclassicals also committed to the ordinalist paradigm, as in fact most are, the Arrow 
result is indeed a problem. 
 
says that in any consistent formal system (of at least the level of complexity of 
arithmetic) there must be true statements whose truth cannot be proven within the 
system, that is, it cannot be both complete and consistent.  The SWF is a formal system 
and must at the very least impound arithmetic  how else is it to aggregate preferences? 
 
condition U) and consistent (condition O) while at the same time satisfying the other 
three conditions (P, I, D). 
 
Gödel proceeds by formulating a statement in a formal language, say, PC (for predicate 
to prove the statement without proving a contradiction  for if one proved that it was not 
provable, by proving it one would have proved that it was provable.  Hence a statement 
and its negation would both be true and PC would be inconsistent.  Hence it is the case 
that it is unprovable; but that is just what it asserts, so it is also true.   
 
So Gödel works by setting up a formal system and then importing a paradox, namely, a 
setting up a formal system and importing a paradox: the paradox of voting.  The paradox 
of voting, as we have seen, says that if three voters hold the preference orderings  
 
A: x > y > z 
B: y > z > x 
C: z > x > y 
 
then majority voting on each pair yields the binary social preference rankings 
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S: x > y,  y > z,  and z > x,  in each case by a majority of 2 to 1. 
 
Hence, for society, every option is preferred to every other option: the social ranking is 
intransitive (and hence not an ordering). 
 
In the Arrow proof, A, B and C are, respectively, one member of the smallest decisive 
set, the complement of the smallest decisive set, and the smallest decisive set minus one 
person, A.  The decisive set referred to is decisive for x against y.  The pattern of choices 
set out above is then deployed to show that wherever z is placed on the social preference 
ranking, this must imply that either A or C is decisive, contradicting the assumption that 
they were both smaller than the smallest decisive set.  This result is then used to show 
that if all five conditions are satisfied simultaneously, the system is inconsistent.   
 
Completeness in the Gödel context means that all and only the true statements are 
provable.  Completeness in the Arrow context means that for every possible pattern of 
preferences there is a unique social ordering.  Incompleteness is shown in Gödel by 
-defeating statement: if it can be proved (ie, if the system 
is complete) then the system must be inconsistent.  Incompleteness is shown in Arrow by 
-defeating pattern of preferences: if an SWF is derived 
from it the system is inconsistent. 
 
It has been suggested that the Arrow impossibility theorem presents as much a problem 
for proponents of planning as for those of laissez-faire
41
.  This is false, even apart from 
the cardinal-ordinal issue mentioned above
42
intellect standing outside the formal system in question can detect the truth status of the 
that the formal system is incomplete.  Further, we can see how to make it more complete 
by incorporating true but unprovable statements into the system as axioms, thereby 
expanding the system.  Similarly, as we encounter paradoxical preference constellations, 
we can expand the preference aggregating procedure to encompass them by identifying 
                                               
41 In correspondence in response to an earlier version of this chapter. 
42
 
-personal 
comparisons, if the second half of the slogan is to mean anything. 
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cyclical preferences, taking their transitive closure and impounding the result as a new 
axiom of the aggregating procedure.  This, to be sure, will still leave the aggregation 
procedure vulnerable to further paradoxical preference constellations, but as soon as one 
is encountered it can be treated in the same way.  If the number of policy options is finite 
then eventually all comparisons will have been made and we will have a complete social 
welfare ordering.  Otherwise, the result is an infinite regress with each obstacle being 
overcome, only to give way  potentially, at least  to a new one.  It is, perhaps, in the 
nature of things that we can get there, not all in one go, but only as an unending series of 
approximations.   
 
3.9 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have argued that Arrovian 
sciences to argue that we should abandon the concept of collective rationality itself.  
Micro-level rationality is all that we can ask for.  The policy prescription, therefore 
consists of maximum freedom for individuals to maximise their individual utilities, 
coupled with passive acceptance of whatever emerges at the macro level.  As Barry and 
critique of the idea of a SWF, these writers accuse Arrow, and hence, implicitly, 
mainstream neoclassical economics, of standing in a tradition leading from Rousseau and 
Hegel to modern totalitarianism.   
 
lity in principle 
designed to show the impossibility in principle of artificial intelligence.  Both arguments 
fail for the same reason: they involve a dualistic vision of the world in which individual 
humans are set apart from the rest of nature by some innate quality  such as 
 the absence of which is supposed to prevent systems other than 
individual humans from being conscious or forming purposes. 
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Fi
still an important challenge for the neoclassical paradigm, the Arrovian theorem is of less 
the Arrow 
combination of conflict and convergence of agent interests.  
 75 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 The Invisible Hand of God in Adam Smith
43
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The two previous chapters have looked at the mid- and late-twentieth century response 
of political economy to two perceived anomalies which have been seen as challenges to 
In the present chapter attention returns to the roots of this tradition in the writings of the 
eighteenth century father of nineteenth and twentieth century economics: Adam Smith. 
 
Adam Smith has been lauded by the economists  both orthodox and heterodox  of the 
last 
surrounds Smith, endowing his name with an authority not enjoyed by any other worldly 
example
Fischer and Dornbusch (1991: 9, 50, 260), and in the 1996 Nobel Prize Lecture 
(Mirrlees, 1997: 1311).  On the heterodox side, it is well known that Marx, for example, 
ghly, 
501).  I want to argue here, however, that there is a very significant apologetic
44
 aspect 
                                               
43 An earlier version of this chapter, and material derived from it have appeared as Denis (1997, 1999a, 
and 2000).  The chapter as a whole is at point of writing under consideration at Research in the History 
of Economic Thought and Methodology.   
44
 The question of what it is that is to be defended, or apologised for, is a subsidiary theme of the 
chapter.  Essentially, Smith is trying to defend two potentially incompatible things: the existing system 
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to Smith, which has as yet received little attention, and, further, that this apologetic 
and macro levels, between individual actions and social consequences. 
 
 the ease 
with which Smith satisfies himself that we are living in the best of all possible worlds  
and just as easy to dismiss such passages as obiter dicta unrelated to his basic theme.  
Here, for example, is a famous passage, the second, in fact, of the three occasions on 
given in full: 
 
necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal 
portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, 
advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species.  
When providence divided the earth among a few lordly masters, it neither forgot nor 
abandoned those who seemed to have been left out in the partition.  These last too enjoy 
their share of all that it produces.  In what constitutes the real happiness of human life, 
they are in no respect inferior to those who would seem so much above them.  In ease of 
body and peace of mind, all the different ranks of life are nearly upon a level, and the 
beggar, who suns himself by the side of the highway, possesses that security which kings 
are fighting f TMS IV.1.10) 
 
So the poor should be content with their lot  they are just as well off as the rich in the 
things that really matter.  Perhaps the typical reaction on reading this is to dismiss it as a 
vulgar aside, a mere personal prejudice, having 
researches.  This, however, would be profoundly mistaken.  The thesis of this chapter is 
an be understood as aiming, not so much at 
discovery of the world, but at reconciliation with it  indeed, he plainly says as much  
 
 
 in particular The History of 
Astronomy, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, and, to a lesser extent, The Wealth of 
Nations  that this was indeed his approach.  The next section constitutes a 
bibliographical preamble discussing the relationship of each of these three works to 
Weltanschauung.  Then a section on The History of Astronomy argues 
that in his major methodological work Smith presents a view of science as an activity 
aimed, in the first instance, at reconciling us with the world, rather than at theoretically 
 of the world as a 
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harmonious machine operated by a utilitarian deity.  This conception first arises and is 
presented with great clarity in The Theory of Moral Sentiments; it is then applied to, or 
rather, simply imposed upon, the social world in The Wealth of Nations.  A subsequent 
section establishes the links between Smith and his contemporaries, showing how 
profoundly in tune he was with the Zeitgeist of the second half of the eighteenth century. 
The section also discusses his failure to deal with some critical contradictions in his 
system. The conclusion notes two possible responses to Smith: that an evolutionary 
mechanism can replace a utilitarian deity as a mechanism ensuring that macro optimality 
corresponds to micro rationality; and, alternatively, the recognition that there is no such 
automatic mechanism behoves us to construct one ourselves. 
 
A preliminary caveat is in order.  My purpose is not to deny the enormous contribution 
which Smith has made to the development of economics.  That would be absurd.  A full 
account of Smith would present those contributions alongside what (as I argue in this 
circumscribed; namely, to trace one particular feature, albeit a key feature, 
thought.  The object is to show how Smith believed that the hand of God would invisibly, 
TMS I.ii.3.4), ensure that uncoordinated 
(TMS VI.ii.3.1), and to show how this belief is related to his philosophy as a whole. 
 
4.2 Bibliographical note 
 
I shall be referring to the two works which Adam Smith published in his lifetime, the 
Wealth of Nations and the Theories of Moral Sentiments  hereafter referred to as WN 
and TMS, and one posthumous work, known, misleadingly, as the History of Astronomy, 
and referred to here as Astronomy.  The edition of these works that I will refer to is that 
contained in Adam Smith (1976-1980) The Glasgow Edition of the Works and 
Correspondence of Adam Smith Oxford: Clarendon Press/OUP (reprinted (1981-82) 
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund).  The relevant volumes of the Works are:  
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 Volume I (1976) The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed AL Macfie and DD 
Raphael
45
 (hereafter TMS); 
 
 Volume II (itself in two volumes) (1976) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes 
of the Wealth of Nations, ed RH Campbell, AS Skinner and WB Todd (WN); 
 
 Volume III (1980) Essays on Philosophical Subjects, ed WPD Wightman and JC 
Bryce (EPS).  This volume includes the Astronomy, the 
 (1756), and a number of other miscellaneous items by, and about, Adam 
Smith.   
 
This Works is regarded as the definitive edition: enormous scholarly efforts have been 
work in its most mature and finished form, with variations reported in footnotes and 
appropriate, to the Part, Section, Chapter, subsection and paragraph to preserve 
consistency with other editions.  Editorial introductions are listed separately in the 
bibliography to this thesis and referred to as such for the sake of clarity.   
 
Adam Smith (1723-1790) published two books in his lifetime.  His first, TMS, first 
published in 1759, was also his last: the 6th edition in 1790 contained extensive revisions 
and additions worked up by Smith in the last year of his life.  WN was first published in 
1776; the 5th edition appeared in 1789 and a 6th, posthumous, edition in 1791.  The 
History of Astronomy is a fragment of an uncompleted larger work entitled The 
Principles which Lead and Direct Philosophical Enquiries; Illustrated by the History of 
Astronomy, by the History of the Ancient Physics, and by the History of the Ancient 
Logics and Metaphysics.  The fragments come to just under 100 pages, most of which 
consists of the part on the History of Astronomy, giving the whole its conventional name.  
Astronomy was first published in 1795 in a posthumous volume entitled Essays on 
                                               
45 The editors themselves sometimes seem a little hazy as to who exactly the editors of the individual 
volumes are, and what their order of priority should be.  According to TMS: ii, 
page of EPS  the 
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Philosophical Subjects edited by Joseph Black and James Hutton.  It was written at 
various times, but textual analysis reveals that even the later parts were written before 
1758, and most likely the main part was drafted in the late 1740s (Wightman, 1980: 7-8).  
This makes it nearly contemporaneous with the composition of TMS (1st edition, 1759).  
Shortly before he died, Smith had the bulk of his papers burnt (EPS: 327n), only passing 
a few to his literary executors for them to make up their own minds on the question of 
possible publication.  In an earlier (1773) letter to Hume, Smith specifically singled out 
Astronomy as being possibly worth publishing (Wightman, 1980: 27; EPS: 328n). 
 
The point here is to establish that the three works referred to can be viewed as the 
products of a unified system not as disparate milestones on an intellectual career 
culminating in WN  in which TMS and Astronomy have interest only as stages in 
Smith
stance I am arguing against here: TMS, he says, 
On the 
contrary: Astronomy and TMS are products of the same period and the same system of 
thought; the changes in TMS between the first and sixth editions are such only as to 
clarify and give more substance to this basic system; and the system remained unchanged 
in its basic outlines after five editions of the WN.    
 
- -problem based on ignorance and 
misunderstanding.  Anybody who reads TMS, first in one of the earlier editions and then 
in edition 6, will not have the slightest inclination to be puzzled that the same man wrote 
this book and WN, or to suppose that he underwent any radical change of view about 
in edition 6 of 1790 as in edition 1 of 1759 .... It is also perfectly obvious that TMS is not 
isolated from WN  
 
Indeed, Viner (1958: 215), contradicting his main thesis of irreconcilability between WN 
and TMS, notes that Smith was a
essence of his fully developed doctrine, as expounded in the Wealth of Nations
lecture of 1749, at the same time that he was writing the Astronomy, and long before 
publication of TMS.  Contrary to the view which sees major discontinuities between 
TMS and WN
system of thought as a unity, rather than a process.  It is that unity which we are to 
investigate here, and the question to be addressed is: How are micro and macro levels 
articulated in Smith, how does the invisible hand actually work? 
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4.3  
 
economics sought to capture the essence of the scientific method in order to employ it in 
the sphere of economic research .... For Smith, the essence of science was the evocation of 
order, wonder46 
(Mirowski, 1989: 198) 
 
The Principles which Lead and Direct 
Philosophical Enquiries; Illustrated by the History of Astronomy; by the History of the 
Ancient Physics; and by the History of the Ancient Logics and Metaphysics. The full 
47
.  
As far as Smith is concerned in his discussion of successive schools of thought in these 
Histories, the purpose of a system of thought is not so much to disclose the truth of how 
the world is, but, principally, to soothe the imagination which had previously been 
agitated by wonder at the marvels of the world
48
.   
 
. measures the value of philosophical systems solely in relation to their 
Scottish Philosophy and British Physics, 1750-1880 
p 123, cited in Raphael and Skinner, 1980: 12) 
 
                                               
46 
for Smith, wonder was a dis-ease of the imagination, caused by the incoherent appearances of nature, the 
purpose of  
47 
used almost 
 
48 As we shall see in the next section, Smith held a harmonious view of nature.  He would have denied 
that that there was any inconsistency between investigating the world and accepting it: investigation 
would simply reveal harmony.  The confidence that reason would confirm the prior wisdom of religion 
and sentiment permitted Smith, like many philosophers and scientists of the period, from Newton to 
Hegel, to make genuine discoveries.  This ambivalence as to the status of reason leads to a fundamental 
-
168).  I submit, nevertheless, that reading works such as the Astronomy allows us to see that it was 
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At the level of appearances, Smith says, the world throws up phenomena which appear 
incoherent and therefore inflame the imagination.  This inflammation is to be regarded as 
nter anything that is nor familiar or 
expected, Smith argues, we are struck by the feelings we call Surprise and Wonder.  
soothe the imagination by suggesting connections between things, and by tracing the 
unknown back to the familiar, so that the observer may regain his tranquillity: 
 
abound with events which appear solitary and incoherent ... which therefore disturb the 
easy movement of the imagination .... Philosophy, by representing the invisible chains 
which bind together all these disjointed objects, endeavours to introduce order into this 
chaos of jarring and discordant appearances, to allay this tumult of the imagination, and to 
restore it ... to [its former] tone of tranquillity and composure ... Philosophy, therefore, 
(Astronomy II.12) 
 
Or, more pi
Astronomy IV.34).  We 
categorizing things we 
come to be 
 
 
For Smith, therefore, it is just irrelevant to talk about the truth or otherwise of the 
findings of a science  what matters is its success 
which we should bear in mind when considering the sequence of schools of thought in a 
science such as astronomy: 
 
 examine, therefore, all the different systems of nature, which ... have successively 
been adopted by the learned and ingenious; and, without regarding their absurdity or 
probability, their agreement or inconsistency with truth and reality, let us consider them 
only in that particular point of view which belongs to our subject; and content ourselves 
with inquiring how far each of them was fitted to sooth the imagination, and to render the 
ded) 
 
system as if it embodied real knowledge of the world: 
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ave been endeavouring to represent all philosophical systems as mere 
inventions of the imagination, to connect together the otherwise disjointed and discordant 
phaenomena of nature, have insensibly been drawn in, to make use of language expressing 
the conn
(Astronomy IV.76) 
 
ion is, as Raphael 
and Skinner (1980: 19-21) point out, that it would be mistaken, or at best off the point, 
 
 
him, science 
starts off, as indeed all science must, with the level of appearances: but then, instead of 
penetrating those appearances to reality, the truth, to the essence of the thing, science 
remains at the level of appearances, merely contrasting one set of appearances with 
another.  In place of a congeries of apparently incoherent, isolated phenomena, Smithian 
science gives us a coherent and interconnected vision of the world
49
.  But, for Smith, that 
vision is no more real, no less apparent than either the raw appearances or the connecting 
principles proposed by rival explanations.  The criterion for choosing between these 
appearances is not their greater or lesser degree of truth, but a purely aesthetic 
consideration: which is the more pleasing?  Thus a scientific explanation of a 
phenomenon is to be preferred to none, and a later system is preferred to an earlier one, 
because and to the extent to which they are able to provoke greater admiration 
(Astronomy II.12).  Though much to be preferred to the earlier systems, there is no 
suggestion  the  idea is without interest to Smith  that the Newtonian system is more 
profound, indeed, it may well be replaced when an even more pleasing system is 
gin, up to that summit of 
perfection to which it is at present supposed to have arrived [with Newton], and to 
(ibid).  In every period, Smith says, science is believed 
most pleasing.  Whether there is any progress in this is left moot. 
 
                                               
49 Doing so is already a step towards penetrating appearances to the reality hidden behind them, but we 
th the discoveries he made despite them. 
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It has been suggested
50
 that Smith denies that there is any such thing as the truth, an 
objective reality to the world apart from the models and images of it which we construct.  
This in turn, it is argued, is a very modern view of the world, popular, for example 
among some twentieth century physicists.  His disdain for the truth has also been linked 
51
.  For 
Smith, there is indeed objective truth, but human, finite minds cannot grasp, or even 
approach it: only the infinite mind of God can 
infinite, between the human and the divine.  This was a very common medieval view of 
the nature of infinity; see Rucker (1995: 4), for example, for a discussion of this point in 
Thomas Aquinas.  This contrast will be touched on in the discussion of TMS below; 
indeed, it forms the basis for the very restricted role of reason and philosophy (the sphere 
of finitude), relative to that o
system.   
 
his thought: 
 
that they 
have invented science fiction  or any other sort of fiction.  But he does contrast an 
invention by the imagination with a discovery of the truth, and so he implies that scientific 
 
 
Raphael and Skinner make two claims here: (a) that Smith implies that scientific theory 
cannot be true, and (b) that Smith does not say that scientists are writing science fiction.  
In my opinion these two claims are incompatible  
then it must, surely, be fiction.  But aside from that, the second claim is actually false.  
52
  and he meant no sneer by this, for he 
admired Descartes greatly
53
: 
                                               
50 By various correspondents in response to earlier versions of this chapter. 
51 
invisible hand theory, Macfie (1967
scepticism as to the validity of the doctrines of that faith. 
52 In a similar vein, David 
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contain a word of truth ... should nevertheless have been so universally received by all the 
learned in Europe 
greedily receive a work which we justly esteem one of the most entertaining romances that 
Lectures in Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1748-1750), 
cited in editorial footnote 3, EPS: 244) 
 
Again, later, in his  (1756: §5), he says of the Cartesian 
and 
conclusions, it had the same superiority over the Peripatetic system, [as] the Newtonian 
EPS p244, emphasis added). 
 
Smith regarded the narrative as the appropriate focus for the attention of an 
investigating philosopher.  Although completely untrue, a romance, the principles and 
 as as much an improvement over 
cuous 
pretended causes of those wonderful effects, not only do not actually exist, but are 
utterly impossible, and if they did exist, could produce no such effects as are ascribed to 
TMS VII.ii.4.14). 
 
Contra 
producing, but science fiction with a particular slant, science fiction with the purpose of 
soothing the imagination and reconciling us to the world about us.  As Mirowski points 
out, the primary function of science for Smith is the evocation of order. 
 
links between his methodology and his underlying intellectual goals.  The purpose of 
redundant, and, in particular, that Sm -economic writings can tell us nothing 
                                                                                                                                         
1970: 31) 
53 See 
adequate credit as the prime suspect in the smuggling of Cartesian economics into the backyard of 
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writings on methodology set out a research programme which Smith then followed in his 
psychological (TMS) and economic (WN) 
the essay on the history of astronomy with a theory of scientific systems is himself 
 
 
4.4 Weltanschauung 
 
4.4.1 All is for the best in this world and we should accept our lot with joy 
 
54
; the 
points where Smith does, and does not, agree with the Stoics, are not, however, germane 
to the theme presented here
55
.  Smith believes that the universe, or Nature, is an 
enormous, sophisticated and subtle machine.  This machine is supervised by an 
omnipotent, omniscient and beneficent, indeed, a utilitarian
56
, deity.  The sole aim of the 
machine (and, probably, of the deity himself, see TMS VII.ii.3.18), is the maximisation 
of happiness: 
 
immediate care and protection of that great, benevolent, and all-wise being, who directs all 
the movements of nature; and who is determined, by his own unalterable perfections, to 
TMS VI.ii.3.1)  
                                                                                                                                         
 
54 This assertion has been questioned by some correspondents; nevertheless, I think it clear that Stoicism 
luence 
-6).  The argument is also set out in Clarke 
(1996, 1998).  In any case, acceptance of this point is not a precondition for understanding or accepting 
the argument presented in the remainder of the present chapter. 
55 See Macfie (1959: 225) for some of the ways Smith modifies Stoic doctrine. 
56 Smith himself is certainly not a utilitarian.  That would require him to hold a consequentialist view of 
morality rather than the deontological view he actually does hold.   See Sen and Williams (1982: 3-4) 
for the argument that utilitarianism lies at the intersection of welfarism and consequentialism.  It would 
also require him to believe, what he does not believe, that it is possible for human actions and 
institutions to increase the total quantity of happiness in the world.  The deity, however, is another 
matter.  For more on the relation between Smith a
Theory of Economic Policy (Macfie, 1967: 152-161). 
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 eternity, contrived and 
conducted the immense machine of the universe, so as at all times to produce the greatest 
TMS VI.ii.3.5) 
 
So the world is perfect: we do  Smith is a true 
Panglossian.  Since the world is really perfect, our apparent troubles stem from our finite, 
partial view of the world.  The purpose of philosophy, therefore, is to cultivate a fine 
indifference to whatever occurs: 
 
mes willing that his own private interest should be 
sacrificed to the public interest of his own particular order or society.  He is at all times 
willing, too, that the interest of this order or society should be sacrificed to the greater 
interest of the state or sovereignty, of which it is only a subordinate part.  He should, 
therefore, be equally willing that all those inferior interests should be sacrificed to the 
greater interest of the universe, to the interest of that great society of all sensible and 
intelligent beings, of which God himself is the immediate administrator and director .... 
[Since the] benevolent and all-wise Being can admit into the system of his government, no 
partial evil which is not necessary for the universal good, he [sc the wise and virtuous 
man] must consider all the misfortunes which may befal himself, his friends, his society, 
or his country, as necessary for the prosperity of the universe, and therefore as what he 
ought, not only to submit to with resignation, but as what he himself, if he had known all 
the connexions and dependencies of things, ought sincerely and devoutly to have wished 
TMS VI.ii.3.3) 
 
Smith sustains this theme by making use of the analogy of soldiers marching cheerfully 
off to be slaughtered in defe  
 
No conductor of an army can deserve more unlimited trust, more ardent and zealous 
affection, than the great Conductor of the universe.  In the greatest public as well as 
private disasters, a wise man ought to consider that he himself, his friends and 
countrymen, have only been ordered upon the forlorn station of the universe; that had it 
not been necessary for the good of the whole, they would not have been so ordered; and 
that it is their duty, not only with humble resignation to submit to this allotment, but to 
 
 
The message is clear: what is good is good and what is bad is good as well; everything is 
for the best, so  whatever  happens  rejoice, and accept.  Lest the reader should be 
passed by the time he came to write WN, I should point out that, though similar ideas 
can be found in the earlier editions, these passages themselves are taken from Part VI, a 
new section written by Smith, in the last year of his life, for the 1790 edition. 
 
Smith has another tactic for convincing us that all is for the best.  His first move is to say 
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introduce an afterlife to balance the books.  All our virtue and vice will be appropriately 
rewarded, if not here, then hereafter: 
 
expectation of a life to come: a hope and expectation deeply rooted in human nature .... 
TMS 
that it [sc injustice] will be punished, even in a life to come.  Our sense of its ill desert 
pursues it ... even beyond the grave .... The justice of God, however, we think, still 
requires, that he should hereafter avenge the injuries of the widow and the fatherless, who 
are here so TMS II.ii.3.12) 
 
Smith combines the idea of justice in the hereafter with that of the limits to reason and 
the scope for religion and sentiment, which we will examine in more detail below.  To 
those such as the wrongly condemned man, Smith says, 
 
consolation .... Religion can alone afford them any effectual comfort.  She alone can tell 
them, that it is of little importance what man may think of their conduct, while the all-
seeing Judge of the world approves of it.  She alone can present to them the view of 
another world ... where their innocence is in due time to be declared, and their virtue to be 
TMS III.2.12). 
 
Indeed, we are not only led to a belief in a life after death by our religious sentiments, but 
by an intellectual consideration of the idea of justice, itself: 
 
injustice, we naturally appeal to heaven, and hope, that the great Author of our nature will 
himself execute hereafter, what all the principles which he has given us for the direction of 
our conduct, prompt us to attempt even here; that he will complete the plan which he 
himself has thus taught us to begin; and will, in a life to come, render to everyone 
according to the works which he has performed in this world.  And thus we are led to the 
belief of a future state, not only by the weakness, by the hopes and fears of human nature, 
but by the noblest and best principles which belong to it, by the love of virtue, and by the 
TMS III.5.10) 
 
4.4.2 Why, then, bother with considerations of morality? 
 
The idea that things seem good or bad to us only because of our limited perspective, and 
everything is good, is extremely important in Smith.  However, it does raise the question 
of why we should then be concerned as to the moral qualities of our behaviour.  The 
argument proceeds in three steps.  Firstly, in answer to the question, Why do we approve 
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of moral actions and disapprove of immoral actions?, Smith says that our moral response 
to an action is a sentimental reaction, that is, it is produced by our instinctive feelings, in 
particular, the emotion of sympathy.  By sympathy we enter, to a limited degree, into the 
feelings of those affected by the action in question, the victims or beneficiaries: 
 
e of the merit of good actions is founded upon a sympathy with the gratitude of 
the persons who receive the benefit of them ... Gratitude and resentment ... are ... 
counterparts to one another; and if our sense of merit arises from a sympathy with the one, 
our sense of demerit [must] ... proceed from a fellow- TMS 
II.i.5.7) 
 
These emotions are placed within us by the deity as part of the grand design.  Our 
instinctive response to murder, for example, is directly implanted in us by a Nature seen 
as an active and conscious principle in the world: 
 
human heart ... an immediate and instinctive approbation of the sacred and necessary law 
of retaliat TMS 
TMS II.ii.1.10) 
 
Secondly, however, Smith tells us that the wise man will recognise that whatever happens 
to him is for the best, and that however unpleasant it appears, that is only because we as 
limited beings do not see the distant, but only the proximate, consequences and 
ramifications of actions.  Hence, morality is based only on a consideration of the 
proximate consequences of the action whose morality we are to appraise.  If the first 
round effects are unjustly detrimental to some person or group, the subsequent 
ramifications will prove beneficial to themselves or others to a degree that more than 
counterbalances the evil done at first.  Nevertheless, our appraisal of the morality of the 
 
 
y the all-ruling providence of a wise, powerful and good 
God, every single event ought to be regarded, as making a necessary part of the plan of the 
universe, and as tending to promote the general order and happiness of the whole: that the 
vices and follies of mankind, therefore, made as necessary a part of this plan as their 
wisdom or their virtue; and by that eternal art which educes good from ill, were made to 
tend equally to the prosperity and perfection of the great system of nature.  No speculation 
of this kind, however, how deeply soever it might be rooted in the mind, could diminish 
our natural abhorrence for vice, whose immediate effects are so destructive, and whose 
TMS I.ii.3.4) 
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Thus Smith argues that our abhorrence of vice is due to our failure to follow through all 
the ramifications of an immoral act.  If we were to do so, he implies, we would accept 
vice with equanimity as generating remote positive effects which at least outweigh the 
emotional instincts.   
 
The third step is thus to find a way to endorse the morality of a moral action.  Why 
should we bother to make the distinction between moral and immoral actions if their 
effects are the same?  Smith has no clear answer to this; he does, however, have two 
unclear answers.  The first approach is to duck the issue and say that this is a positive, 
not a normative science, that is moral which is considered moral: 
 
at present examining upon what principles a perfect being would approve of the 
punishment of bad actions; but upon what principles so weak and imperfect a creature as 
TMS II.i.5.10) 
 
Essentially, what distinguishes the moral from the immoral here is an aesthetic matter: it 
is a question of what feels better, even though reason can make no distinction.  Perhaps 
Smith says more than he intends to here for there is a clear logical implication in the 
contrast he employs: although we, imperfect creatures, may regard this action as moral 
and that as immoral, a perfect being, conscious of all their most distant consequences, 
would see matters in quite another light and, presumably, would not make this 
distinction.  That Smith could not accept this implication is shown by his alternative 
response.  For the second approach is, precisely, to argue that by acting morally we place 
ourselves on the same side, as it were, as the deity: 
 
effectual means for promoting the happiness of mankind, and may therefore be said, in 
some sense, to co-operate with the Deity, and to advance, as far as in our power, the plan 
of Providence.  By acting otherways, on the contrary, we seem to obstruct, in some 
measure, the scheme which the Author of nature has established for the happiness and 
perfection 
(TMS III.5.7) 
 
True, this is not very logical, for it evades the question, how we could conceivably 
displease a god by our choice of action, given that, according to Smith, he is in a position 
to dictate exactly the mixture of feelings, the strengths and weaknesses and so on, 
making up each personality, and hence the behaviour to which each person will be led.  
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Again, it seems inconsistent to speak of more and less effectual means for promoting the 
happiness of humanity when God has already determined to maximise the quantity of 
happiness in the world; the means chosen are presumably those chosen by him, and hence 
rsement of morality is 
sentimental, based on its feeling of rightness, and revealed divine sanction, without 
rational justification.  Morality and virtue are essentially ornaments, having no rational 
great ornaments of humanity, and 
which seem to raise it to a resemblance of divine perfection, [are] the love of virtue and 
TMS III.5.4). 
 
In spite of his harmonious view of nature, Smith senses that there is a tension between 
reason and sentiment, between the logic of his position and his religious feelings.  Does 
side of sentiment: 
 
which they tend to produce; that he loves the one, only because it promotes the happiness 
of society, which his benevolence prompts him to desire; and that he hates the other, only 
because it occasions the misery of mankind, which the same divine quality renders the 
object of his aversion; is not the doctrine of nature, but of an artificial ... refinement of 
philosophy.  All our natural sentiments prompt us to believe, that as perfect virtue is 
supposed necessarily to appear to the Deity, as it does to us, for its own sake, and without 
further view, the natural and proper object of love and reward, so must vice, of hatred and 
TMS II.ii.3.13, editions 1-5, omitted in 6.) 
 
Smith cannot logically say that virtue is preferable to vice because it leads to the 
happiness of society
57
, as this would be inconsistent with his claim that God has in any 
case arranged everything to maximise happiness in the world at every instant.  But it is 
equally quite illogical for him to say that virtue appears to God as it does to us  for the 
only reason it appears thus to us, according to Smith, is that that is how God has made 
us, in order that we may play our predestined part in the great plan.  But there is no 
supposed to play a subordinate part in.   
 
*     *     * 
 
                                               
57 
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To conclude, the message of the present subsection is that, for Smith, morality has an 
aesthetic basis.  For example, Smith lists as one of the four sources of approbation, that  
 
to promote the happiness either of the individual or of the society, they appear to derive a 
beauty from this utility, not unlike that which we ascribe to any well-
(TMS VII.iii.3.16) 
 
Macfie is at pains to point out that beauty is more important to Smith than usefulness, 
indeed, utility seems only to be considered to the extent that it, itself, entails beauty.  In 
Smith, Macfie says, 
 
pleasant.  Here, indeed, Smith is consistent and specific.  I
that he constantly returns  -
  So what is valuable from the point of view of 
references to Smith are from TMS VII.iii.1.2) 
 
beauty that has final value, utility instrumental value (apart from its own inherent beauty 
 
 
4.4.3 Every cloud has a silver lining 
 
I said in the previous subsection that, according to Smith, God was in a position to 
choose the mental composition of individual persons, and hence to lead them to desirable 
behaviours.  We now need further to investigate this t
TMS VI.ii.2.4). 
 
This is important for a number of reasons.  Firstly, I need to justify this claim of 
Panglossian view that everything is predetermined by the deity, predestined to turn out 
for the best.  And, thirdly, because, again, these arguments further illust
                                                                                                                                         
subsection of this Chapter, and TMS II.ii.3.1ff. 
 92 
mentioned before, that if we are misled by appearances, then this deception, too, is part 
of the plan and hence a Good Thing.  
 
A major instance concerns the predisposition to benevolence and the very much stronger 
one, not just to obey, TMS II.ii.2.3), which 
God has placed in our personal make-
(TMS 
to that s TMS II.ii.3.1).  While it would be nice if 
without society-
different men, as among different merchants, from a sense of its utility, without any 
TMS 
II.ii.3.2-3). 
 
Nature has therefore endowed men with consciences in order that they may behave 
justly: 
 
consciousness of deserved reward, she has not thought it necessary to guard and enforce 
the practice of it by the terrors of merited punishment in case it should be neglected.  It is 
the ornament which embellishes, not the foundation which supports the building, and 
which it was, therefore, sufficient to recommend, but by no means necessary to impose.  
Justice, on the contrary, is the main pillar that upholds the whole edifice.  If it is removed, 
the great, the immense fabric of human society, that fabric which to raise and support 
seems in this world ... to have been the peculiar and darling care of Nature, must in a 
moment crumble into atoms.  In order to enforce the observation of justice, therefore, 
Nature has implanted in the human breast that consciousness of ill-desert, those terrors of 
merited punishment which attend upon its violation, as the great safe-guards of the 
association of mankind, to protect t
(TMS II.ii.3.4) 
 
It is clear that Smith is saying here that Nature, in order to preserve society, has placed in 
our personalities a desire for justice, even if it is unclear whether this is based on a love 
of justice for its own sake, or a fear of retribution.  A sense of justice is an endowment of 
nature, but nature seen as an active force in the world, conscious and intentional.  
Speaking of TMS, Heilbroner says 
 
assume human nature to contain such a saving element.  The imperatives of duty and the 
voice of conscience must be there from the start, available to us in critical situations.  They 
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must be part of the human makeup, placed there by the Deity that has arranged for our 
collective well-  
 
order is in reality of more 
basic importance to him.  Speaking of the tendency fo
 
 
  
It checks the spirit of innovation.  It tends to preserve whatever is the established balance 
among the different orders and societies into which the state is divided; and while it 
sometimes appears to obstruct some alterations in government which may be fashionable 
and popular at the time, it contributes in reality to the stability and permanency of the 
TMS VI.ii.2.10) 
 
The assumption is that what is, is likely to be best, and should in general be preserved, 
even at the expense of justice.  Having said that, however, we should note that, for 
Smith, just as there can be no profound antagonism between investigation and 
reconciliation, there cannot be any serious conflict between order and justice.  Indeed, 
everyone always gets their just deserts in the end:   
 
every virtue naturally meets with its proper reward, with the recompense which is most fit 
to encourage and promote it; and this too so surely, that it requires a very extraordinary 
TMS III.5.8) 
 
And should such extraordinary circumstances occur, everything can be set to rights, and 
the books balanced, as we have already seen, in the hereafter.  It is precisely this concept 
of heaven as a mechanism for balancing the books that allows Smith to defend principles, 
such as the partiality of the orders of society in defence of their own interests, and the 
 instead of on vice and folly 
(TMS II.ii.3.4), when they conflict with the claims of justice.  
 
When  Smith speaks of justice he is thinking of order, when he talks of order he is 
thinking of property: 
 
 rich, though the acquisition might 
be much more beneficial to the one than the loss could be hurtful to the other .... by [doing 
so] he renders himself the proper object of the contempt and indignation of mankind; as 
well as of the punishment which that contempt and indignation must naturally dispose 
them to inflict, for having thus violated one of those sacred rules, upon the tolerable 
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observation of which depend the whole security and peace of human society.  There is no 
commonly honest man who does not more dread the inward disgrace of such an action, the 
indelible stain which it would for ever stamp upon his own mind, than the greatest 
external calamity which, without any fault of his own, could possibly befal him; and who 
does not inwardly feel [that such an action] is more contrary to nature, than death, than 
TMS III.3.6). 
 
Thus theft by the poor from the rich   even when, as he concedes, it would augment 
social welfare  calls down more Smithian abuse upon their heads than any other crime.  
(TMS 
TMS II.i.2.5), is dealt with matter-of-factly without any of the excitement 
shown in his discussion of theft from the rich.  Again, it is well known that Smith 
regarded the state as an institution guarding the rich from the poor: 
 
can be no government, the very end of which is to secure 
Lectures on Jurisprudence, cited in 
WN 
is in reality instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have 
WN V.i.b.12)   
 
This fact, however, has been subjected to the almost comical misinterpretation that 
somehow this represented a complaint, a plea on behalf of the underdog.  Viner (1958: 
government activity, and Raphael (1985: 8) says that the WN 
ther from the truth.  The context of these passages shows 
unambiguously that Smith was simply, and, in his view, uncontroversially, setting out 
how things were and how they should be: 
 
 
enemies, whom, though he never provoked, he can never appease, and from whose 
injustice he can be protected only by the powerful arm of the civil magistrate continually 
held up to chastise it [sc the injustice of those enemies].  The acquisition of valuable and 
extensive property, therefore, necessarily requires the establish  
 
Robert Heilbroner gets closer to the real meaning of these passages: 
 
aws and government 
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58 
contemporaries imagined a society in which exploitation and oppression would not be 
 
 
*     *     * 
 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith develops the doctrine of a beneficent order in 
nature, manifesting itself through the operation of the forces of external nature and the 
innate propensities i
that Providence has so fashioned the constitution of external nature as to make its 
processes favourable to man, and has implanted ab initio in human nature such sentiments 
as would bring about, through their ordinary working, the happiness and welfare of 
-17) 
 
Our strengths are thus implanted in us by divine providence.  Not only our strengths but 
our weaknesses, too, however, are endowed by nature.  A particularly striking example 
concerns the tendency of a fickle public to admire people merely for being lucky: 
 
she is either favourable or adverse, can render the same character the object, either of 
general love and admiration, or of universal hatred and contempt.  This great disorder in 
our moral sentiments is by no means, however, without its utility; and we may on this as 
well as on many other occasions, admire the wisdom of God even in the weakness and 
folly of man.  Our admiration of success is founded upon the same principle with our 
respect for wealth and greatness, and is equally necessary for establishing the distinction 
of ranks and the order of society.  By this admiration of success we are taught to submit 
more easily to those superiors, whom the course of human affairs may assign to us; to 
regard with reverence, and sometimes even with a sort of respectful affection, that 
fortunate violence which we are no longer capable of resisting; not only the violence of 
such splendid characters as those of a Caesar or an Alexander, but often that of the most 
TMS VI.iii.30) 
 
This is a remarkable passage.  Adm
folly, like everything else, has been given us by God for a reason.  The good thing about 
this weakness is that it reconciles us with our rulers, even those who only achieved this 
tyrants such as Tamerlane (or Timur Lenk), who reputedly made mountains of his 
 
 
As Smith reminds us, this view of the role of fortune in moral sentiments parallels that of 
public admiration of the great in preference to the good: 
                                               
58 The reference is to Smith (1976) Lectures on Jurisprudence Oxford: Clarendon Press, p208. 
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despise, or, at least, to neglect persons of poor and mean condition ... is ... the great and 
most universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments.  That wealth and greatness 
are often regarded with the respect and admiration which are due only to wisdom and 
virtue; and that the contempt, of which vice and folly are the only proper objects, is often 
most unjustly bestowed upon poverty and weakness, has been the complaint of moralists in 
TMS I.iii.3.1) 
 
And they were wrong   since, as we have seen, even injustice can be 
part of a higher Good.  Smith, himself, incidentally, was happy to contribute to this 
contempt for the poor (though the case of the rich who become poor was another matter 
altogether): 
 
overty, excites little compassion.  Its complaints are too 
apt to be the objects rather of contempt than of fellow-feeling.  We despise a beggar; and 
... he is scarce ever the object of any serious commiseration.  The fall from riches to 
poverty, as it commonly occasions the most real distress to the sufferer, so it seldom fails 
TMS III.3.18) 
 
-given and has its 
sary both to establish and maintain the distinction of ranks and the 
TMS I.iii.3.1). 
 
upon the respect which we naturally conceive for [the greatly fortunate ... the rich and 
powerful] .... The peace and order of society is of more importance than even the relief of 
the miserable .... Moralists ... warn us against the fascination of greatness.  This 
fascination, indeed, is so powerful, that the rich and the great are too often preferred to the 
wise and the virtuous.  Nature has wisely judged that the distinction of ranks, the peace 
and order of society would rest more securely upon the plain and palpable difference of 
birth and fortune, than upon the invisible and often uncertain difference of wisdom and 
virtue.  The undistinguishing eyes of the great mob of mankind can well enough perceive 
the former: it is with difficulty that the nice discernment of the wise and the virtuous can 
sometimes distinguish the latter.  In the order of all those recommendations, the 
TMS VI.ii.1.20) 
 
So even this particular weakness, which Smith has earlier damned in the most severe 
be a ruling stratum, and Nature has judged it best to have an obvious one to which the 
masses can easily be led to give their loyalty. 
 
There is a further point concerning the admiration of wealth which il
view that deceptive appearances can still be desirable.  For Smith, the outward 
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appearance of great disparity in wealth between the rich and the poor conceals a very 
large measure of real equality in welfare.  In the passage from TMS (IV.1.10) cited at the 
human life, they [sc the poor] are in no respect inferior to those who would seem so 
 by divine providence  
or by the rich who are, in turn, led by divine providence  so that we all get an equal 
that great happiness and grief are occasioned not by a state or condition but by a change 
in condition. 
 
-failing certainty with which all men, sooner or later, accommodate themselves 
to whatever becomes their permanent situation, may, perhaps, induce us to think that the 
Stoics were, at least, thus far very nearly in the right; that, between one permanent 
situation and another, there was, with regard to real happiness, no essential difference .... 
Happiness consists in tranquillity and enjoyment.  Without tranquillity there can be no 
enjoyment; and where there is perfect tranquillity there is scarce any thing which is not 
capable of amusing.  But in every permanent situation, where there is no expectation of 
change, the mind of every man, in a longer or shorter time, returns to its natural and usual 
st TMS III.3.30) 
 
He illustrates the point with an anecdote about an imprisoned count who amused himself 
it is only changes which matter, is reflected in his statement, reported earlier, that the 
poor are, at best, ignored, while the impoverished rich are pitied.  Smith draws the 
conclusion that much of the evil in life can be attributed to failure to understand this 
point: 
 
both the misery and disorders of human life, seems to arise from 
over-rating the difference between one permanent situation and another.  Avarice over-
rates the difference between poverty and riches .... The person under the influence of those 
extravagant passions [sc avarice], is not only miserable in his actual situation, but is often 
disposed to disturb the peace of society, in order to arrive at that which he so foolishly 
admires ... [although] in all the ordinary situations of human life, a well-disposed mind 
may be equally ... contented .... In all the most glittering and exalted situation that our idle 
fancy can hold out to us, the pleasures from which we derive our happiness, are almost the 
same with those which, in our actual, though humble station, we have at all times at hand, 
TMS III.3.31) 
 
But in even this cloud there is a silver lining!  It is in the extremity, or extravagance, of 
the emotion that the problem lies.  Merely to be deceived by appearances, on the 
contrary, is often desirable: 
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condition of the rich .... He is enchanted with the distant idea of this felicity .... and, in 
order to arrive at it, he devotes himself for ever to the pursuit of wealth and greatness .... 
Through the whole of his life he pursues the idea of a certain artificial and elegant repose 
which he may never arrive at, for which he sacrifices a real tranquillity, that is at all times 
in his power, and which, if in the extremity of old age he should at last attain to it, he will 
find to be in no respect preferable to that humble security and contentment which he had 
abandoned for it.  It is then ... that he begins at last to find that wealth and greatness are 
mere trinkets of frivolous utility .... And it is well that nature imposes upon us in this 
(TMS IV.1.8-10) 
 
h leads people to fulfil 
what they think are their own purposes, only to find they were fulfilling the purposes of a 
Hegel
59
Sabine, 1951: 519), both whom are 
known to have read and admired Smith
60
. 
 
This becomes clear in the first few pages of TMS (I.i.1.1-13), where we find that, 
according to Smith, the whole structure of moral sentiments is built on illusion.  The 
basis for morality is sympathy, that is, our ability to a limited extent to enter into the 
emotions of other people.  But this participation in the pains and pleasures of others is 
achieved solely by an act of the imagination, divorced from the material causes of those 
pains and pleasures in the person we sympathise with.  This sympathy even extends to 
fictional characters, people in the past and the dead  people, that is, who are incapable 
of feeling pain and pleasure in the first place, as well as to the insane, who are incapable 
of comprehending the degradation their illness has brought them to, and persons 
experiencing what we can never experience, such, if we are male, as a woman in labour.  
TMS I.i.1.13), the 
TMS I.i.1.11).  We place ourselves, in the 
imagination, in the position of the other person, without in fact being in that position, and 
often without it being possible that we ever could be in such a position.  We cannot help 
                                               
59 
the term itself is not employed there. 
60
 For Hegel, see the favourable comments on the political economy of Smith, Say and Ricardo in The 
Philosophy of Right (Knox, 1952: §189 and Addition); for Burke, see the long extracts from his review 
of TMS and letter to Smith of 1759 in Raphael and Macfie (1976: 27-28). 
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it: it is a god-given compulsion from which even the most hardened criminal is not 
completely immune (TMS I.i.1.1).   
 
ividual humans in an extremely cavalier manner, subjecting them to 
all sorts of illusions and deceptions, and other weaknesses and indignities, and in general 
treating them like puppets, often with quite deleterious consequences to the individual in 
question, supposedly in the interest of maximising human welfare.  A classic case of this 
occurs at the end of the first chapter of TMS, where he applauds even the fear of death 
inciples 
in human nature [is] the dread of death, the great poison to the happiness, but the great 
restraint upon the injustice of mankind, which, while it afflicts and mortifies the 
TMS I.i.1.13). 
 
In connection with this we should perhaps recall the value which Smith really placed on 
the individual in the context of the overall system of which he is part.  Before his God, 
TMS II.ii.3.12
61
).  Again, in The History of 
the Ancient Physics 
laws, directed to the conservation and prosperity of the whole, without regard to that [sc 
Astronomy: Physics 9).   
 
 o consider the 
unrestrained by respect for individual lives and individual suffering in pursuit of what we 
 
TMS 
bestows upon it ... a rank and dignity 
TMS 
TMS VI.iii.8)  
Passages showing a quite militaristic outlook on society (TMS VI.ii.3-4), passages 
 100 
introduced in the 6th edition of TMS 
above.  Twentieth century indivi
Smith: one wonders whether they have read him.  As Alec Macfie says,  
 
individualist, is the very reverse of the truth.  For him as for Hume, the interests of society 
Macfie, 1961: 23) 
 
*     *     * 
 
The message of this section is thus that, according to Smith, people do things for 
apparent reasons  the real reasons being often hidden from them, and it is desirable that 
they should do so.  They act justly from a sense of justice, but the reason why justice has 
been given us in this way is so that society may subsist; we admire the rich, the fortunate 
and the powerful, instead of the wise and virtuous, because it is in our nature to do so, 
but those feelings have been implanted in us to reconcile us to our lot; we mistake wealth 
for happiness, and are led to do so, so that trade and industry may flourish; we 
investigate the world thinking to discover its truth, so that by means of ever more 
pleasing stories about the world we may be reconciled to it. 
 
4.4.4 Review 
 
Weltanschauung: 
 
1 The universe is a machine administered by a deity. 
2 The sole purpose of the machine is to maximise happiness. 
3 All parts of that machine, including individual people, play their allotted roles. 
4 We do what we do because it is what we are led to do by the feelings 
implanted in our nature by the deity.  All is part of the plan. 
5 Even human folly and weakness are part  
6 Everyone has nearly the same level of happiness. 
7 We should therefore be content with our lot. 
                                                                                                                                         
61 eds 1-5 only. 
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8 The failure to realise this, mistaking wealth for happiness, leads people to be 
 industrious: the economy depends on their being so deceived. 
9 People mistake wealth and good fortune for wisdom and virtue. 
10 This allows them to be reconciled to class distinctions and oppressive rulers. 
11 We like morality and dislike immorality because we only see their proximate 
effects on human welfare. 
12 This weakness is also a good thing as (a) it allows us to be moral and hence on 
the same side as God, and (b) morality, particularly justice, is a prerequisite for 
society. 
13 Appearances are part of the divine plan. 
 
In the next subsection we will see how 
 
 
4.4.5 The invisible hand 
 
Astronomy.  There is a contrast between the 
role of the invisible hand here, on the one hand, and in TMS and WN, on the other: the 
Astronomy heathen 
 
 
gods.  Fire burns, and water refreshes ... by the necessity of their own nature; nor was the 
invisible hand of Jupiter ever apprehended to be employed in those matters.  But ... 
irregular events were ascribed to his favour or his anger .... Those ... intelligent beings, 
whom they imagined, but knew not, were naturally supposed ... not to employ themselves 
in supporting the ordinary course of things, which went on of its own accord, but to stop, 
 
 
Smith says that this was because humans acted in this way to change the course of events 
which would have occurred without human intervention and so primitive peoples 
responsible for only the exceptional, with his own view of the whole world, including 
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societies and individuals within it, as a great machine designed and managed for the best 
interest of all by a divine administrator: 
 
confounded mankind, that they despaired of discovering in her operations any regular 
system.  Their ignorance, and confusion of thought, necessarily gave birth to that 
pusillanimous superstition, which ascribes almost every unexpected event, to the arbitrary 
will of some designing, though invisible beings, who produced it for some private and 
particular purpose.  The idea of an universal mind, of a God of all, who originally formed 
the whole, and who governs the whole by general laws, directed to the conservation and 
prosperity of the whole, without regard to that of any private individual, was a notion to 
Astronomy: Physics 9) 
 
So, firstly, not only the irregular, but, and much more importantly, the most regular 
occurrences are the work of the deity; and, secondly, human actions, too, far from being 
contrary to nature, are profoundly in harmony with it. Natural events and human actions 
alike and without exception
62
 
it [s -
(Macfie, 1971: 598). 
 
In contrast to that in the Astronomy  in TMS and WN is 
TMS, has already been 
given at the beginning of this chapter.  In WN he says: 
 
63] intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a 
manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is 
in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no 
part of his intention.  Nor is it always the worse for society that it was no part of it.  By 
pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than 
WN IV.ii.9) 
 
                                               
62 We shall see later that Smith does admit exceptions  and in this he is logically inconsistent. 
63 ie, every capitalist.  Smith naively adopts the standpoint of the individual capitalist and momentarily 
forgets that there exist other agents, who have no 
that the first of the two arguments for individual liberty which Smith gives here, is essentially a 
mercantilist argument: we do not need government intervention in foreign trade to give preference to 
domestic industry, because individual capitalists will be led by the invisible hand to prefer domestic 
industry without intervention.   
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In both cases he claims that the invisible hand will ensure that the unintended outcome of 
self-seeking behaviour will be socially desirable.  Without it, in the TMS case, individuals 
would be subject to large differences in welfare; and in the WN case, the total wealth 
available to society would be smaller than it actually is (and more of it will fall into the 
hands of foreigners
64
). 
 
It should by now be clear that the use of the phras
universe is managed by a deity determined on the utilitarian objective of the maximisation 
of happiness, and our emotions and motives are predestined by that deity to lead us to 
behave in a manner consonant with the divine plan.  The administration of the plan is 
carried out by God  but, of course, we cannot see anything: his hands are invisible
65
: 
e that Smith gives to the covert intervention of the 
invisible hand requires no separate treatment.  We have already seen how agents are 
ocially desirable ways, how the unintended consequences 
of our desire for justice, or riches, make society possible.  The notion of an invisible hand 
is of a piece with this philosophy.   
 
This is essentially the view of the invisible hand, and of the continuity of the invisible 
hand between TMS and WN, taken by Peter Gay: 
 
conducted the immense machin
private inclination and obey his most powerful passions, and yet benefit the social order.  
By taking care of his own happiness, man is led to promote the happiness of others  this 
is the notorious 
without intending it, without even knowing it.  All is for the best in the only possible 
world that God could have made. 
 
The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith keeps these philosophical concerns alive, but with 
greater subtlety than before, with far greater respect for harsh truths and for the exceptions 
that modify all rules, and with an impressive command of social realities.  Like Diderot, 
Adam Smith learned much in the 1760s; like Diderot, he did not discard his essential 
 
                                               
64 it.   
65
 Smith even furnishes us with an account of why God is invisible (TMS III.2.31, eds 3-5 only).  If we 
could see him, Smith says, we would be so dazzled that we would be unable to go about our normal 
business. 
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Heilbroner reads Smith in much the same way.  The theme of the invisible hand, he 
writes,  
 
Moral Sentiments [m]an is by his 
human nature incapable of foreseeing the consequences of his actions beyond a very 
narrow range.  How then does he know what course to follow, when he cannot use his 
faculties to anticipate the outcome of his own actions, much less those of his fellow actors?  
The question is answered in much the same way as the provision of a sense of duty and 
conscience.  The Deity, when he created the world, gave to humankind a surer guide than 
nd refers to the means by 
despite the frailty of its reasoning powers.  The means are a number of powerful instincts 
and promptings that the Deity has instilled within us, which we obey because we have to, 
quite unconscious of their long-
action that would otherwise require a Godlike 
60) 
 
The Wealth of Nations
evidence of the Invisible Hand.  No participant in the market has in mind  
power to effect  the orderly p rowth starts as a consequence of 
the Invisible Hand, which has implanted within us that all-important confusion of wealth 
-153) 
 
ation of  
 
Frankly, we do not believe it; rather we have learned that the interests and the prosperity 
of the individual may be in conflict with the well-being of the community, that no such 
147).   
 
Latter day Smithians, however, wishing to propagate a very different interpretation of 
 
 
one unfortunate appearance in The Wealth of Nations  unfortunate because it has been so 
totally misrepresented.  There is no question, either in the specific context where he used 
the phrase or in the larger context of the argument of the entire book, but that the invisible 
hand is the hand of competition, which places immense pressure on individuals to behave 
(Rosenberg, 1990: 21) 
 
metaphor (or even simile), for competition, is extremely widespread.  The invisible hand 
had, as we have seen, everything to do with divine guidance, and Rosenberg makes no 
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on of competition by no means exhausts the notion of 
the invisible hand, to which it is wholly subordinate.   
 
which a free market economy is kept on an even course despite the absence of any 
ghostly economic planner.  Without it, neither morality nor social order would be 
 
 
A much earlier version of this chapter followed conventional usage in referring to a 
metaphor 
{ XE "Smith, Adam" } the equilibrium state 
has been said to be created by a 
consistent in flagging any such comparison by the use of simile instead of metaphor.  
Smith intended us to read his statements in WN and TMS 
Had he desired anoth as  as if as 
though are frequently 
inserted into the passage in WN in question in a  presumably unconscious  
misrepresentation as simile of what Smith saw only as literal truth.  See, for example, 
-interest would be 
Again
Smith{ XE "Smith, Adam" } was his insistence that the freedom of individuals to 
was no 
as if 
not say that.   
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Raphael, one of the editors of the Glasgow Edition TMS, is, like Rosenberg, 
 
 
phrase for vivid effect, to give us a picture of an imaginary controlling device, but he 
knows very well that the effect comes about automatically through the interplay of 
theism controlled the working o
religious language simply in order to make his readers appreciate the remarkable character 
of the phenomenon.  I do not mean that he deliberately placed a false halo around it.  He 
was led by an invisibl -67)  
 
As we have seen, the invisible hand concept certainly was theological, and the 
meaning: the theological interpretation is the first and most 
obvious meaning to strike the reader of what Smith actually wrote.  It is the non-
theological interpretation, the interpretation which says that, in spite of what Smith 
wrote, he actually meant something different, which requires demonstration.  What is 
remarkable is the regularity with which those writers who wish to separate the invisible 
hand from the invisible mind which guides it simply resort to assertion without setting 
out the case for the their alternative interpretation.  Raphael says that the working of the 
God with the workings of competition.  This failure to see divine intervention in the 
ordinary, automatic, day-to-day workings of the world, including the economy, is just 
 
 
doubt Smith would say that the beneficial results [of the invisible hand] are ultimately 
due to nature or the divine author of nature, but he does not mean that God pulls the 
 God.  This is correct.  
God, in Smith, does not intervene directly, unmediatedly, in human affairs.  We do not 
know what Smith did or did not privately believe  very likely he shared his friend, David 
tainly the public Smith of the 
Astronomy, TMS and WN shows no evidence whatsoever of belief in such miraculous 
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direct intervention.  What he does very clearly show is a belief that human happiness is 
iated by the totality of natural 
Either God is pulling the strings all the time, and we are literally puppets with no 
personal autonomy whatever.  In this case the correct philosophical response would be 
utter fatalism and apathy.  Or we need some guidance on when to treat outcomes as 
this section and again later in the chapter.   
 
sue concerns 
Smith, which Raphael is attempting to refute, is that he sanctified the working of the 
economy by 
is exactly what Smith was trying to do, and in this he was in step with his generation.  
it by an invisible hand, effectively concedes the case. 
 
To return to the point at issue.  Hayek, too, makes it clear that he regards the phrase as 
unfortunate: 
 
 of the eighteenth century  even 
 provided ... an explanation [of how the 
(CRS: 392-393). 
 
For details of this explanation, supposedly given by Smith, Hayek refers us, in a footnote, 
Individualism and Economic Order (IEO).  Sadly, his promise is not redeemed.  What 
Hayek does  and this point will be amplified in the chapter on Hayek  is to argue for 
the spontaneity 
invisible hand, abstracting from the optimality with which Smith endowed it, and then 
tacitly to assume that optimality has been established.   
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Blaug, after perfectly reasonably criticising the notion of the invisible hand as involving a 
fallacy of composition  what is good for the individual is necessarily good for society  
complains that 
 
the whole of the Wealth of Nations rests on this kind of naive 
reasoning, the so-
and economic efficiency, turns out upon examination to be identical with the concept of 
 
 
But the whole point is, that comp
balance had already been pre-reconciled by a kindly Great Administrator of the system of 
the universe.  While it is perfectly true that the whole of WN 
 and that part is precisely the doctrine of the 
 
 
Macfie, too, deprecat
most t  
 
TMS and WN are irreconcilable by scouring WN 
laissez-faire.  
On the basis of an apparently impressive mass of such exceptions Viner argues that there 
is a change of methodology between TMS and WN: in the former we have the theistic 
invisible hand type of argument (which I ascribe to both WN and TMS), where a natural 
harmony of interests is deduced from the assumed attributes of the deity; in the latter we 
have an inductive invisible hand theory, only valid where the facts justify it.   
 
Now, it is true that there are many exceptions to the desirability of laissez faire policies 
in WN  exceptions, indeed, to which twentieth century Smithians and invisible hand 
theorists would do well to give more attention  and Viner performs a valuable service 
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by collating them.  Nevertheless, they remain exceptions
methodology varied so abruptly between the psychological and economic aspects of his 
scientific work, and without a single hint anywhere that he was simultaneously adopting 
such contrary standpoints in the two disciplines, does unacceptable violence to the unity 
th a clear 
conception of the nature of scientific thought; it is also the case that he carried out the 
programme implicit within it with relentless consistency throughout his life.  If there had 
been only one edition each of TMS and WN, then, while still incorrect, the case would 
appear more plausible, that Smith changed his position between 1759 and 1776.  
However, this is not the case, and at the end of his life, in 1790, Smith was still saying 
substantially the same things in his revisions to both books as he had in their first 
discount the sixth edition of TMS 
can be seen to be implausible in the extreme.  As Macfie argues on the critical question of 
the role of the invisible hand in TMS and WN
invisible hand ... [is] exactly carried over from the Moral Sentiments into the Wealth of 
Nations
66
; see also ibid: 223-4.) 
 
that it is impossible fully to understand the Wealth of Nations without recourse to the 
Theory of Moral Sentiments
seems to me, Viner himself must share some of the blame for the partial occlusion of that 
fundamental insight into the meaning of the invisible hand in WN. 
 
The discussion raises two serious issues, however.  Firstly, it is the case that the 
WN, and the theistic explanation of it 
does not appear at all.  A great deal of empirical material, however, does appear, and, 
while the overwhelming bulk of that material is directed towards showing the superiority 
of the laissez faire system, he does indicate exceptions to its desirability.  It is easy to see 
how modern, nineteenth and twentieth century readers of WN in isolation 
                                               
66
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other works and from those of his contemporaries, should assume that this was a 
predominantly empirical study drawing the conclusion that in general, free competition 
was a good thing.  It is easy to overlook the fact that the empirical material only plays 
the role of illustrating a preconceived order.  Smith does not in fact anywhere make the 
inductive judgement that, as a generalisation, individual self-seeking behaviour leads 
automatically to socially desirable outcomes  on the contrary, this is assumed 
beforehand and illustrated by details of many empirical circumstances where it is 
asserted, over and over again, that this has occurred, or would occur if only enterprise 
ot only in the WN but 
in TMS and Astronomy as well, that we can clearly see the a priori and deductive 
nterests are pre-
reconciled by the invisible hand of a benevolent deity
67
.  Whatever the stylistic and 
presentational differences between TMS and WN, this faith remains the starting point of 
and here [sc in WN] 
remains to control the individual conflicts and excesses of competition, and to safeguard 
 
 
The second point is that the supposition that there is a divine plan, in which all agent 
return to this point in Section 5c, below.  In brief, the point is that there is a difference 
between two kinds of inconsistency.  Viner alleges an arbitrary inconsistency in which 
Smith switches, without comment, between two fundamentally contrasting standpoints.  
Why should Smith have done this?  In my interpretation, however, Smith is inconsistent 
because his standpoint compels him to be: the inconsistency is implicit in his world view.  
He has adopted that standpoint and has to live with the consequences.  The exceptions 
he notes were, in general and in modern language, those associated with externalities, 
public goods and market power.  Smith was faced with the choice of being dogmatic  
even in these circumstances the invisible hand will sort things out, which is what his 
theory actually implies, or moderate  dropping the theory without explanation when its 
consequences strain credulity.  Wisely, he chose the latter: a more rigorous and 
                                               
67 In TMS ndamental doctrines of the Wealth of Nations ... and the famous work 
cannot be properly understood without some knowledge of the Theory  
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intellectually consistent approach would have made WN far less plausible, palatable and 
effective for its purpose.   
 
Hegel, deducing the State, in the Philosophy of Right, from the theological category of 
the Idea elaborated in the Science of Logic, should, in faith to his system, have 
reproduced the Prussian state exactly as it was.  As is well known, however, he could not 
resist idealising the existing state and ended up with an improved, more consistent 
version.  By breaking the link between the ideal and actual in this way, he only showed 
that his mode of procedure was capable of being used to deduce and justify whatever 
state system one desired.  Smith is in the same position.  Within his system, natural 
liberty, which gives the invisible hand its operational scope, must be absolute.  If the 
constrain its movements, however mysterious and obscure they may be
68
.  The macro 
universal happiness of all rational and sensible beings, is the business of God and not of 
TMS VI.ii.3.6). 
 
In WN, however, Smith says 
 
eople, it may be said, from receiving in payment the promissory 
notes of a banker ... is a manifest violation of that natural liberty which it is the proper 
business of law, not to infringe, but to support.  Such regulations may ... be considered as 
in some respect a violation of natural liberty.  But those exertions of the natural liberty of a 
few individuals, which might endanger the security of the whole society, are, and ought to 
be, restrained by the laws of all governments; of the most free, as well as of the most 
despotical.  The obligation of building party walls, in order to prevent the communication 
of fire, is a violation of natural liberty, exactly of the same kind with the regulations of the 
WN II.ii.94) 
 
government intervention?  If God gets it wrong here, where else does he get it wrong?  
Is there really a god governing our lives after all?  The idea of an invisible hand 
evaporates leaving us with something much more mundane and imperfect: an accidental 
and unreliable coincidence between individual and social interests, the spontaneity 
                                               
68
 In another context, Flew says that the variety and contrariety of conclusions drawn from a single 
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proposition without the optimality proposition.  This issue will be revisited at the end of 
the chapter. 
 
*     *     * 
 
 in Mary 
Shelley (1818) Frankenstein Ch XII, Thomas Hardy (1874) Far From the Madding 
Crowd Ch 42, and in HG Wells (1898) The War of the Worlds Ch 6, to give just three 
examples  in each case in utterly pedestrian contexts.  Raphael (1985: 67) gives an 
instance of its use in the early eighteenth century, when a captain wrote in his log that the 
the guiding  hand of an unseen god ensuring the desirable social consequences of self-
seeking behaviour   was a 
commonplace of late eighteenth century social commentary is shown by Hayek by 
reference to Smith, Tucker, Ferguson and Edmund Burke (IEO: 7).  Taking the last as 
or not, in pursuing their own selfish interests, to connect the general good with their own 
Thoughts and Details on Scarcity cited in IEO: 7). 
 
The next section looks in more detail at the relationship between Smith and his 
contemporaries. 
 
4.5 nvironment
69 
 
4.5.1 
th
 Century Philosophes 
 
All are but parts of one stupendous whole,  
Whose body nature is, and God the soul; 
                                               
69 Much of this section relies on Becker (1932).  Becker has been heavily criticised, notably in Peter Gay 
 -210).  The points made in this 
complaint that Becker exaggerates.  The same point could be made about Gay.  Unfortunately, this is not 
of Smith (Gay, 1969: passim), or of the Philosophes -
207).   
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.... 
All discord, harmony not understood; 
All partial evil, universal good: 
And, in spite of pride,  
One truth is clear, Whatever is, is right. 
(Alexander Pope, cited in Becker, 1932: 6670) 
 
cfie, 1959: 210).  Robert 
Heilbroner stresses the need to locate Smith in his times in order to understand his works 
(Heilbroner, 1986: 1).  He also stresses that what links Smith and his contemporaries is 
the conservatism of both: 
 
ting to find a great monument of conservative economic thought, 
and we will not be disappointed  Smith is indeed the greatest of all conservative 
Smith, like all his contemporaries, believed firmly in the need for a well-defined social 
conserving vision of social continuity and order, the Enlightenment thinkers found the 
basis for their distinctive brand of philosophical and historical conservatism.  [They were] 
[c]onvinced of the need for  indeed, the inescapable necessity of  a stratified, property-
society in wh ]ll the 
Philosophes, including Smith, share one limit to their social imaginations.  This is an 
inability to imagine that the lower orders might some day exercise sovereignty over 
society.  Democracy, with all its implicit threats to property and hierarchy, was not yet on 
1986: 1-3).   
 
The Heavenly City of the 
Eighteenth-Century Philosophers 
-70), he makes a powerful case 
that the intellectuals of this period
71
 , but that, 
of St Augustine only to rebuild it with more up-to-  
 
                                               
70 The italicised conclud
 
71 He includes in the term philosophes, amongst others, from France: Montesquieu, Voltaire, Volney, 
Diderot, Savigny and Rousseau; from Germany: Leibniz, Lessing, Herder and Goethe; from Britain: 
Locke, Hume, Ferguson and Adam Smith{ XE "Smith, Adam" }; and from America: Jefferson and 
Franklin (Becker, 1932: 33).   
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 modern in its temper 
.... And yet I think the Philosophes were nearer the Middle Ages, less emancipated from 
the preconceptions of medieval Christian thought, than they quite realized or we have 
commonly supposed .... [T]hey speak a familiar language .... But I think our appreciation 
is of the surface more than of the fundamentals .... [I]f we examine the foundations of their 
faith, we find that at every turn the Philosophes betray their debt to medieval thought 
without being aware of it .... They had put off the fear of God, but maintained a respectful 
attitude towards the Deity.  They ridiculed the idea that the universe had been created in 
six days, but still believed it to be a beautifully articulated machine designed by the 
Supreme Being according to a rational plan as an abiding place for mankind .... they 
renounced the authority of church and Bible, but exhibited a naïve faith in the authority of 
nature and reason .... [T]he underlying preconceptions of eighteenth century thought were 
still ... essent -31) 
 
On the overall aim of the philosophers, he cites Hume  with whom Smith shared a 
mutual admiration and close friendship  
cker, 1932: 39).  Like Smith, Hume was sufficiently concerned with 
preservation of the social order to be willing to lay down his pen in its service.  In his 
own words: 
 
offence 
theory, however true, which leads to a practice dangerous and pernicious.  Why rake into 
those corners of nature, which spread a nuisance all around? ... Truths which are 
pernicious to society ... will yield to errors, which are salutary and advantageous  
 
the programme just mentioned,  
 
philosophical speculations for other subjects, such as 
1932: 38- Dialogues away in 
his desk72 ... his contemporaries, could they have looked into that locked desk, would have 
found ... the brilliant argument that demolished the foundations of natural religion .... 
Hume ... refused to publish his Dialogues, and never, in public at least, failed to exhibit a 
punctil 73) 
 
                                               
72 Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion remained unpublished until after his death.  It was 
Adam Smith{ XE "Smith, Adam" } who persuaded him to suppress it.  The manuscript was originally 
 literary executor, but at the last moment Hume gave it to a nephew who published 
it.  Had Smith laid hands on it he would undoubtedly have burned it.  The event had a profound effect on 
ut ensuring that his own papers 
were burnt, which was done a week before his death. 
73 See also Becker (1932: 79-81), for a similar story about Diderot. 
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ma TMS 
prioritising reconciliation over investigation.   
 
Philosophes faced  
 
ure 
is good, then there is no evil in the world; if there is evil in the world, then nature is so far 
not good .... Will they, closing their eyes to the brute facts, maintain that there is no evil in 
the world?  In that case there is nothing for them to set right.  Or will they, keeping their 
 
 
The philosophers were at a crossroads: reason pointed forwards, to atheism and to the 
project of rebuilding a haphazard, spontaneous and irrational society in the image of the 
order they had previously ascribed to nature; the alternative was the denial of reason and 
a return to medieval Christian faith.  Open-eyed, they could adopt an empirical, 
materialist standpoint, recognising the need to take control of, and responsibility for, 
spontaneous human institutions; or with eyes closed they could take an a priori stance, 
Philosophers did in this emergency.  They found ... that reason is amenable to treatment.  
 
 
None of this was written with Smith specifically to th  but 
the description fits like a glove.  Smith is the epitome of this intellectual retreat of the 
enlightenment in the late eighteenth century, the retreat from rationalism to 
romanticism
74
.  In every respect, reason is belittled and sentiment and religion brought to 
the fore
75
.  At best, reason only confirms what we know anyway by means of sentiment 
and religion: 
 
                                               
74 TMS. 
75 This is not to criticise his rejection of a rationalist account of morality (see TMS VII.iii Ch II Of those 
Systems which make Reason the Principle of Approbation), epitomised in the title of The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments, which so far as it goes, is undoubtedly correct, though he is mistaken in the reason he 
gives for such sentiments arising in the first place.   
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first 
impressed by nature, and afterwards confirmed by reasoning and philosophy, that those 
important rules of morality are the commands and laws of the Deity, who will finally 
reward the obedient, and punish the transgressors of their duty .... [R]eligion ... gave a 
sanction to the rules of morality, long before the age of artificial reasoning and 
philosophy.  That the terrors of religion should thus enforce the natural sense of duty, was 
of too much importance to the happiness of mankind, for nature to leave it dependent on 
the slowness and uncertainty of philosophical researches.  These researches, however, 
TMS 
II.5.3, my emphasis) 
 
Reasoning, for Smith, is artificial, and only sentiment is natural: 
 
at the Deity loves virtue and hates vice ... for the effects which they tend to produce ... 
is not the doctrine of nature, but of an artificial, though ingenious, refinement of 
philosophy.  All our natural sentiments prompt us to believe [the opposite] ... 76 (TMS 
p91 note, editions 1 and 277) 
 
TMS III.3.21). 
 
The medieval view of the world, and the role of reason within it  the view of the world 
to which Smith and his contemporaries turned  is well summarised by Becker: 
 
master dramatist according to a central theme and on a rational plan.  Finished in idea 
before it was enacted in fact ... the drama was unalterable either for good or evil .... the 
duty of man was to accept the drama as written, since he could not alter it; his function, to 
play the role assigned .... Intelligence was essential, since God had endowed men with it.  
But the function of intelligence was strictly limited .... The function of intelligence was 
therefore to demonstrate the truth of revealed knowledge, to reconcile diverse and 
pragmatic experience with the rational 
1932: 7) 
 
Smith, therefore, was in many ways typical of the philosophers of the period  on 
influence on his philosophy, Smith regarded the preservation of the social order as of 
primary importance.  Like his contemporary, Kant, who was also, though in a different 
direction, influenced by Hume
78
, Smith wanted to place limits on the legitimate field of 
                                               
76 Smith, incidentally, here clearly ascribes to God his own hypostatisation of the intermediate, the 
r the end. 
77
 Editions 3-
 
78 See Kant (1950: 5 ff; or Academy edition, Vol IV: 258 ff). 
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action of reason, to find a space for instinct and religious belief
79
.  Perhaps the greatest 
overlap between Smith and his contemporaries lay in their application of the doctrine of 
natural law.  This is the topic of the next subsection. 
 
4.5.2 Nature  and the natural in Smith 
 
 Adam Smith and his disciples ... nature means the totality of impulses and instincts 
by which the individual members of society are animated; and their contention is that the 
best arrangements result from giving free play to those forces in the confidence that partial 
failure will be more than compensated by success elsewhere, and that the pursuit of his 
History of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century cited in IEO: 12 n 15) 
 
The reader may have noticed the number of times, in the passages cited above, Smith 
background or substrate of our activities, nature is seen as a direct manifestation of the 
adoption and adaptation of the archaic conception of natural law
80
 so popular amongst 
eighteenth century philosophers (Becker, 1932: Ch II; Sabine, 1951: Ch XXVIIff).   
 
The late eighteenth century French philosopher, Comte de Volney, defined natural law in 
eminently Smithian terms: 
                                               
79 
been presented, though not, I think, completely successfully, as a direct precursor of Kant.  Macfie 
(1967: 68 and n 24; 91 n 23) gives the references.  
the destructive spark which helped to inspire the Kantian reconstruction, Smith may well have contrived 
... the revealing light which led to the Critique of Practical Reason ite of 
it (ibid: 68).  He also wrongly clai
What greater 
 
80 It is interesting in this context that the very reason that Smith started to study economics was his need 
tr
Interestingly, Physiocracy, with which, of course, Smith had much to do, is a near-synonym for natural 
law. 
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universe; the order which his wisdom presents to the sense and reason of men, to serve 
them as an equal and common rule of conduct, and to guide them ... towards perfection 
 
 
Here again we see the universe as an orderly system administered by a god.  The order 
implicit in it, which is presented to both the senses and the reason of humans, issues in 
both factual statements about the way the world is, and normative statements as to how 
people are to behave, so as to correspond with the divine will.  Again the god is 
utilitarian, maximising the happiness of mankind. 
 
Becker cites this definition as typical of the eighteenth century philosophers, among 
whom he explicitly includes Adam Smith (Becker, 1932: 33).  His commentary certainly 
applies well to Smith: 
 
of Thomas Aquinas.  Important if true, we say; but how comes it, we ask, that you are so 
well acquainted with God and his purposes?  Who told you ... that there is a regular and 
constant order of nature? ... Indeed it is all too simple.  It assumes everything that most 
 
 
I keep stressing the primacy of order in Smith, and the same is true of the Philosophes: 
they wanted to be able to point to an ordered natural world in order to justify the 
conceptions of social order to which they variously subscribed: 
 
-century minds were too accustomed to a stable society with fixed ranks, 
too habituated to an orderly code ... to be at all happy in a disordered universe.  It seemed 
safer, therefore, ... to retain God ... as a ... guaranty that all was well in the most 
comfortable of common-   (Becker, 1932: 49-50) 
 
And if a god did not exist, it would be necessary, as Voltaire (in)famously declared, to 
invent one.  But a god in isolation, separate from the world, was not to the point.  Their 
programme demanded that God directly reveal himself in nature: 
 
works.  To be enlightened was to understand ... that it was ... in the great book of nature ... 
that the laws of God had been recorded.  This is the new revelation ... This open book of 
nature was what Jean Jacques Rousseau and his philosophical colleagues went in search of 
when they wished to know what God had said to them.  Nature and natural law  what 
magic these words held for the philosophical century! ... Hume, Voltaire, Rousseau, 
Volney: in each of them nature takes without question the position customarily reserved 
for the guest of honor .... Search the writings of the new economists and you will find 
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them demanding the abolition of artificial restrictions on trade and industry in order that 
men may be free to follow the natural law of self-interest .... controversialists of every 
1932: 51-52) 
 
Perhaps we can best see the importance of this view of nature in the popular and 
scholarly response to a figure towering over the eighteenth century, that of Newton.  
philosophy were published.  The point of interest was not the technical detail but the 
problems  the relations between humanity, nature and God.  Colin Maclaurin, Professor 
of Mathematics in the University of Edinburgh, set out the nature of these relationships 
in his own guidebook, , 
published in 1775: 
 
phenomena of nature, to explain their causes ... and to enquire into the 
whole constitution of the universe, is the business of natural philosophy .... But natural 
philosophy is subservient to purposes of a higher kind, and it is chiefly to be valued as it 
lays a sure foundation for natural religion and moral philosophy; by leading us, in a 
satisfactory manner, to the knowledge of the Author and Governor of the universe.... 
 
of his conduct, in nature, from the very deficient ideas we are able to form of that great 
mysterious Being .... 
 
manner, that mighty power which prevails throughout ... and that wisdom which we see 
displayed in the exquisite structure and just motions of the greatest and subtilest parts.  
These, with perfect goodness, by which they are evidently directed, constitute the supreme 
object of the speculations of a philosopher; who, while he contemplates and admires so 
excellent a system, cannot but be himself excited and animated to correspond with the 
general harmony of nature -63) 
 
may well be taken as a just expression of the prevailing state of mind about the middle of 
the eighteenth century.  Obviously the disciples of the Newtonian philosophy had ... 
 
 
The deification of nature led, as it was supposed to lead, to the sanctification of the 
ogramme.  Macfie, 
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which the Law of Nature and Stoicism inspired in Scotland was a faith in natural liberty 
nt references to the 
TMS 
(TMS 
rendered holy, consecrated, and hedged round against the appro
(TMS II.iii.3.4).  And in WN
WN IV.vii.b.44). 
 
For Smith, therefore, as was commonly the case in natural law theorists, what is natural 
is god-given and therefore implicitly good.  When Smith describes certain institutional 
arrangements in WN 
example, in WN IV.ii.3), he is saying that the former are not just spontaneous, but 
spontaneous and therefore an immediate expression of the will of God, whereas the latter 
must at the very least lie under the suspicion of sacrilege.  There are many occasions 
where Smith invokes nature
81
 in this way in WN
preference or of restraint [of trade by the government] ... being ... completely taken 
away, the obvious and simple system of natural lib
(WN WN IV.v.b.16 
82
). 
 
In his lectures as early as 1749 Smith was linking the ideas of an active, beneficent and 
rational nature  in short a teleological nature  to the policy prescription of laissez-
faire
requires no more than to let her alone, and give her fair play in the pursuit of her ends 
that she may establish h
laisser faire , which had been 
                                               
81 
every WN has 
the second meaning, only that in the many invocations of nature in WN the penumbra of connotation is 
definitely intended to include this second meaning on many occasions.  An excellent discussion of the 
 
82 WN 
WN I.vii passim, WN IV.i.12, WN IV.ii.3 and WN p453 editorial 
footnotes 7 and 8, containing references to further passages in WN and the Early Draft of WN.  
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in use in France since the end of the previous century to denote freedom from 
government interference.   
 
But Smith extends the idea of what is natural to include human nature.  What is instinct 
in us was implanted there by Nature, for a purpose  and this includes our weaknesses as 
well as our strengths.  Thus, speaking of resentment and its issue in 
TMS 
not seem to have dealt so unkindly with us, as to have endowed us with any principle 
which is wholly and in every respect evil, or which, in no degree and in no direction, can 
taken to an excess.  This tactic, however logical in itself, involves Smith in inescapable 
contradictions once he attempts to derive his laissez-faire policy prescription from it, as 
we shall see in the next subsection. 
 
So Smith has a similar approach to nature and the natural as his contemporaries.  If 
anything, however, Smith is even more archaic than his contemporaries.  Prior to the 
eighteenth century, according to Becker, 
 
somehow be, even if not evidently so to finite minds, good and reasonable.  Design in 
nature was thus derived a priori from the character which the Creator was assumed to 
have; and natural law, so far from being associated with the observed behaviour of 
physical phenomena, was no more than a conceptual universe above and outside the real 
one, a logical construction dwelling in the mind of God and dimly reflected in the minds 
 
 
In the eighteenth century, however,  he cites Hume, in the person of Cleanthes in his 
Dialogues, as epitome  the logical process is reversed:  
 
must be rational because God is eternal reason; 
he concludes that God must be an engineer because nature is 
 the new philosophy was that the existence of God, if there was 
one, and his goodness, if goodness he could claim, must be inferred from the observable 
behaviour of the world.  Following Newton, the Philosophers had all insisted on this to the 
point of ped  
 
Smith in this respect is out of step with his contemporaries.  He clearly starts by 
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the deity, and only afterwards claims to be able to support his conclusions by reference to 
observations of nature itself: 
 
the original purpose intended by the Author of nature, when he brought them into 
existence.  No other end seems worthy of that supreme wisdom and divine benignity which 
we necessarily ascribe to him; and this opinion, which we are led to by the abstract 
consideration of his infinite perfections, is still more confirmed by the examination of the 
works of nature, which seem all intended to promote happiness, and to guard against 
TMS III.5.7) 
 
There is no reason to believe that Smith would have seen any opposition between these 
two approaches  deductive versus inductive, a priori versus empirical  to the relation 
between God and nature.  But he would certainly have rejected the latter as sole, or even 
do not perceive the remote ramifications of things.  Things, as he stresses in Astronomy, 
often appear to us to be discordant and unconnected.  This is precisely why we need a 
the most pleasing general explanation available.  So it would be a mistake to deduce 
discordant world of appearances at once comprehensible and safe.  Smith in this respect 
is thus conservative even with respect to his contemporaries. 
 
Smith explicitly links the superiority of our natural feelings over the artificiality of reason, 
to the preservation of social order: 
 
re the servants of the people, to be obeyed, resisted, deposed, or punished, as 
the public conveniency may require, is the doctrine of reason and philosophy; but it is not 
the doctrine of Nature.  Nature would teach us to submit to them for their own sake, to 
TMS: I.iii.2.3) 
 
The message is clear: the natural sentiments placed in us by a benevolent deity, expressed 
in established traditions, for example, of granting legitimacy to monarchs, are to be 
heeded in preference to whatever reason may tell us, so that social order may be 
preserved.   
 
In conclusion of this sub-section, we may note how Heilbroner links the philosophes
promotion of sentiment over reason with the notion of an invisible hand in Smith: 
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 certainly Adam Smith  placed the 
critically important conception of an Invisible Hand  an indirect intervention of the 
Divinity into the mechanisms of social life  is based on the inability of human reason to 
 
 
4.5.3  
 
83
, and we have noted some of 
them in passing.  However, at base, there is one particular contradiction which confronts 
Smith, in various guises, at every turn.  In his version of the stoic theory, everything is 
instant.  In empirical reality, there is obvious suffering and injustice.  How is the latter to 
be reconciled with the administration of the machine of the universe by a beneficent, 
omniscient and omnipotent god?  To quote 
unanswered.  Is he [sc God] willing to prevent evil, but not able?  Then he is impotent.  
Is he able, but not willing?  Then he is malevolent.  Is he both able and willing?  Whence 
32: 68). 
 
Presumably even the most pious would concede that there must be logical restrictions on 
what a god can do  whether or not he can create a weight so heavy that he cannot lift it, 
for example, he is necessarily restricted to what is logically possible in what he can 
simultaneously achieve
84
.  It is far less obvious, however, that suffering in general, let 
alone any specific instance of suffering, is a logical necessity for the achievement of 
o put the case.  Instead, its 
ours that it was a problem for theories of this kind.  He never addressed the issue, 
however, and failed to present any explicit theodicy going beyond these assumptions.   
                                               
83 
other directions than exactly logical thinking, and he displayed a fine tolerance for a generous measure 
of i  
84 
reference is to Saint Thomas Aquinas, 1944, Summa Theologiae London: Blackfriars Ia, 7, 2-4), 
showing that he, for one, clearly accepted that God is constrained to what is logically possible. 
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Theodicy generally involves at some point an invocation of free will: God had to permit 
evil if he was to allow man free will and hence moral responsibility.  Here again, Smith is 
on shaky ground, because he has made everything, including human nature, a part of 
nature; all behaviour, including human behaviour, is natural, and hence god-given. Our 
behaviour is prompted by the sent
Since we do what we are led to do, what we are predestined to do, choice is presumably 
an illusion.  Our judgement of the moral quality of an action, as we have seen, is for 
Smith essentially a sentimental judgement without rational content.  Arguably, it was 
open to Smith to adopt the compatibilist position of Chrysippus, (whom, incidentally, 
Smith only mentions in order to flay, rather unfairly, as a traitor to, rather than exponent 
of, stoicism (TMS VII.ii.1.41)).  But Smith carefully avoids addressing this issue, too, 
 
 
The problem for Smith is this: if God is maximising happiness, he cannot at the same 
time permit either evil and suffering or free will.  If he allows suffering, then the quantity 
of happiness is presumably not at its logically possible maximum; if he allows free will, 
then he is again not maximising happiness, as he is leaving that to the outcome of the 
this point, would be to say that God is not maximising the happiness of all living 
f the dead as well.  Everyone has freedom of choice 
in their behaviour now, but they get their just deserts, in heaven, where also all unjust 
work.  How does punishing sinners in the hereafter contribute to maximising happiness?  
tormented souls: it cannot deter sinners in this life; it is futile suffering. 
 
Finally, the further consequence of the view that everything in the world is part of the 
nature and the behaviour to which man is led is a part of nature, is that regulation and 
state planning are just as natural and god-inspired as free trade and laissez-faire.  Viner 
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e work of God, and man the product of nature, then all that man does and 
thinks, all that he has ever done or thought, must be natural, too, and in accord with the 
his customs ever be out of harmony  
 
The concept of the natural only means anything  other than fatalistic acquiescence to 
anything and everything  if it is contrasted with something else, something unnatural.  
in WN TMS.  But he cannot sustain 
this contrast on the basis of his theory.  The category of the artificial has no meaning in a 
theory where the natural is already all-encompassing.  This is clearly a critical 
laissez-faire, but again, he makes no attempt to 
address the issue. 
 
The contradiction can be seen particularly clearly in a paradoxical passage in TMS where 
he attempts, unsuccessfully, to reconcile his Panglossian view of  the outcome of natural 
processes with the human attempt to remedy na
the best which are logically possible, then such faults are inconceivable.  Smith says that 
perfectly suited to the situation of mankind in this life, yet they are by no means suited to 
TMS III.5.9).  In other words, God allocates prosperity 
by general rules which are designed to maximise human happiness, but the allocations 
which result, because of the finitude of human minds, do not always satisfy the moral 
sentiments which he has placed in us. 
 
which she herself would otherwise have made.  The rules which for this purpose she 
which she follows are fit for her; those which he follows for him: but both are calculated to 
promote the same great end, the order of the world, and the perfection and happiness of 
TMS III.5.9) 
 
So nature
85
 
                                               
85 ers and wild 
animals: Smith is talking about the spontaneous outcomes of social processes, in particular the 
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optimising, happiness-m
of nature is happiness-
suboptimal.  Smith cannot have it both ways.  Or, rather, there is one interpretation 
which would allow him to have it both ways.  If he were to say that nature including 
humanity were designed to optimise, but that nature without man were incomplete, 
imperfect, suboptimal, which is more or less what Hegel says, then he could reconcile 
both accounts.   Then human action to correct spontaneous market outcomes and 
redistribute prosperity according to merit would be optimising as it would be the result 
of both the rules of nature and the rules of man.   
 
foundation for the invisible hand mechanism, it by no means follows that it undermines 
the case for a visible hand of state intervention.  On the contrary, his Weltanschauung 
prejudices, and not his theoretical system, which lead him to prefer one to the other.  
State intervention is a product of all the human strengths and frailties of those involved in 
-
given and designed to lead individuals to act so as to maximise human happiness.  There 
is nothing in the system of thought which Smith presents to say that the invisible hand 
active in the economic process will be inactive in the political process. 
 
Smith cannot have been unaware of these inconsistencies in his standpoint.  Yet there is a 
sense in which he, himself, is not inconsistent in neglecting them.  Someone who kept 
faith with the Enlightenment ideal of following Reason wherever it may lead  a Ricardo, 
for example, a Marx, a Darwin, or an Einstein  would have concentrated attention on 
these contradictions and drawn the logical consequences.  But we have already seen that 
Smith was not in this mould
86
.  The late eighteenth century philosophers turned their 
intellectually unified, logically coherent system of thought, but to paint as pleasing as 
                                                                                                                                         
 
86 ntral aim or virtue of 
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4.6 Conclusion 
 
The question we started with was, how Smith saw the articulation between individual 
behaviour at the micro level and social outcomes at the macro level.  The answer I have 
given in this chapter is that the articulating mechanism consists in the agency of a deity.  
Our behaviours at the micro level are always just what is required for the optimal macro 
own interests, our own illusions and our own fellow feeling for others, to perform just 
those actions required to fulfil the divine p
Hayek, to the extent that, as representatives of a secular age, they cannot rely on an 
interventionist god, need an alternative mode of articulation between levels.  The most 
frequently invoked alternative  to the extent that the problem is addressed at all  is 
some kind of evolutionary mechanism, but that lies beyond the scope of the present 
chapter.   
 
I have also argue
to the apologetic aspect in his political economy.  While his belief in a harmonious 
universe allowed him to make real scientific progress in political economy, without fear 
that i
reconcile humanity with the spontaneous social order and the status quo
87
.  He invoked 
the idea of a divine teleological plan, of the universe as a machine administered by a god, 
in order to explain away suffering and evil as only the proximate manifestations of chains 
of connection whose distant ramifications would include more than compensatory 
benefits.  The idea is to convince us that we need do nothing at the macro level.  All we 
should do is pursue our own individual interests at the micro level, and display 
appropriate levels of patriotism and respect for our leaders.  The rich, the powerful and 
the fortunate all ensure that the big decisions of society are for the best  because they 
                                               
87
 That these, the spontaneous social order and the status quo, were not the same thing, did not in 
ubsequent writers, such as Ricardo, coming 
after the Industrial Revolution. 
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are taken by the hand and led by God to do so.   All is for the best, then, in this, the best 
of all possible worlds.   
 
the speculation that the truth is just the opposite of what he says.  Smith claims that the 
universe is a coherent and harmonic whole administered by a single intelligence.  But we 
as thoug
88
  
(Dawkins, 1995: 123)  Smith claims that human nature and human society are a part of 
riven by sectional interest then as it is now.  His claim is to be understood, not as a 
positive statement of what is the case but as a normative statement of what is to be 
ut 
state, make an optimal contribution to human welfare because guided by the invisible 
hand of a beneficent, omnipotent and omniscient god.  Again, we know of no reason to 
even suspect that any supernal agency exists, such that we can rely on its intervention to 
maximise social welfare
89
normative sense: what is required is a higher level human agency which will reconcile 
our differences and lead us through the pursuit of our own interests to the maximum 
achievable level of welfare: 
 
Moral Sentiments  to the 
Deity  great Author of Nature, Engineer, Great Architect, and so on .... Adam Smith did 
believe (as a matter of faith) in this final reconciler .... Now, there is little doubt that we 
today do not accept this kind of argument .... The inevitable reaction is that, if the 
supernatural control is abandoned, human societies must supply their own .... [T]he state 
 
 
 
                                               
88 
gazelle, what is He playing at?  Is He a sadist who enjoys spectator blood sport  
89
 And, even if there were such a power, some might argue, passing up all responsibility to it for our own 
actions and their consequences in this fashion, might scarcely be the best method of winning its 
approval.   
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Chapter 5 Friedrich Hayek: a Panglossian evolutionary theorist
90
  
 
 
omplex phenomena ... can be made intelligible only by ... a cosmology, that is, a 
SIP: 76) 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis looked at the mid- and late-twentieth century response of 
political economy to two anomalies which have been perceived as challenges to the 
Chapter 4 attention returned to the roots of this tradition in the writings of the eighteenth 
century father of nineteenth and twentieth century economics, Adam Smith.  The 
question addressed there was, how Smith saw the articulation between individual 
behaviour at the micro level and social outcomes at the macro level.  The answer I gave 
is that the articulating mechanism consisted in the agency of a deity.  Our behaviours at 
the micro level were always just what was required for the optimal macro outcome 
because that invisible deity always led us by the hand, through the pursuit of an amalgam 
of our own interests, our own illusions and fears, and our own fellow feeling for others, 
to perform just those actions required to fulfil the divine plan.  This is what Smith meant 
 
 
The implication I drew is that invisible hand theorists of more recent times, such as 
Friedrich Hayek, to the extent that, as representatives of a secular age, they cannot rely 
on an interventionist god, need an alternative mode of articulation between levels.  The 
most frequently invoked alternative, in so far as an explicit alternative is presented at all, 
                                               
90 An earlier version of this paper appeared as Denis (1999b),  and at point of writing material derived 
from it is under consideration at Constitutional Political Economy as Denis (2001b).   
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is some form of evolutionary mechanism.  This amounts to replacing one form of 
Panglossianism with another.  In replacing God with evolution we move from justifying 
the claim that it was selected by nature.  We remain within the Leibnizian paradigm, that 
this is the best of all possible worlds, only replacing the explanation that it was selected 
by God all at once with the explanation that it was selected by Nature over a long period 
of time. 
 
The purpose of the present chapter, therefore, is to investigate the deployment by Hayek 
of an evolutionary mechanism to argue that spontaneous aggregate level outcomes of our 
activity are intrinsically superior to any outcome we could achieve by conscious 
intervention at the macro level.   
 
in fact distorts the Darwinian theory of evolution and falsifies the standpoint of Adam 
Smith.  This distor -
established policy prescription.  He falsely claims that the Smithian economists can be 
applying in the biological field the ideas that the Smithians had already established in 
 apparently in 
order to render respectable a theory of social evolution which leads to laissez-faire 
conclusions.  A theme of the chapter will be the care with which we have to read Hayek.  
Frequently we will find him saying one thing and doing another.  Statements about his 
standpoint cannot necessarily be taken at face value.  Two examples we will meet 
concern his supposedly individualist methodological stance, and contradictory statements 
as to the nature of the Darwinian theory of evolution.   
 
As with the chapter on Smith, an initial caveat is in order.  This chapter is in no way to be 
construed as an attempt to give an all-
the contrary, the focus is on the specific concern of the research of which the chapter, 
and indeed the thesis, forms part: the question, that is, of how economic theorists have 
linked micro and macro levels, how these levels are coordinated or articulated.  Given, as 
I argued in the previous chapter, that in Adam Smith individual behaviours are pre-
coordinated by the invisible hand of a wise and benevolent Providence, and further that 
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the more secular twentieth century could not be expected to accept such an explanation, 
the invisible hand?  With respect to Hayek, therefore, I am here concerned only with this 
one que
 indeed, the two are in many ways very similar
91
  
and that 
intent, to major factual and theoretical distortions. 
 
5.2 Hayek and Smith 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, twentieth century Smithians have had trouble with 
 
WN in isolation) could see that what Smith was 
unpalatable notion in a relatively secular age.  Some instances of this anxiety about the 
given in the last chapter.   
 
Hayek was one of those who made it clear that he regarded the phrase as unfortunate.  
other great Scottish individualists of the eighteenth century  even though they spoke of 
 provided ... an explanation [of how the interaction of the efforts of 
CRS: 392-393).  
Unfortunately, the explanation that Hayek refers us to is for something different: he has 
illicitly changed the subject.   
 
The invisible hand   was the mechanism in Smith which ensured the 
perfect reconciliation of unconstrained individual motives and behaviour both with each 
other and with the social interest of maximising human welfare.  Two strands can be 
discerned in this thought: spontaneous order and optimality.  The spontaneous order 
                                               
91 Hutchison says that after the mid-  
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strand says that individual self-seeking behaviour, unconstrained by central authority, 
may result, not in chaos, but in orderly collective behaviour.  The optimality (efficiency, 
desirability) strand says that this order will be, in some sense, the best that we can get.  
Clearly, these are very different propositions.  The spontaneity proposition is, I think, 
undeniable, while the far stronger optimality proposition is just false.  If Smith had 
confined himself to the former, that would have been unexceptionable  and there would 
have been no call for divine intervention, nothing for an invisible hand to do.  The 
consequences of individual action would just be the consequences: orderly but often sub-
optimal collective behaviour.  No explanation of the transmutation of base passions into 
golden outcomes would be necessary as no such transmutation would be assumed to 
take place.   
 
Now the optimality proposition clearly encompasses the spontaneity proposition, and 
hence, when Smith attempts to sustain the former, he necessarily defends the latter.  The 
bulk of WN is concerned with this defence of the idea of a spontaneous order.  
Optimality and the invisible hand are there but they tend to be implicit.  It is therefore 
unsurprising that economists, reading Smith through nineteenth and especially twentieth 
representing the spontaneous emergence of some order, rather than, what it is, an 
assertion of the optimality of that emergent order.  Hayek, however, has pretensions to 
be  more than merely a technical economist  an intellectual and a scholar.  He has 
written widely on the Smith-Hume-Ferguson-Burke tradition  
COL: 61)  from which he claims intellectual descent.  It is illegitimate for 
him to slur over the difference between spontaneity and optimality.  The question is, how 
the question and immediately reduces it to the lesser, more innocuous question of the 
ion of the efforts of individuals can 
then were satisfied with having supported the spontaneity proposition, but this is not 
what he does.  Throughout his writings, Hayek adopts the same procedure: firstly, focus 
attention on the spontaneous order, and then slide over to an assumption of its 
optimality.   
                                                                                                                                         
(Hutchison, 1981: 228 n 17). 
 133 
 
says it is, an account of the spontaneous emergence of orderly social behaviour in the 
absence of prior design and central direction of individual activity.  On the other, it has 
invisible hand of God.  It is clear that God has to be replaced in the story: the question is, 
spontaneous order is to be played by evolution.   
 
92 has become the constant source of 
irritation of the scientistically minded, it describes nevertheless the central problem of the 
social sciences.  As it was put a hundred years after Smith by Carl Menger, who did more 
than any other writer to carry beyond Smith the elucidation of the meaning of this phrase, 
most important for its advancement can arise without a common will aiming at their 
93
 (CRS: 146-147) 
 
In this passage Hayek sets up the problem he is going to use a theory of evolution to 
solve.  That problem is how individuals pursuing their own goals fulfil social objectives 
about which the individuals neither know nor care.  This is the problem of the emergence 
of a spontaneous order.  But Hayek immediately identifies this with the problem of the 
assumption.  This says that individuals fulfil social goals, and those goals are just the 
ones which serve the collective interests of the indiv
assumed by Hayek (and Menger) that this is so, the big question being not 
whether but how  
 
socioeconomic and cultural evolution is the 
                                               
92 Hayek gives no reference here, and the phrase as it stands does not appear in Smith.  A similar 
passage is in WN 
by an invisible hand to  
93 The reference is to Menger (1883, LSE reprint 1933) Untersuchungen über die Methoden der 
Sozialwissenschaft p 163; trans Hayek.  
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1993: 153).  These accounts seem to point in different directions, the one highlighting 
attention on the evolutionary aspect.  In reality both are right, since the whole point of 
explanation of that order.  As we saw in the previous chapter, the deification of nature by 
the eighteenth century philosophers, including Smith, led  indeed, was intended to lead 
 to the sanctification of the particular model of human behaviour that they wished to 
hold up as natural.  In just the same way, the notion of evolution deployed by Hayek is 
intended, not to provide a scientific understanding of the social order, warts and all, 
which has emerged from a blind evolutionary process
94
, but to present that order as 
something with which it is beyond our competence to interfere.  Flew gets the 
ideological, almost theological role of evolution exactly right in his discussion of Social 
Darwinism: 
 
commendable, and that Nature is a deep repository of wisdom, [so] for many the process of 
evolution by natural selection becomes a secular surrogate for Divine Providence; and ... 
for some the possibility, or even the duty, of relying on this benign and mighty force 
presents itself as a decisive reason why positive social policies must be superfluous, and 
may be wrong   
 
 
 
5.3 Holism and reductionism in Hayek 
 
5.3.1 Shenfield on collectivism and holism in Hayek 
 
It is a commonplace that the methodological standpoint of the Austrian school, including 
and, perhaps, especially Hayek, what they insist upon with a fundamentalist zeal which 
distinguishes them from their more pragmatic neoclassical cousins, is the reductionist 
principle of methodological individualism.  See, for example Garrison and Kirzner (1989: 
121-122), and Hodgson (1993: 153-157).  With regard to Friedrich Hayek, this 
                                               
94 here is, at bottom, no design, 
explore the consequences for our institutions of such a blind, pitilessly indifferent process in a social 
context would be a  
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metho
95
, p. 221) 
(Hodgson, 1993: 157). 
 
 policy individualism.  
This is not to say that Hayek is entirely consistent or that it is impossible, with care, to 
pick out a methodological individualism in what he says.  On the contrary, perhaps even 
more than Smith, whose legacy he claims, Hayek seems to have taken literally the 
96
.  As we shall see, where the internal tensions of his standpoint, the stresses 
of combining holism and individualism in this way, prove too severe, consistency is the 
first casualty. 
 
The profound intellectual disarray of the Austrian school on the question of holism and 
reductionism is shown by a remarkable passage in Shenfield (1977).  The context for this 
needs to be made explicit.  Machlup (1977a) is a book of Essays on Hayek, presented at 
a conference of the Mont Pelerin Society in 1975, devoted to the achievements of 
Friedrich Hayek.  The Mont Pelerin Society was set up by Hayek and presided over by 
him for 12 years, after which he became its honorary president.  Perhaps needless to say, 
something of the nature of a quasi-official Austrian statement of Hayekian 
methodology
97
. 
 
                                               
95 Either the date or page number of this citation in Hodgson is incorrect. 
96 , that 
 
97 Shenfield also read the final text of Vol III of LLL 
 showing, again, the close links between Hayek and Shenfield (LLL: xxi). 
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The topic 
98
, the allegedly 
inappropriate attempt to apply natural scientific methods in the social sciences.   He 
argues that scientism depends on an unholy trinity of objectivism, collectivism and 
historicism.  It is with the second of these that we are concerned.  Collectivism, he says, 
Collectivism (perhaps better called holism ... ) ... treats as 
, as if 
 
 
This confused formulation says at least three things.  Firstly it correctly recognises that 
holism, as its name suggests, attempts to grasp entities as a whole, rather than as a 
collection of parts, as a unity rather than a plurality.  Secondly, however, focusing on 
particular social entities such as the economy, it suggests that the referent is not in fact an 
ication is clearly that holism is a 
misleading way to see things.  Lastly, Shenfield suggests that holism ascribes rational 
artly  result of the use of language for a system of 
 the implication being that 
such attribution is fallacious.  This point is neither trivial nor superficial.  It is interesting 
that already an in
that applied  
 
persisting where they prove useful and fading out where they are not.  The result is that 
society  like the physical structure of animals  has evolved to a point of much greater 
1983: 7  KES) 
 
There is a clear theoretical distinction between holistic accounts which view aggregate 
organisms.  The latter implicitly ascribes aggregate entities a greater degree of autonomy.  
This is both a bigger and a more specific claim.  Both views, however, tend to be labelled 
organic links between individuals lead to macroscopic effects of individual actions 
                                               
98 What Pop  
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(Carabelli, 1988).  Marx would undoubtedly have agreed, but went much further than 
Keynes, arguing that macro level entities, such as capital and the state, had the autonomy 
and self-
political state is an organism and that, therefore, its various powers are no longer to be 
part of the much richer orga IEO: 22).   
 
extreme: not all versions need see all social level entities as organisms, though, to be 
sure, some certainly do see some such entities in this light.  Adam Smith, for example, 
believed the world was an organism
99
 with every part organically linked to every other 
and subordinated to the task of maximising human happiness.  The world was ruled by a 
single mind, that of God, whose will was executed by the invisible hand.  While we can 
not mean to say that we should discard holism or organicism sans phrase.  On the 
contrary, while each holism must be judged on its merits, according to its ability to 
identify the principle connections between the elements of the entity in question, 
reductionism can be rejected a limine since it itself rejects a limine the relevance of those 
connections.   
 
Having said that collectivism was partly caused by organicism, Shenfield now goes on to 
examine the roots of collectivism in holism: 'Partly collectivism arises from the essential 
belief of philosophical holism, namely that wholes are more than the sum of their parts, 
and that the parts are less real than the wholes, being largely abstract analytical 
standpoint might put it, this is not an unrecognisable description of holism.  It would be 
                                               
99 That his imagery was mechanical rather than organic is a reflection of the idiom of the time, 
particularly the influence of the Newtonian scientific revolution, and has no bearing on the content of 
his theory in this respect.  For centuries people have employed the trope of referring to animals as 
machines without there being any suggestion that they misunderstood the nature of an organism.  Two 
examples spanning the last half-millennium a
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more correct to say that, in the holist view, wholes are different from rather than more 
than 
could, at a pinch, 
that it does not and cannot exist without me, as a functioning leg, but I could exist 
without it, though less ably than with it.  But this is not the main thrust of holism, which 
is merely to argue for seeing entities as wholes, as systems of relations, rather than as 
congeries of isolated parts.  Hayek himself is clear on this: 
 
greater than the mere sum of it
elements are related to each other that the talk about the whole being more than the parts 
TSO
is ... more than the totality of regularities observable in the actions of the individuals and 
cannot be wholly reduced to them ... a whole is more than the mere sum of its parts but 
(SIP: 70) 
 
consistent with the definition of the term used in this thesis.  So Hayek says that the 
whole is greater than the sum of the parts: to understand the entity in questions we have 
to understand the system of relations between its parts.  And Shenfield says that believing 
the whole is more than the sum of the parts is holism.  So presumably we can agree that 
o Shenfield, 
holism is just what Hayek is combating.  Or is it?  Having identified holism as the 
philosophical basis of collectivism, itself one of the three legs supporting scientism, the 
oceeds to admit that 
the holistic view is correct: 
 
its individuals would be if they had no contact with each other. Such a sum would not be a 
society at all.  A society is not a collection of hermits.  It is formed because individuals set 
up relations with each other.  It is then not more than the total of its interconnected 
  
 
taken in 
isolation.  But that is exactly what holism says: the whole cannot be understood except 
concedes the 
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 a collection of Robinson 
reductionist, and individualist, stance, while Shenfield, and, indeed, Hayek, adopt a 
holistic standpoint. 
 
One of the distinguishing features of the Austrian tradition separating it from the 
neoclassical orthodoxy is supposed to be its greater emphasis on methodology, its more 
advanced epistemological self-consciousness, its greater sensitivity to the need to 
establish the philosophical preconditions for the practice of economics.  What can we 
say, therefore when Shenfield, having conceded the case for holism, goes on in the very 
next sentence to conclude his critique of collectivism with  
 
unreality, or as a lesser 
- 100
(Shenfield, 1977: 69) 
 
Although introduced by 
preceded them.  No case at all has been presented for regarding the holist standpoint as 
-
On the contrary, as noted above, where he actually addresses the issues, he concedes the 
case.  The reference to the lamentable discussion of holism in Popper (1957: 76 ff) does 
nothing to help. 
 
In an epilogue to his discussion of collectivism, a paragraph on collectivism and 
measurement, Shenfield manages to combine holism and opposition to it in a single 
sentence: 
 
of scientific status.  But by treating the objects of its study as wholes, it is led to subject to 
measurement almost anything except their essence, namely the systems of connection 
(Shenfield, 1977: 69) 
 
                                               
100 The reference is to Karl Popper (1 Economica XI (new series), 
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Shenfield says here, firstl
from its relationship with the whole.  How such a system can only become visible when 
we cease to see it as a whole is just incomprehensible.  This confusion is adopted almost 
word for word from Popper (1957: 76).  
 
the essence of the objects of study), the implication is clearly that that essence is the one 
thing that they should be measuring.  This begs the question of how one is supposed to 
eason for scepticism about measurement in 
social science, which was basically a holistic one.  According to Hayek,  
 
particular social processes are never so numerous as to enable us to substitute ascertained 
probabilities for information about the individual events .... in the biological and in the 
social sciences frequently we cannot rely on probabilities, or the law of large numbers, 
because unlike the positions which exist in the physical sciences, where statistical evidence 
of probabilities can be substituted for information on particular facts, we have to deal with 
... organized complexity, where we cannot expect to find permanent constant relations 
between aggregates KES: 25) 
 
Here Hayek is making an essentially holistic point: the law of large numbers depends on 
the independence of the events in question; that is, that the mass of events is a congeries.  
-level events 
we are concerned with are connected to each other in an organic way: they are not 
independent, and hence statistical inference is invalid.   
 
n a holistic 
outlook, is not, however, to say that it is right.  On the contrary, what this view ignores is 
that it displays a constancy or consistency over time in some of its key internal variables, 
                                                                                                                                         
August, 126. 
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in spite of changes in environmental variables.  This is summed up both in the concept of 
 
 
This, again, is something which Hayek is well aware of.  In a subsection of The Sensory 
Order concerned with the evolution of the sensory order, Hayek briefly considers the 
purposive action made possible by a developed central nervous system may be premature 
so long as we do not possess a fully adequate biological theory of the comparatively 
TSO: 82)  His response to this view is to refer in 
he most promising 
(Fliessgleichgewicht
101
be reached will in some measure be independent of the initial conditions, seems to 
TSO: 83). 
 
This is essentially both a systems theoretical account of order emerging at the macro 
level of purposive behaviour and an assertion of our ability to understand it even in the 
ab
dynamic steady state immediately suggests that certain variables will be in stable long-run 
mutual relationship, which in turn suggests the suitability of appropriate mathematical 
and statistical techniques.  The body of techniques including cointegration, unit roots and 
error correction mechanisms springs to mind. 
 
Hayek with him, is extremely hostile to holistic approaches to economics, while semi-
covertly recognising that such approaches are methodologically sound.  Their opposition 
is due to the policy consequences which such approaches may entail  individual utility 
maximising behaviour is interdependent, and hence may not aggregate to collective 
welfare maximising outcomes.  The tensions implicit in this inconsistent standpoint soon 
begin to emerge when Shenfield attempts to apply this approach to the question of the 
validity of macroeconomics.  We should bear in mind that Friedman wrote the Foreword 
to the book (Shenfield, 1977: xxi-xxiv), and also chaired the session preceding 
                                               
101 ie, flow equilibrium. 
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Scientism did not deal with, namely the question of 
the legitimacy or virtue of macroeconomics.  Is not the whole of macroeconomics 
 
 
Now objectively the answer to this q
clear on this: 
 
regard itself as scientific .... [M]icroeconomic theory [is] the only legitimate economic 
KES: 21- General Theory] 
did not refer so much to any detail of the analysis as the general approach followed in the 
whole work.  The real issue was the validity of ... macro- TBT: 100) 
 
Shenfield, however, is more cautious.  He examines two aggregate level entities, national 
income and the general price level, for evidence of holism.  While the concept of national 
income is  rather grudgingly  acquitted, the general price level, Shenfield find
holistic fiction because it sets up an imaginary whole which is different from the 
102
).  This 
immediately creates a major difficulty as conservative neoclassical economists, in 
particular the monetarist school of thought around Milton Friedman, have depended 
upon the quantity theory of money, which itself depends on a notion of the general price 
y which 
-71).  How, then, to avoid 
division in the conservative ranks?  How to avoid castigating Friedman as a rank 
collectivist  he nature of 
 
 
may be a few collectivist ... concepts which, when used by those who know the pitfalls of 
collectivism, may be enlightening.  Macroeconomics can have value, but only in the hands 
 
 
Shenfield seems not to notice what he has said here.  He has made the value and 
significance of concepts such as the general price level and the quantity of money 
                                               
102 Keynes goes further and finds major difficulties with both concepts, such that he decides not to use 
them in the General Theory (GT: 37-40). 
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depend, not on their content and inner logic, but on the personal characteristics of the 
theorist deploying them.  If we were to take this approach seriously, all debate about 
ideas must cease and be replaced by discussion of personalities.  It would be interesting 
to know what Hayek and Friedman made of this attempted reconciliation of their 
theoretical standpoints. 
 
It is also interesting to note that, whereas earlier, on methodological terrain, we could 
characterise Hayek as adopting a holist and Friedman a reductionist stance, they have 
now  at the level of theory  
entities such as the price level which only emerge at the macro level  something which 
-holist prejudice (though not his real methodology) makes impermissible.  
This switch demonstrates how profoundly unconcerned these writers are with 
maintaining methodological and theoretical consistency.  Both want to retain policy 
individualism in a holist world: where they differ is on where to make concessions with 
-Keynesian 
macroeconomics to underpin a laissez-faire policy prescription, while to the same end 
Hayek would prefer to proscribe macroeconomic thought altogether.  
 
5.3.2 Hayek and holism 
 
Early in the final version of his magnum opus, Toynbee (1972), sets out definitions of his 
main terms.  Perhaps the most impor  
 
SOCIETY is the total network of relations between human beings.  The components of 
society are thus not human beings but relations between them.  In a social structure 
foci in the network o
Leviathan, displaying society as a gigantic human figure composed of a 
multitude of life-sized human figures, is an anthropomorphic misrepresentation of reality; 
and so is the practice of speaking of h
visible and palpable collection of people is not a society; it is a crowd.  A crowd, unlike a 
society, can be 103 
 
This is a vivid presentation of a holist view of society.  But what is interesting here for 
he 
                                               
103 For a similar criticism of the frontispiece to Leviathan, see Haworth (1994: 13). 
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foci 
Friedrich Hayek (CRS: 59).   
 
of the theory, not of society, but of mind, can be found in his work on theoretical 
psychology, The Sensory Order.  It is extremely significant that TSO was read in draft, 
favourable references in the text to Ashby, Bertalanffy and Wiener, the pioneers of 
cybernetics and systems thinking, and to Cannon, a pre-cursor of cybernetics and 
holistic standpoint emphasising the systematic interconnection of the substrate elements 
without considering the properties of those elements in isolation (Pask: 1961: 13).  All of 
 (1993: 157) remark cited earlier that methodologically Hayek 
is more a systems theorist than an individualist
104
.   
 
At the end of TSO
 
 
While our theory leads us to deny any ultimate dualism of the forces governing the realms 
of mind and that of the physical world respectively, it forces us at the same time to 
recognize that for practical purposes we shall always have to adopt a dualistic view .... 
[A]ny explanation of mental phenomena which we can hope ever to attain cannot be 
substitute statements about particular physical events (or classes of physical events) for 
statements about mental events .... [W]e shall never be able to bridge the gap between 
physical and mental phenomena; and for practical purposes ... we shall permanently have 
TSO: 179) 
 
We should bear in mind that at the beginning of the book, in defining his terms, he refers 
105
).  Taking this into 
                                               
104 See also LLL: xviii-xix. 
105 Later in the book, Hayek forgets that he has defined the microcosm and the macrocosm in this way, 
and refers to them the other way round  the macrocosm as the physical order and the microcosm as the 
sensory order (TSO: 108, 127).  The logic for this seems to be that the physical world, the macrocosm in 
this alternative definition, incorporates everything, including the microcosms of the sensory orders of 
organisms within it.  This is just one of a host of errors and inconsistencies which will irritate and 
frustrate the reader of this book.  A substantial proportion of the index entries are incorrect and the 
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account, the passage just cited is a lucid and succinct account of the holist standpoint 
applied to psycho
reduction, however, compel us to understand the macro level in its own terms.  There is 
prevailing in a particular part of the physical universe  that part of it which is ourselves
in practice we are forced to recognise a dichotomy between lower and 
educe 
 
 
part, of the holistic nature of the world in which we live.  This recognition is particularly 
important as it throws into sharp relief his assertion of individualist and reductionist 
methodological conceptions when policy issues loom.  It also exposes a key aspect of his 
overall procedure: that, where necessary to defend his laissez-faire policy prescription, 
of individualism, and to underpin that he realises he needs to assert an individualist 
methodology.  However, such a methodology faces insurmountable incongruities with 
the way the world is: at some stage the fundamentally holistic nature of the world has to 
be taken on board if our interaction with it is to have any efficacy whatever.  Hence the 
s the consequence of his partisan policy 
approach manifests itself in connection with his theory of evolution.  We will find that 
something very similar occurs here, too: Hayek says one thing and does another  he is 
well aware of the implications of the Darwinian theory, but falsifies it when it clashes 
with his desired policy outcome.  
 
5.4 Hayek and evolution 
 
                                                                                                                                         
German orthography is haphazard.  Elsewhere (CRS: 72), in an extended analogy between the physical 
and social domains, Hayek uses the terms microcosm and macrocosm to refer to the atomic substrate and 
aggregate outcome levels respectively.   
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5.4.1 Darwinian evolution 
 
ly be understood on the basis of its rôle in his overall 
intellectual project, and, hence, an understanding of the nature of that project itself.  
policy prescription, namely laissez-faire
106
.  Now to say this is not necessarily to 
condemn Hayek, although we shall see later that he can indeed be seriously criticised on 
this score.  It is certainly no dishonour, however, to adopt a polemical stance or to allow 
that stanc
economics, from Smith and Marx to Keynes and Friedman have a had a particular policy 
axe to grind, and have attempted to establish an economic theory to provide 
underpinning for a pre-existing social philosophy.  It is their engagement with policy 
implications, rather than any aloof, purely theoretical standpoint, which has given what 
they had to say its coherence and bite.  The problems that arise when Hayek attempts to 
do this, however, will become apparent as we examine his theory.   
 
cannot be relied upon to give us an accurate description of his own mode of procedure.  
We have already seen an example of this in connection with methodological issues: 
Hayek repeatedly asserts his adherence to one approach, methodological individualism, 
while in fact adopting a contrary one, methodological holism.  When unconstrained by 
potential adverse policy implications  in theoretical psychology, for example  Hayek 
adopts a thorough-going holist account, and traces of this view can be seen elsewhere.  
When he is discussing society, however, the shutters come down and methodological 
individualism is proclaimed.  That what is key for Hayek is the goal of privileging the 
level of the individual, and not the methodological approach to be adopted, is shown by 
                                               
106 Hayek himself denies that he supports laissez-faire, and denies that Hume, Smith or Burke supported 
it (COL  
laissez-faire as the negation of 
all state activity  
elsewhere he makes laissez-faire mean, not an injunction to leave individuals alone, but to leave the 
existing laws alone (IEO: 135).  On this interpretation, a removal of absolutist and mercantilist laws 
restricting trade would be a denial rather than an implementation of laissez-faire.  Laissez-faire is 
understood in the same way in RTS (RTS: 13, 27).  This, I contend, is an absurd misuse of words.  On 
the meaning of the word which everyone else uses, Hayek is clearly a proponent of laissez-faire. 
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his adoption of holism in psychology, and his claim to adopt individualism in economics.  
The former implies a systems view of the individual personality, while the latter again, 
although now arbitrarily, privileges the level of the individual agent.  Focus on the 
abstraction of the individual is the goal, and the selection of methodology is made to suit.  
 
We may see another example of Hayek saying one thing and doing another in connection 
with the theory of evolution.  He correctly sets out the principle elements of the 
Darwinian theory of evolution, but the theory he actually uses is different.  We can see 
this by comparing what he says in COL, SIP, and NSP.  In COL, Hayek sets out his 
evolutionary theory and links it to his major themes.  Hume, Smith and Ferguson, he 
evolved COL
Hayek wishes to attract to the tradition from which he claims descent the prestige 
associated with the Darwinian theory of evolution (Hodgson, 1993: 152).  He 
immediately links 
have given us an interpretation of the growth of civilization that is still the indispensable 
foundation of the argument for liberty.  They find the origin of institutions, not in 
co COL: 56-57).   
 
 
evolution  laissez-faire
for 
the governmental and property systems which actually exist, Smith argued that all was 
for the best in this world as the invisible hand of God guided agents to those actions 
which achieved the socially most desirable outcomes.  I said also that in the more secular 
twentieth century this goal of reconciliation could only be achieved if a plausible and 
m is to replace the 
supernatural invisible hand with a natural one, a version of evolutionary theory which can 
combine the minimal policy prescription of laissez-faire
respectability of a Darwin.   
 
At the same time he re-writes history in an attempt to show, contrary to what we saw in 
the previous chapter, that Smith did not make God the linchpin of his system: on the 
 148 
contrary, we are informed, Smith et al had already discovered evolution, and, indeed, 
had done most of the work for which Darwin later took the credit: 
 
of social evolution today is likely to create the impression that we are borrowing the idea 
from biology, it is worth stressing that it was, in fact, the other way round: there can be 
little doubt that it was from the theories of social evolution that Darwin and his 
COL: 59) 
 
This is indeed a staggering claim.  Although, like much of what Hayek has to say, it is 
wrapped up in vague phrases   this is 
clearly a claim that the credit for the Darwinian theory should properly go to the Scottish 
eighteenth century philosophers, principally Smith and Hume.  As Hodgson says, 
multiple precedence is ... without foundation .... It betrays both a misreading of the 
sources and some misunderst  
 
Contrary to what Hayek says, there is no truth whatever in the claim that anything even 
remotely approaching an anticipation of Darwin can be found in the works of Adam 
Smith.  Many of the things whose origin 
fundamental feature of our social psychology, make a great deal of sense in an 
himself had such a perspective, indeed he most certainly did not
107
. As far as Hume is 
theory and its relation to Darwin  
 
In COL 
of a pre-
                                               
107 
WN 
Astronomy 
There is no sense of diversification of social forms coupled with selection of the fittest ones which would 
make this an evolutionary process in the modern, Darwinian sense. 
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(COL: 59).  In SIP, however, he says  
 
natural selection] we must clear out of the way a widely held misconception as to its 
content.  It is often represented as if it consisted of an assertion about the succession of 
particular species of organisms which gradually changed into each other.  This however, is 
not the theory of evolution SIP: 31). 
 
of structure always means a common ancestry ... is emphatically not the main content of 
 (SIP
own: the hypothesis  
 
innum
18-19).   
 
It was thus, not merely the assertion of the hypothesis of descent, but also the 
explanation of modification, that was the aim of The Origin of Species (Dennett, 1995: 
39).  So the theory of evolution espoused in COL is now, in SIP
gives no hint as to who might be guilty of holding it, and none at all that he himself had 
recently held this view.  If the COL conception of evolution is incorrect, what is the 
correct conception?  
 
ution by natural selection] ... is that a 
mechanism of reduplication with transmittable variations and competitive selection of 
those which prove to have a better chance of survival will in the course of time produce a 
great variety of structures adapted to continuous adjustment to the environment and to 
SIP: 32) 
 
result 
of evolution is concerned, we have organisms which are well-adapted to their 
form of that 
adaptation in some species).   
 
 150 
The reader might be forgiven for thinking that, at least it is the later formulation which is 
done so
108
.  But this is not so.  In 1978 Hayek (NSP: 249-266) reprinted without 
comment his 1966 British Academy Lecture on a Mastermind, 
mark the definite breakthrough in modern thought of the twin ideas of evolution and of 
Mandeville: 250).  Moreover  
 
of evolution a commonplace in the social sciences of the nineteenth century long before 
Darwin.  And it was in this atmosphere of evolutionary thought in the study of society, 
effective habits and practices, that Charles Darwin at last applied the idea systematically to 
be NSP: 264-265). 
 
So, again, Hayek is claiming that the Scottish Enlightenment philosophers, this time 
ular context of society.  
the biological context, and the rest was history
109
 and perhaps more importantly  
contain not one point of evidence to back up his description of Mandeville as a 
question of Malthus having articulated this idea with the other necessary components  
replication, descent and modification  to achieve a theory of evolution.  And secondly, 
                                               
108 ground for 
 
109  regularity 
without design, and that social change can be explained without recourse to deliberate human actions, 
was discovered by the thinkers of the 18th-century Scottish Enlightenment, notably Adam Ferguson, 
David Hume and Adam Smith, long before Darwin in a not dissimilar way explained the biological 
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Hayek gives no credit to Malthus for his contribution to Darwinism.  As is well known, 
Malthus strongly rejected the Panglossian optimism of the Smithian tradition which 
tated more to harmony and 
equilibrium  as in the cases of Adam Smith and Herbert Spencer  than to the relentless 
-278, 
n4)
110
. 
  
So Hayek says different, and, indeed, contradictory things.  When in 1960 he reduces 
Darwinian evolutionary theory to a hypothesis of common ancestry  what he 
 it is so that he can link Darwin with the Scottish 
philosophers, particularly Smith and Hume, and bolster a particular notion of evolution in 
COL
COL: 59).  
 
 
In the passages cited from SIP, he is less constrained.  He is citing evolution as an 
(SIP: 31-35).  His point is to argue that, contrary to physical theories, evolutionary 
theory cannot be used to make specific predictions: because of the limits on our ability to 
acquire the necessary information, it is not possible to predict the direction evolution will 
take or to verify such predictions.  All we can do is to talk about certain patterns of 
outcomes which can or cannot be produced and the conditions which would affect them.  
His interest in this is to say that the study of social structures is of the same kind: a case 
of pattern, not specific, prediction.  Evolution is, again, being used here ultimately to 
underscore a theoretical point required to generate his desired policy conclusions: the 
limitations on our knowledge of society preclude central planning
111
.  Nevertheless, the 
                                               
110 Essay on the 
Principle of Population in the second (1802) and subsequent editions in Poovey (1998: Ch 6).   
111
 The argument is illegitimate since, as The Sensory Order makes clear, the same limits to self-
knowledge apply to individuals as to society  
plan their activities. 
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link is here far less direct; hence in this context he has no reason to distort the theory and 
we get a relatively objective account. 
 
discussing evolutionary theory in general terms as an example of the study of complex 
phenomena, he is deploying it to underpin a particular policy agenda.  He draws out a 
tradition going from Mandeville through Hume, Smith, Ferguson, and Burke, as well as 
Savigny and Herder (NSP: 265), to himself.  These thinkers share two things: a notion of 
independently of their intentions, and a belief in the optimality  in some sense (the 
individuals Hayek mentions vary)  of that spontaneous order
112
.  The identification of 
NSP
spontaneous emergence of a social order as tantamount to an evolutionary process.  The 
corollary would be that the spontaneous order philosophers are pioneer evolutionary 
theorists, and Darwin is seen as getting all the credit simply by applying the idea to 
biological phenomena.  One result is to confer the scientific authority of Darwinism on 
the spontaneous order tradition, and another is to present a fallible social process as 
something natural and hence right.  The idea of optimality is smuggled in under cover of 
spontaneity.   
 
In sum, then, when Hayek is discussing the theory of evolution in an objective way, he is 
able to give a reasonable account of the process; when he is actually using the theory to 
buttress his overall system we get something very different.  The theory is treated with 
                                               
112 That what Mandeville says in many places is open to this interpretation is very true.  But it is also 
vices by the dexterous managem
if these actions were properly channelled by the government.  As a mercantilist, Mandeville had no 
laissez-
faire
was a mercantilist or a liberal seems likely: the fact is that he inconsistently adopted both points of view 
in different places.   
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knows what he is talking about, but it seems that he is willing to distort theory, just as he 
is willing to distort facts, in order to fit with his desired conclusions. 
 
We have seen how Hayek is guilty of a major distortion of Smith, how he recruits 
Mandeville to his spontaneous order tradition by suppressing contrary evidence, and how 
a  
 
basis of his argument for freedom.  But this theory did more.  Though his primary aim was 
to account for the evolution of social institutions, he seems to have been clearly aware that 
the same argument could also be used to explain the evolution of biological organisms.  In 
his posthumously published Dialogues on Natural Religion he more than hints at such an 
applicati
revolutions, through the endless periods of eternal duration.  The incessant changes to 
a
an animal could subsist unless its parts were so adjusted?  Do we not find that it perishes 
ut intermission; 
is evolution.  It was still 
(SIP: 119) 
 
There are three references to evolution 
 and even if Hume had used the term evolution, it would not have meant what 
we 
domain prior to 1859.  Let us explore this issue further.  The object of this passage is to 
convince the reader that Hume had a full-blown theory of evolution which he applied to 
institutions and which he toyed with applying to biological phenomena.  Yet the article 
on David Hume in which it appears, contains no evidence or argument that Hume did in 
fact have an evolutionary theory of society.  What we see instead is a demonstration that 
Hume regarded the emergence of the regular and lawful institutional structure of society 
as being largely the product of a spontaneous process.  The impression that Hayek 
wishes to create is that the two are the same thing.  Now there are certainly links 
between the theory of evolution and the emergence of a spontaneous human order; 
evolution is clearly both orderly and rule-governed on the one hand, and  spontaneous, in 
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there are very significant differences between the two; the social structure, for example, 
arises, and must arise, on the basis of the deliberate actions of human beings (even if not 
as a result of their intentions), but this is clearly not necessarily the case for evolution.  A 
simple identity between the theory of spontaneous orders and that of evolution cannot be 
assumed: on the contrary, the links between the two, and what divides them, have to be 
argued for.   
 
Dialogues for a theory of evolution in nature.  To 
help us we may call as expert witness the American philosopher Daniel Dennett, who has 
dealt with precisely this point in his book .  Part 4 of Chapter 1 
t, 1995: 28-34).   After noting, what is 
surely correct, that Hume himself appears in the Dialogues in the person of Philo, 
, 1995: 32).  And it is true: if we read the 
Dialogues, or just the passages cited in Dennett, we can see that Philo did come close to 
the discovery of evolution by natural selection.   
 
The extracts Dennett cites show (a) a prescient depiction of the origin of life (an 
which we actually observe in living things; (c) the claim that defects in form will lead to 
removal of the form.  The latter statement is clearly an idea of natural selection.  What 
this account lacks, what distinguishes it from Darwinism, is the idea of reproduction as 
combining overall stability of form with some errors: imperfect replication, allowing 
 which 
must be a severe defect in any putative theory of evolution.   
 
Moreover, Philo is ambiguous about the key issue of imperfect replication.  Firstly he 
contrasts the stability of the orders or economies, with the random transpositions of 
disordered matter.  Secondly he implies that there must be changes in natural forms in 
that defects in them are removed.  But if the orders are stable, where do the defects 
come from?  Again, because he says nothing about reproduction, descent with 
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modification, we are left with that version of selection in which an original endowment of 
variety is gradually whittled away by selection leaving only the forms we see today.  A 
form of selection in which a given pool of objects is sifted, the imperfect forms removed 
and only the adapted ones remain.  In this account nothing has happened to the adapted 
forms, only to the unadapted ones: the adapted forms were there from the start
113
, 
can be seen in Lucretius in the first century BC (Lucretius, 55 BC: Book 5, lines 837-
877; 1969: 191; 1951: 196-198), and in Empedocles more than four hundred years 
before that (Barrow and Tipler, 1988: 34).   
 
In arriving at a verdict on Philo, we need to take three things into consideration.  Firstly, 
itute only a speculation, involving a brief passage, not a worked out 
judgment is her
seriously, without a source of variety for natural selection to work on, in the form of 
copying with errors, a fully functioning theory of evolution is not possible.  Hume has 
Smith anticipated Darwin.   
 
To summarise the results of the discussion so far: Hayek is able to set out the theory of 
evolution concisely, but when he comes to use it, the theory of evolution he employs is 
-Hume-Smith-Ferguson 
NSP: 265, n58) developed the theory of evolution which Darwin then later 
applied to the biological sphere.  This claim is false.  In both cases his objective is to 
identify the emergence of a spontaneous social order with an evolutionary process, in 
order to present that order as something natural, something which we cannot and should 
not adapt to our own needs. The arguments in each case have been shown to be 
                                               
113 
n of the new forms is obscure  if anything, it appears to 
be by the continual emergence of new life forms from inanimate matter rather than by adaptation of 
existing forms.  In this sense it is true that adapted forms do not acquire their adaptation from the 
evolutionary process but acquire it at their origin as life forms.   
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illegitimate.  Ultimately the rôle of evolution in Hayek is just that of the invisible hand in 
Smith: an inscrutable agency which arranges that the unintended outcomes of our actions 
will be benign.  Again, we have an interface between a holistic world and a reductionist 
policy prescription: our activities as human beings are organically linked to each other 
but can be treated as if they were independent: if the actions of each individual are 
directed towards the good of that individual, then the actions of all individuals must tend 
to the good of all.  All the hard work of reconciling disparate interests and behaviours is 
accomplished behind the scenes by the process of evolution. 
 
5.4.2 Hayekian evolution 
 
We have seen that the the
COL: 56-57), 
(NSP
COL: 59)?  This subsection will investigate these questions further.   
 
In order to do so we first need to introduce the distinction between ontogeny and 
phylogeny  terms used by Hayek himself (TSO: 42, for example), but without any 
apparent consciousness of the significance of the distinction for his theory.  Ontogeny is 
the development of the individual of a species, while phylogeny is the evolution of the 
species.  Now the term evolution 
developing [of a
are included under the catchword evolution in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 
(Onions, 1973: 693)
114
.  But there is a key difference between these ideas: ontogeny, the 
development of the individual from embryo to maturity, has a goal, whereas phylogeny 
has none.  Ontogeny is teleological: the phases which the immature organism normally 
passes through are means to the end of creating a reproductively mature adult.  Once 
                                               
114
 The two definitions are dated to 1670 and 1832 respectively.  The second definition still is not the 
same thing as Darwinism  as, indeed, it could not be, prior to 1859  lacking as it does the key notion 
of natural selection as the cause of the modification of species. 
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that goal, adulthood, is achieved, development ceases.  Deviation from the normal 
ontogeny is in general pathological.  Phylogeny is very different: there is no goal in the 
development, and can be none, since no agency exists to implement the interest of the 
species.  Each individual attempts to survive and to pass on its DNA to successive 
generations, the best it can, given the character of its environment, including the other 
individuals of its species.  The history of the species is just a list of the ways in which this 
is permanent change, the process of adaptation to the environment can never be 
complete.  Ontogeny terminates, but the only possible terminus to phylogeny is 
extinction.   
 
It must, then, be clear that the Darwinian theory of evolution is a theory of phylogeny, 
not ontogeny.  Hodgson (1993: 161) makes the case, however, that Ha
theory is ontogenetic and not phylogenetic: 
 
SIP
interpreted as nothing else but an endeavour to reconstruct from regularities of the 
individual actions 
Biological ontogeny is precisely the endeavour to explain the development of organisms 
from the regularities of their genetic endowment, in contrast to phylogeny which considers 
t
 
 
Now this argument could easily be extremely unfair to Hayek.  Ontogeny and phylogeny 
are not alternative theories in biology, but complementary.  It is true that species evolve, 
and it is also true that individuals develop to adulthood.  Hodgson has clearly identified 
ayek uses this 
ontogeny in place whole of 
like Popper, exhibited great anxiety and dogmatism about the boundaries between one 
science and another and between science and other related activities.  It would be quite 
plausible for Hayek to relegate phylogeny to some other cognate discipline.  We will see 
shortly that this is not the case. 
 
The implication of Hodgs
evolutionary, since evolution concerns phylogeny not ontogeny. This is very important 
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outcome: there is a log  
history.  The ontogenetic version of evolution is fully compatible with the Whig 
interpretation of history, in which the essence and goal of history is the development of 
 
 
 evolution with his persistent tendency 
 
 
writings of Walras or Smith, Hayek makes the addition of 
mere appendage.  Darwin is then reduced in stature because he is not significant for the 
Hayekian theory.  Without further clarification, the latter can easily be reduced to the post-
Humean ontogeny of the emergence of the coherent social order... [O]ntogeny was well 
established before Darwin.  It is thus no accident that Hayek simultaneously upgrades 
 
 
Here we have further evidence that Hayek attempts to annex the prestige of Darwinian 
evolution whilst simultaneously distorting the Darwinian theory.  Hayek's theory is 
ontogenetic; ontogenetic theories of development in nature and society were extant long 
before Darwin, and, moreover, are not theories of evolution at all, but a theory of the 
maturation of an organism.  Clearly, twentieth century capitalism has emerged from some 
kind of developmental process.  The question is, whether that process was ontogenetic 
elevant concept of development is that of 
ontogeny: we have reached the terminus of history, and the system we have now must be 
considered optimal.  If, on the contrary, phylogeny is the appropriate concept then no 
such assumption of optimality can be justified: on the contrary the desirability or 
otherwise of the institutional framework has to be determined by reference to the facts 
rather than to theological, or evolutionary, invisible hand apologetics.  
 
Even Norman Barry, a writer with great sympathy fo
invocation of evolution as a failure:  
 
meeting ma
evidence hardly points to an ultimate triumph of the market order ... the evidence for 
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beginn -47) 
 
5.4.3 The assumed optimality of evolved institutions  
 
There is a key passage in COL in which Hayek links the Scottish Enlightenment 
thinkers, social evolution, and the question of optimality: 
 
ionalist tradition assumes that man was originally endowed with both the 
intellectual and the moral attributes that enabled him to fashion civilization deliberately, 
the evolutionists made it clear that civilization was the accumulated hard-earned result of 
trial and error; that it was the sum of experience, in part handed from generation to 
generation as explicit knowledge, but to a larger extent embodied in tools and institutions 
which had proved themselves superior  institutions whose significance we might discover 
Scottish theorists were very much aware how delicate this artificial structure of civilisation 
ncts115 being tamed and 
checked by institutions that he neither had designed nor could control.  They were very far 
they did sometimes use the last phrase).  They knew that it required the artifices of 
institutions and traditions to reconcile the conflicts of interest.  Their problem was how 
f love, may receive such direction in this case 
(as in all others) as to promote the public interest by those efforts it shall make towards 
116  
-
117 
would be reconciled, that had successfully channeled individual efforts to socially 
COL: 59-60) 
 
There are many points to comment on in this passage.  Firstly, as we saw in the previous 
 
view was a little more complex: it was true, in his view, that man was imperfect  but 
even the imperfections were god-given and contributed to the overall plan.  The 
such by men because of their finite minds: the infinite mind of God, seeing all the 
                                               
115 altruism and solidarity
these two instincts ... which remained the great obstacle to the development of the modern economy .... I 
could write the whole of economic history in terms of the subduing of these good natural instincts by 
KES: 31). 
116
 The reference is to Josiah Tucker (1755) The Elements of Commerce in RL Schuyler (ed) (1931) 
Josiah Tucker: A Selection New York: Columbia University Press, p 92. 
117 The reference is to Edmund Burke Thoughts and Details on Scarcity in Works Vol VII: 398. 
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apparent imperfections to the perfection of the whole.  In this sense, then, Smith certainly 
did believe in the natural goodness of man, despite all appearances contradicting that 
belief.  Again, Hayek distorts what the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers actually said in 
order to present them as the initiators of an evolutionary trend in social thought.   
 
reconcile conflicting interests.  The central question of economics and of social science in 
general does indeed concern how individual self-seeking behaviour is to be led into 
assured that institutions evolved to secure life, liberty, and property, and that they have 
the effect of directing self-interest into the service of the community.  But we are given 
absolutely no details  no examples, no analysis of the evolution of particular institutions 
or types of institution.  Hayek ought to show, as an example, how, and in what 
circumstances, some of the institutions we have inherited from the past reconcile self-
interest with the interests of others.  But there is no word here on how institutions 
accomplish this task.   
 
spontaneous emergence of a social order with the extreme rationalist account
118
 in which 
every instance of institutional progress occurs as a direct result of the conscious 
intentions of some social reformer.  In this Hayek is correct.  It was in the interest of the 
absolutist regimes and their mercantilist literary representatives to argue that the only 
alternative to a consciously constructed and imposed centralised order was a chaotic 
anarchy.  The Smithians performed a signal service by arguing that social orders could 
also arise spontaneously on the basis of self-seeking behaviour.   
 
Secondly, however, we have the hypothesis of optimality.  The institutions which issue 
from an extensive process of evolution are said to reconcile individual interests and 
channel individual efforts into socially beneficial directions.  Clearly, they must do this to 
some extent, or we would not be able to observe spontaneous orders, but the key 
question is, how well they do this.  On this, Hayek is content to remain silent and to 
                                               
118 This is not the place to discuss whether his treatment of the continental rationalist trend is any nearer 
the mark than his treatment of the Smithian trend. 
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allow the presumption of optimality to remain unexamined.  In his theory, the institutions 
which are handed down by our forbears show their superiority in their very survival: they 
he argues that individual interests are rendered socially beneficial by the evolution of 
institutions.  But this begs the question: institutions, like genes, survive the selection 
 at 
surviving, not necessarily at serving our interests.  An institution may well survive 
because, although harmful to the majority, it serves the interest of a minority who happen 
 the Mafia, for example, or 
Thuggee. 
 
The clear 
old it has survived the selection process of imitation and learning, by means of which 
institutions, ideas and skills are transmitted to new generations, on the basis of their 
success in serving the interests of previous generations. The hidden implication is that 
when one of two institutional forms is selected, then it can be regarded as unambiguously 
superior to the alternative form.  In some sense it reconciles the interests of the individual 
agents more efficiently.  There is no hint that one group of agents may have an interest in 
on
Once this is allowed, institutional change involves victory and defeat for different groups.  
In that case it becomes impossible to describe such change, without qualification, as 
it is unproblematic to compare two institutions and sele
Sen, discussing this point in Hayek, makes the point that the Smithian argument which 
Hayek relies on  
 
achieve the results intended by individuals 
... and then some more.  I want bread and will happily give some money for it, and the 
baker wants money and will give me a loaf of bread in exchange.  When we carry out the 
exchange, we do achieve what we set out to achieve, and in the process we have helped 
each other ... the market works on the basis of congruence of interests of different 
participants.  That is the essence of the Smithian perspective: different people have a 
common interest in exchange and the market gives them the opportunity to pursue their 
common interests ... In most economic problems the interests of the different people 
involved are partly congruent, partly conflicting.  The market mechanism on its own 
confines its attention only to issues of congruence, leaving the interest conflicts 
3: 4-6) 
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As we saw in the previous chapter, market activity in Smith does not reconcile individual 
agent interests  because these interests have been pre-reconciled by the invisible hand of 
God: exchange realises that pre-existing reconciliation.  Now, we can see that Hayek 
adopts a comparable stand.  Agent interests are assumed not to be mutually 
contradictory: individual agents hold common but merely spontaneously uncoordinated 
interests.  Explaining the evolution of new modes of conduct Hayek says that 
manners of conduct ... were adopted because somebody who acted on them profited 
KES: 32).  In other words, there was a pre-
existing harmony of interest between the individual and the group: the individual benefits 
himself  and simultaneously the group  by his actions.  This is the basic assumption on 
realise terests by 
bringing about a coordination of their activities.  This allows the optimality of the 
institutional framework resulting from the evolutionary process to be assumed.   
 
Since I have placed considerable emphasis on the optimality assumption in Hayek, it is 
important to consider the occasions on which it is explicitly raised in his writings.  I will 
refer to two such passages, one in IEO and one in COL. 
 
his peculiar knowledge and skill with the aim of furthering the aims 
for which he cares, and if, in so doing, he is to make as large a contribution as possible to 
needs which are beyond his ken, it is clearly necessary ... that the relative importance to 
him of the different results he can achieve must correspond to the relative importance to 
IEO [A]ny 
individual can expect from the different uses of his abilities and resources correspond to 
IEO: 21). 
 
This is just an obscure way of saying that the ordinal ranking of the possible outcomes of 
his a
119
) must be the 
same for him and for other people affected by his actions; ie, if he faces a choice between 
spending and saving, and he decides to save, society in general must not prefer that he 
spends.  In other words, there must be a harmony of interests.  If this condition were 
always satisfied, then self-serving behaviour would always lead to socially optimal 
                                               
119 
ordinal ranking.  Whether it does or not, it certainly means at least that, and hence the argument in the 
text follows.   
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outcomes.  So we urgently need to know when we can expect this harmony to hold.  
such a market the individual making a decision has the same ranking of outcomes of his 
behaviour as everyone else does.  Hayek, in other words, blandly asserts that there is no 
such thing as an externality.  This is just to assume the whole problem away.  It also 
eliminates any qualitative diversity between individuals: each individual has the same 
ranking of outcomes as everyone else.   
 
It is true that Hayek a
markets could imply that any market in which the condition fails is defined as 
claim is empirical, he should justify it empirically  which, of course, he cannot do.  If it 
 
 
In COL, Hayek allows that the points he has previously made  
 
sets of moral beliefs which have grown up in a society will be 
beneficial .... [A] group or nation [may] destroy itself by the moral beliefs to which it 
adheres.  Only the eventual results can show whether the ideals which guide a group are 
beneficial or destructive .... It may well be that a nation may destroy itself by following the 
teaching of what it regards as its best men .... There would be little danger of this in a 
society whose members were still free to choose their way of practical life, because in such 
a society such tendencies would be self-
ideals would decline, and others, less moral by current standards, would take their place.  
But this will happen only in a free society in which such ideals ar
(COL: 67) 
 
So, although he admits that suboptimal systems may evolve, firstly, this can only be 
rationalistically step in beforehand to avert the catastrophe.  Secondly he is able to assert 
 by appeal to 
assumes optimality
good for individuals is good for their group and what is good for the group is good for 
the nation.  But of course the behaviour which is Nash for agents within a society  
whether they be individuals or groups  cannot be assumed to be optimal for the society 
as a whole.  Individuals and groups do not achieve pre-eminence in a nation by following 
rules which it would be in the interest of the nation for everyone to follow, but by 
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following rules which 
establishment.   
 
To conclude, therefore, Hayek does clearly subscribe to the optimality assumption.  A 
IEO: 20) will generate social 
outcomes which are the best we can get.  His theory of social evolution is intended to 
provide underpinning for this assumption.   
 
In view of the link drawn in the previous chapter between the assumption of optimality 
and the natural law tradition in Smith, it is interesting to note here the very favourable 
view that Hayek takes of that tradition.  In Mandeville, pp 131 ff, he details how the 
 ie, natural 
law  from Greek times up to the present.  He postulates a connection between freedom, 
all free countries a belief that a special providence watched over their affairs which 
turned Mandeville: 130)
120
Weltanschauung.  Hayek summarises 
the history of the spontaneous order tradition as follows: 
 
the spontaneous development of social orders .... [I]t [sc this tradition] led to a systematic 
questioning of how things would have ordered themselves if they had not otherwise been 
arranged by the deliberate efforts of government; they [sc the older theorists of natural 
Mandeville: 
131). 
 
Thus Hayek claims intellectual descent from the ancient
121
 and medieval tradition of 
natural law.  In particular he says of the tradition from which he claims intellectual 
                                               
120 The preceding 
ng to Hayek, 
holding a belief in the ministrations of a special providence illustrates an understanding of social 
 yet more evidence of the quasi-  
121 Two examples he gives are Aristophanes and Cato (Mandeville: 130-131). 
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continued or resumed the aim of the older natural law theo SIP: 103-104).   
 
5.4.4 Group selection 
 
The idea that institutions, constructed on the basis of individual micro behaviour, are 
selected on the basis of their success at the macro level, leads immediately to the idea of 
group selection, so reviled by contemporary biology.  This subsection explores the theme 
 
 
SIP: 
Ch 4: 66-81).  Firstly, he explains that rules of individual behaviour constitute the basic 
units of evolution in society: it is rules which play in social science the role played by 
conduct of individuals can be d
SIP: 
rules can be transmitted genetically or culturally, and they may be embodied 
in humans, non-human animals, or even self-replicating von Neumann machines (SIP: 
66).  In so far as they are genetically transmitted, they are identical to the genes for the 
behaviour they specify; in so far as they are culturally transmitted, they are synonymous 
with memes
conduct which govern the behaviour of the individual members of a group ... and ... the 
distinction is well-taken.  The system of rules of conduct are the social equivalent of the 
memotype, while the order of actions corresponds to the 
phenotype.  The system or order of rules is the set of instructions; the system or order of 
actions is the outcome.  They describe the micro behaviour of the individuals composing 
the society and the macro social outcome, respectively.   
 
Contrary to any reductionist view, which would imply a simple, mechanical, and 
aggregative relationship between memotype and phenotype, between system of rules and 
order of actions, Hayek stresses the contingent nature of the macro level system arising 
on the 
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conduct of the individuals with the actions of other individuals and the external 
SIP: 71).  
He cites the entropy principle embodied in the second law of thermodynamics as an 
instance of regular micro level behaviour leading to perfect disorder at the macro level 
(SIP: 67), and a society in which fixed rôles were filled by individuals selected by lot, as 
an instance of irregular behaviour at the micro level supporting a perfectly orderly macro 
outcome (SIP: 69).  Moreover, 
 
actions of a group of individuals ... and it is at least conceivable that the same overall 
order of actions may be produced by different sets of rules of individual conduct ... The 
same set of rules of individual conduct may in some circumstances bring about a certain 
order of actions, but not do so in SIP: 67-68)   
 
These perfectly correct  indeed, valuable  points, however, are leading up to an 
incorrect  in 
other words, an organism.  And what could be more holist than the assertion that 
SIP: 71)?  Having set out a holistic view of the 
relationship between the micro and macro levels, in which the link between the two is 
complex, indirect and mediated, rather than simple, direct and immediate, as it would 
appear in a reductionist view, he proceeds to break the link between the two altogether.  
Macro level objects, 
nothing to their material bases in individual behaviour.  It is in this sense that Hayek 
the substrate-dependence of macro-
mysticism: evolution in this view can operate on the order as a whole even in the absence 
of any mechanism tying the interest of the individual to that of the whole.  By eliminating 
the tie between macro and micro, Hayek obscures the necessity of such a mechanism.  
His thesis is that social evolution is evolution which occurs at the level of society, at the 
level of the group: the cultural  
 
transmission of rules of conduct takes place from individual to individual, while what 
may be called the natural selection of rules will operate on the basis of the greater or lesser 
efficiency of the resulting order of the group SIP
different rules of individual conduct operates through the viability of the order it will 
SIP
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COL: 56-
NSP: 256). 
 
Cultural rules are, indeed, transmitted from individual to individual in the sense that only 
individuals can execute cultural instructions (whether on their own account as principals, 
or as agents for others such as firms and organisations), although the transmission is 
mainly mediated by cultural artefacts  telephone messages, letters, newspapers, 
magazines, journals, books, films, TV and radio programmes, e-mail and websites
122
.  
However, efficiency and viability, successful and more effective are left undefined.  Do 
we mean efficiency for the order or for the individuals working within its framework?  It 
 
 
We have a system of instructions.  Executing those instructions has consequences.  Some 
consequences are more favourable than others to the continuation and expansion of the 
system of instructions.  Those systems of instructions which we actually find are likely to 
be those whose execution leads to their own successful replication.  What does lead to 
successful replication depends on the environment.  The environment of the system of 
rules includes its own substrate.  Just as a person can only do what their limbs are able 
and willing to do  most people cannot hold their hand in a flame or look at the sun, and 
no one can fly by flapping their arms  a society can only do what its constituent 
individuals are willing and able to do.  The difference is that in the person, the individual 
components all have the same set of instructions, the same genotype; and their interest is 
to lever a copy of that genotype into the future.  The only way they can do it is by aiding 
the production and care of offspring.  This can only be done by each part playing its rôle 
in the activity of the whole person.  Every part has an interest in cooperating with every 
other part to fulfil the aims of the whole person.  In society it is otherwise.  Everyone has 
their own interest to follow, largely based on tastes and preferences selected for because 
of their likelihood of leading to successful genetic propagation.  So the parts of an 
organism play the rôle they are required to play if they get the right information and 
resources  they already have the necessary incentive for playing their part in the overall 
scheme.  The parts of a society play the required rôle  the rôle required for the 
successful adaptation of the social system  if they get the required information, 
                                               
122 -61). 
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resources, and incentives.  So the system will have a selective advantage if it contains 
instructions which allocate to individuals (including here every kind of economic agent  
individual households, firms etc) the appropriate incentives, information and resources.   
 
Consider the following thought experiment to show that we cannot assume that the 
rily the efficient 
satisfaction of human interests:  A well-adapted social system, one which has survived 
the selective process, must include a system of incentives for individuals to follow.  In 
following these incentives, the individual is necessarily doing something which is both in 
him the incentive to do it (we assumed at the start that it was well adapted).  So, on the 
assumption that a set of such incentives can in fact exist, there is at least that much 
mutuality between the individual and the collective.  Nevertheless, while it may be in the 
 call it action A  given what everyone else is 
doing (ie, action A is Nash), it may well be that the collection of all individuals could all 
do better if they were somehow all coordinated to behave otherwise  say to carry out 
action B.  In other words, the individual agents find themselves in a multi-player 
.  In this case, we have two systems of rules competing for the 
allegiance of the population.  One system directs them to carry out action A, acting as an 
isolated human atom, the other requires action B, where the population acts as a 
collective agent and each individual achieves a better satisfaction of his interests. While 
none of this may in fact be the case, it is clear that there is no reason in principle for us to 
assume that the characteristics which are spontaneously selected for in social systems will 
be more desirable to the members of those social systems than the characteristics with 
which they might wish consciously to endow them.   
 
 that the selection process sifting 
institutions is one which endows those systems of rules which are better able to satisfy 
human interests with a higher probability of survival and propagation.  The thought 
experiment shows that this assumption is unwarranted.  On the contrary, selection of 
institutional forms of society may well throw up systems of rules of conduct in which the 
behaviour of each is Nash, but the outcome for all is suboptimal.  And, of course, it is 
precisely the contention of many that that is precisely the situation we face.  Hence 
egs the most important question.  To take a single example, it is 
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perfectly clear that the order we have involuntarily constructed is not beneficent towards 
animals, or we might all be vegans; on what grounds are we to believe that it is 
beneficent towards humans?   
 
Necessarily, Hayek is extremely vague
123
.  He cannot specify the mechanism by which 
mutation and selection is to take place.  It may be that there is a set of rules such that if a 
given society were to implement it, it would have a competitive advantage over other 
groups.  But it may also be the case that the individuals of the society cannot reach that 
set of rules from their present set by each individual following his own spontaneous 
interest.  It may need coordination at the macro level to achieve it.  Selection will never 
be able to work on this set of rules as there is no spontaneous mechanism which will 
allow the society to adopt it, without it being imposed on the whole society by central 
command.   
 
To illustrate his thesis that macro level orders are systems of behaviour that have been 
selected for because they are optimal for the micro level agents, Hayek turns to 
zoological examples: 
 
overall order are those where this order consists in a spatial pattern such as will occur in 
the marching, defence, or hunting of a group of animals or men.  The arrow formation of 
migrating wild geese, the defensive ring of the buffaloes, or the manner in which lionesses 
drive the prey towards the male for the kill, are simple instances in which presumably it is 
not an awareness of the overall pattern by the individual but some rules of how to respond 
                                               
123 ome kind of selection mechanism, 
although its specification, along with that of the unit(s) of selection and the criteria of fitness, are 
note of frustration: Hayek is so obscure, allusive, vague, contradictory and downright wrong that often 
sual attitude to sources and 
anisms of rule replication are not clarified or explained.  The mere suggestion of 
his theory and it is necessary to interpolate and to conjecture so as to attempt to understand his 
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to the immediate environment which co-ordinate the actions of the sever
(SIP: 69) 
 
This is a heterogeneous list of examples.  It would be out of place here to launch into a 
description of their hunting methods were true, it is most unlikely that their tactics could 
be reduced to a stereotype summed up in a few simple rules, in the same way as geese 
and buffalo.  But that is not the main point here.  What is interesting is how these 
examples contradict his thesis.  First
model, the arrow formation would be an order of actions which would have evolved 
because it was optimal for the geese.  A better explanation, or candidate explanation, is 
that perhaps each goose gains by flying in the slipstream of another, and so it follows the 
rule of doing so, where possible.  If this is true, then the arrow formation is an 
epiphenomenon of following this rule: it confers no cost or benefit on the flight of geese.  
Now we know that this is not true for Homo sapiens: the patterns of our collective 
behaviour have a major impact on the fate of individuals.   
 
assuming that his facts are correct): it is quite likely that each animal follows a simple 
rule in certain circumstances of danger  the result is a defensive circle which no 
individual animal intended but which serves all their interests optimally  and presumably 
this behaviour evolved because groups of buffalo which reacted thus were at a selective 
can not be assumed to hold in general.  On the contrary, in situations where it may well 
hold, such as the buffalo circle, there has to be a mechanism by which it is in the interest 
of individuals to behave in the way required for the macro level outcome.  In the case of 
the buffaloes this incentive may lie in the consanguinity of the group: each buffalo is a 
vehicle for much the same assemblage of genes, and so (the gene complex embodied in) 
each gains if it aids the survival of its fellows.  The externality is internalised.  Or perhaps 
it just makes an immediate gain in security for little extra cost by joining a defensive 
circle.  Such links from self-seeking micro behaviour to desirable social outcomes cannot 
be assumed in groups of humans, but have to be demonstrated on each occasion where it 
is thought to hold.   
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Hayek thus believes that people do what they do, not because it is in their interest to do 
so, but because it is functional for the society for them to do so
124
.  A conception which 
clearly denies the necessity of incentives to underpin any posited pattern of individual 
behaviours.  Speaking of the rules of conduct in primitive human societies, he says that  
 
reconstructed the overall order which is produced by actions in accordance with them ... 
all the individuals of the species which exist will behave in that manner because groups of 
SIP: 70) 
 
When we act, what we do is describable, if sufficiently regular, by a rule.  But the 
question is whether the rule is an epiphenomenon, like the arrow formation of the flying 
geese, a pattern which emerges from generalising a large number of instances of the 
particular action, or whether the individual actions are executed because of the rule.  In 
the second case, the actions of individuals are functional for the purposes served by the 
 albeit in scare-quotes  only 
 
 
125, p.83) is right to sugg
quality; it assumes that the contribution of a rule to the maintenance of a system is 
specification of a process by which a rule that is advantageous to the system is sustained in 
 
 
It is a basic assumption 
t, one is simultaneously (and 
more importantly) carrying through the interest of society; that actions performed by 
individuals are automatically functional for society.  This is to assume all our problems 
away.   
 
from SIP 
therefore that the same set of rules is appropriate to all.  All the individuals now alive 
behave in the same way: there was variety in behaviour in the past, but not now, as less 
                                               
124 As we shall see, this involves an impressive negation of the autonomy and rationality, indeed, of the 
value, of individuals. 
125  
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well adapted behaviours have been eliminated.  In the past some individuals behaved this 
way, now all do.  The implication is that evolution is convergence to a destination state, 
rather than permanent flux.  This brings together two threads: firstly, the Lucretian vision 
of evolution which Hume attributes to Philo in the Dialogues, the vision in which 
selection eliminates less well adapted forms, allowing the pre-existing fitter forms to 
as the approach to a destination state.  On the big issues, the emergence of the market 
and common law, evolution, and hence history, comes to an end with capitalism.  Hayek 
CRS: 365-400). 
 
In a footnote to the passage mple further 
illustrations of the kind of orders briefly sketched in this section ... in V.C. Wynne-
Edwards, Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behaviour SIP: 
f view is exactly the group selectionist argument criticised by 
Richard Dawkins:  
 
are prepared to sacrifice themselves for the welfare of the group, may be less likely to go 
extinct than a rival group whose individual members place their own selfish interests first.  
Therefore the world becomes populated mainly by groups consisting of self-sacrificing 
 famous book by V.C. 
Wynne-Edwards [Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behaviour]... [But if] there is 
just one selfish rebel, prepared to exploit the altruism of the rest, then he, by definition, is 
more likely than they are to survive and have children.  Each of these children will tend to 
-run by selfish individuals, and will be indistinguishable from the 
-8)126 
 
To illustrate the point we may cast our minds back to the case of the elephant seals, 
discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis.  We saw that the elephant seal species and 
populations within it are less efficient in exploiting their habitat than they could be, were 
their genes not caught up in a multi-
extinct and many mammal species are endangered: it is not beyond the bounds of 
plausibility that one day the elephant seals will teeter over the edge of extinction when 
                                               
126 It is relevant to the title of this chapter to note that John Maynard Smith, adopting the same 
standpoint as Dawkins, chose to denounce the Hayekian, Wynne-Edwards group-selection argument as 
whole, rather than acti  
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solution to the dilemma cannot emerge and replicate, and displace the Pareto-inefficient 
defection solution, because no mechanism, no incentive structure exists to make 
cooperative behaviour Nash.   
 
Evolution may very well take place at the group or species level; but for that to happen, 
there has to be a mechanism within the group which gives individuals adequate incentive 
to behave in the manner required for the group to prosper.  Hayek attempts to suggest 
such an incentive: 
 
of the group, and through this also for the existence and preservation of the individuals 
themselves, have been shaped by the selection of those from the individuals living in 
groups which at each stage of the evolution of the group tended to act according to such 
SIP: 72) 
 
This contains two formulations; let us examine the first  
individuals which are significant for the existence and preservation of the group [are] 
through this also [significant] for the existence and preservation of the individuals 
correct: the properties of a particular individual, 
although they may well be significant for the group  when taken together with all the 
other similar individuals  can only be significant to that individual as a result of its 
significance for society to a vanishingly small degree, if the group itself is of any 
significant size.  And, moreover, selection cannot distinguish between the effects on an 
 
 
Now we may turn to the second formulation  
are significant for the existence and preservation of the group ... have been shaped by the 
selection ... from the individuals living in groups which at each stage of the evolution of 
behaviour, that is, the rules that they follow, even if not the 
individuals themselves, is descended from the behaviour of individuals in groups which 
have been successful.  Again, behaviour can be successful in two different ways: it can 
fulfil the objectives of those carrying out the activity, or it can be successful in terms of 
propagating itself, of getting itself copied by other individuals and groups.  We have to 
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former which constitute the template for future expansion.  This is the group selection 
argument, and it is vulnerable to the Dawkins critique mentioned above: this other-
regarding behaviour may be optimal for the group, but without individual incentives it is 
not Nash-  attempt to provide an incentive structure 
to underpin the group selectionist argument assumes exactly what was to be 
demonstrated.   
 
Now if groups were run by a central authority, then that authority might be able to set up 
an incentive structure to preserve the optimal behaviour pattern; the central authority 
changes the payoffs to individual actions to make the socially optimal outcome consistent 
with individual self-seeking behaviour.  Such a group is also in a position to observe and 
copy collectively desirable behaviour patterns from other groups, which individual agents 
certainly are not able to do.  As we have seen the group selectionist argument simply 
cannot work for spontaneous human societies.   
 
Hayek recasts his evolutionary argument in teleological terms.  There is, he says,  
 
possessing a kind of order will exist because the elements do what is necessary to secure 
the persistence of that order.  The 
parts to the requirements of the whole, becomes a necessary part of the explanation of why 
structures of the kind exist: we are bound to explain the fact that the elements behave in a 
certain way by the circumstance than this sort of conduct is more likely to preserve the 
whole  on the preservation of which depends the preservation of the individuals, which 
explanation is thus entirely in order so long as it does not imply design by a maker but 
merely the recognition that the kind of structure would not have perpetuated itself if it did 
not act in a manner likely to produce certain effects, and that it has evolved through those 
prevailing at each stage who did. 
 
or of the motive of the acting individuals.  The immediate cause, the impulse which drives 
them to act, will be something affecting them only; and it is merely because in doing so 
they are restrained by rules that an overall order results, while this consequence of 
observing these rul
the animal defending its territory has no idea that it thereby contributes to regulate the 
numbe SIP: 77). 
 
This is a revealing passage.  Firstly, Hayek had already said that different macro orders 
are compatible with the same rules of micro behaviour, and different rules compatible 
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with the same order.  Now he says that the preservation of the individuals depends on the 
preservation of the order such that they would not exist without it.  Well, no doubt their 
existence depends on there being some order, but it by no means follows that their 
survival depends on the maintenance of the particular order obtaining at the present 
moment.  This is the optimality assumption.  Indeed, it is an extreme version of the 
optimality assumption, in which the present order is not just the best we can get, but the 
only one in which we could survive.  This is repeated elsewhere: 
 
order), this is due to the elements responding to external influences which they are likely 
to encounter in a manner which brings about the preservation or restoration of this order; 
and on this, in turn, may be dependent the chances of the individuals to preserve 
SIP: 71) 
 
Hayek says here that an order exists because individuals behave in a way which preserves 
it.  Perfectly true.  But then he goes on to imply that their survival depends on the 
preservation of the order.  This prompts the comments that (a) an order which allows a 
number of individuals to survive is not definitionally the best they can get: the social 
outcome could be suboptimal even if the behaviour of each individual in such an order is 
Nash, and (b) even if their survival depended on the individuals maintaining the order, the 
individuals concerned would still not do so unless it were individually rational to do so.   
 
 the 
adaptation of individuals to the requirements of society.  We explain the way people 
-seeking individuals should do 
f these actions is of course 
eyond their knowledge or 
between the actions individuals would take to satisfy their own drives in the absence of 
rules, and the rules themselves, which take on the status of a restraint.  This breaks with 
his own procedure, which regards all the actions of the individuals, in so far as they are 
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regular, as the execution of rules.  In the version which sees rules as restraints, they can 
only be imposed by an external authority or force.   
 
Thirdly, Hayek claims that teleological explanation is in order, as long as it does not 
imply a deity.  However, so long as the explanation includes no motivation for individuals 
to behave in this socially desirable way, then it must depend on supernatural intervention.  
organised in accordance with the general interest of society.  But it is Hamlet without the 
prince: the supernal agency arranging all th
cannot stand in for this agency, indeed, without that agency it makes no sense: for group 
selection assumes individual and general interests already to be reconciled.  Contrary to 
 explanation is only valid if it is, at least in principle, 
possible to specify a mechanism by which actions at the level at which the teleology is 
thought to hold can be reconciled with the interests of substrate levels.   
 
Lastly, it is very fitting that Hayek should cite Smith, at he does at the end, and explicitly 
link him to a group selectionist standpoint: a footnote at the end of the last sentence of 
the passage cited refers us again to Wynne-Edwards (1962).  The mythical animal 
fulfilling its own interests at the same time as it fulfils those of a higher entity of which it 
is the unwitting subordinate part
127
 is just that  
cunning of history.
128
  Here, it is not even the interest of the population or the species 
w
oses what 
he is doing, namely assuming a mystical force which will reconcile our conflicting plans 
spontaneously to produce a beneficent order at the macro level. 
                                               
127 
point out that he repeats this claim  this time about humans  in KES: the growth of world population, 
- KES: 52). 
128 
their consciousness is limited to these and they are absorbed in their mundane interests, they are all the 
though it is concealed from th  
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selectionist argument which has been rightly subjected to considerable criticism in the 
biological domain.  We have also seen that this is closely associated with the Smithian 
 
twists and turns, his falsifications and distortions, his vagueness and obscurity, can be 
accounted for by his dedication to a particular political programme and his apparent 
willingness cynically to prefer the support of that programme to all scholarly values of 
truth and consistency.   
 
5.4.5 Have Sober and Wilson rescued group selection? 
 
It is now necessary to turn to an important issue which has been raised in connection 
with the points made above (Vromen, personal communication), namely whether Sober 
and Wilson (1998) have rescued the notion of group selection deployed by Hayek.  
Clearly, if they have, then much of the argument of the present chapter collapses.  Now, 
Sober and Wilson certainly perform a signal service by clarifying the conditions under 
out crude, reductionist readings of Darwinian writers such as Dawkins.  Whether they 
have anything sensible to say about those Darwinian writers themselves, is another 
question which it would be inappropriate to explore here.  Suffice it to say that Sober 
and Wilson significantly muddy the water by their systematic usage, from the front cover 
mean cooperative behaviour.  If by altruism we mean, as we clearly should mean, other-
not, what its title implies, about the evolution of 
unselfish behaviour: it is about the evolution of cooperation, that is, the circumstances in 
which cooperation is the outcome of individual self-seeking behaviour.  It is individually 
advantageous to engage in cooperation when the benefits accruing to oneself as a result 
of the cooperative behaviour exceed its costs.  This can happen, for example, when 
cooperate.  In economic terms, cooperation can arise spontaneously when the externality 
generated by cooperation is internalised.   
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selection can take place when there is variation between groups, with some exhibiting 
more, and some less, cooperative behaviour on the part of individual group members, 
where such cooperative individual behaviour is underpinned by some mechanism 
ensuring that cooperation is in the interest of selfish individuals.  Then more cooperative 
groups will tend to displace less cooperative ones: cooperative behaviour is selected for.  
There is nothing in this which contradicts Darwinianism of the Dawkins variety.  Indeed, 
selfish organism theory is a variety of group selection where the group is the community 
of genes embodied in the organism, as Dawkins makes clear  and as Sober and Wilson 
 
 
such mechanisms, reconciling individual and group interests may exist, but to the 
Panglossian notion propagated by Wynne-Edwards and his followers, such as Hayek, 
that group selection can exist in the absence of such mechanisms.   
 
The critical link between individual and group interest is what I will call connation.  It is 
worth quoting Dawkins, from The Extended Phenotype, at length on the issue:   
 
 ghting only its alleles at the same locus, and it will unite with genes at 
other loci only in so far as doing so assists it in its selfish war against its own alleles.  A 
venient 
to do so, it might unite with particular snail genes.  And if it remains true that snail genes 
are in practice selected to work together with each other and against an opposing gang of 
fluke genes, the reason is only that snail genes tend to gain from the same events in the 
world as do other snail genes.  Fluke genes tend to gain from other events.  And the real 
reason why snail genes stand to gain from the same events as each other, while fluke genes 
stand to gain from a different set of events, is simply this: all snail genes share the same 
route into the next generation  snail gametes.  All fluke genes, on the other hand, must 
use a different route, fluke cercariae, to get into the next generation.  It is this fact alone 
s against fluke genes and vice versa.  If it were the case that the 
closer tha 1989b: 221-222, my emphasis) 
 
 what I call connation  is absolutely critical.  The 
difference between parasitism and symbiosis, between a liver fluke and a mitochondrion, 
rests on shared destiny.  The mitochondrion can only place copies of itself in the next 
generation by aiding its host, the animal cell; the liver fluke is not so restricted and 
hink 
about the routes to the future available to social structures, the phenotypic expression of 
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meme complexes.  Clearly, those routes are utterly different from the route by which 
humans reproduce and so those meme complexes cannot be relied upon spontaneously to 
share interests with humans.  The meme complexes embodied in the social institutions 
which emerge spontaneously can be expected sometimes to be symbiotic with, and 
sometimes parasitic on, their human hosts.  Some interesting examples are given in 
Blackmore (1999).   
 
If the social institutions which emerge spontaneously from the evolutionary process can 
be parasitic, then the presumption in favour of a laissez-faire policy framework is 
undermined.  Spontaneously emerging forms may need to be modified or replaced by 
institutions adapted to human interests.  In this context, we can return to the question 
this section seeks to answer: is Hayek a Panglossian evolutionary theorist?  Hayek 
  consistent with 
Darwinian, Dawkinsian thought, or does it rather, as Hayek himself clearly believes, 
stand in the Wynne-
asis of their human 
survival- -complex survival value, the 
conclusion has to be that nothing in Sober and Wilson gives cause to modify our verdict, 
last word here goes to 
-  
 
-level units such as cultures, societies or 
biological ecosystems must be well-functioning organic wholes.  Higher-level 
functionalism always requires special conditions and is vulnerable to subversion from 
 
 
5.5 -individualism 
 
A theme of the previous chapter, on Adam Smith, was that although his policy 
prescription was one of individualism, this was linked to a methodological holism and 
combined with some distinctly anti-individualist social attitudes.  This section will present 
already been discussed.  Here I want to draw attention to some strongly anti-individualist 
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 the adaptation, 
that is, of individuals to the requirements of society.  Hayek repeats this elsewhere: 
 
himself as part of a certain system within which 
KES: 36)   
 
So the individual has to adapt to the system, and it is the system that determines the 
behaviour of the individual.  What we think of as value is just a signal to us to act in 
accordance with the needs of the system.  As statements of fact,  these assertions, like 
 means of defence of the rich against the poor, sound very 
radical and subversive.  As normative statements, as statements of what should be the 
harmonic world view, in which individual interests are illegitimately identified with those 
of the system, which allows him to say this.  If the system is optimal for the individuals 
composing the society, then it is acceptable to require the individual to adapt to it.  If the 
system is necessarily optimal, then there are no social problems.  Apparent problems are 
problems for social scientists only  a challenge for them to explain away.  To assure 
individuals suffering the consequences of macro level social problems that such problems 
do not exist, is to treat those individuals with contempt.   
 
We also saw that in the non-harmonic world in which we actually live, the group 
selectionist argument that individuals behave in the social interest rather than in their own 
interest implies that such individuals are unaware of the consequences of their actions: 
 they are ignorant or irrational
129
 (or both).  If 
individuals were rational and adequately informed, they would follow their own interests 
and the g
                                               
129 Along with anti-individualism, anti-
 (IEO d 
argued in the previous chapter that in many ways Kant could be seen as complementing Smith and 
Hume, particularly in terms of the desire, shared by all three, to limit the legitimate scope of reason.  
However, I cannot explore this theme further here. 
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sec
SIP
who did not know what they were doing COL: 58-59, emphasis added).   
 
The irrationality thesis is stated even more bluntly in KES:  
 
did not understand, they drew upon the aid of supernatural sanctions ... we owe it to 
mystical beliefs, that we preserved a tradition which was beneficial to us.  Thus we owe  
KES
IEO: 8) 
 
This is a very close parallel to the argument in Smith, that individuals are deceived by 
nature for the good of society.  Smith says that the individual is deceived into thinking, 
for example, that wealth will make him happy, and as a result slaves to accumulate 
wealth, without gaining the expected increase in happiness.  This aided society by 
keeping the wheels of industry turning.  Just so, individuals in the Hayekian story are 
misled by bizarre superstitious notions which upset their lives and cause them untold 
suffering, so that civilisation may prosper.   
 
When we are looking at the status of individuals in a proposed or actual social system, a 
key diagnostic turns on the question, what constitutes the ends and what the means of 
the system.  Hayek 
 (COL: 
63).  Again, this is an extremely illiberal and anti-individualist standpoint. Contrary to 
what Hayek says, the ends we serve arise within us as our natural desires, they are not 
something we meet externally as something to which we must subordinate ourselves. The 
system of values within which we work tells us the constraints our actions must satisfy; it 
tells us one way of coordinating our efforts to fulfil our individual goals so that we all 
may fulfil them more effectively.  It is merely a means to the end of human happiness.   
 
To argue that the culturally determined system of what at some point in time is taken as 
end, rather than a 
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means goal here, it makes the 
system of values existing here and now absolute instead of relative.  Its survival, the 
prevention of its succession by another, alternative system becomes a good in its own 
right, an end which we should pursue regardless of its utility for us.  Secondly, instead of 
seeking to pursue our own goals, instead of seeking to maximise our own welfare, we 
are enjoined to pursue, and to subordinate our own interests to, the interest of some non-
human entity.  This is precisely the establishm vis-à-vis 
130
 cited in 
Sen 1970: 1 n 1).   
 
-individualist outlook emerges in his criticism of 
(unnamed) rationali
 
 
functioning of the social process and that it should be our aim, through conscious 
assessment of the concrete facts of the situation, to produce a foreseeable result which they 
ly 
involves a demand that individual intelligence, rather than rules evolved by society, should 
guide individual  action  that men should dispense with the use of what could truly be 
ss of society) and 
contempt for what really is a social phenomenon and of a belief in the superior powers of 
COL: 65) 
 
What is remarkable, in the present context, about this passage, is that it criticises a 
social, but because it is really an appeal to the individual.  He is criticising these 
expressing a very anti-individualist view.  Individuals are not to be trusted to work things 
out for themselves, but have to submit to traditional rules whose rationale is unknown.  
This is very similar to the anti-Protestant view of the Catholic Church, as can be seen by 
re-casting the passage in terms of the Catholic critique of Protestantism: 
 
Protestantism involved a demand that individual religious conscience, rather than the 
doctrines of the Church, should guide individual action  that men should dispense with 
                                               
130 The reference is to Karl Marx (1844/1959) Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 p104; 
reprinted in Marx (1975: 350). 
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 of God, rather than of 
humans) and should rely on their individual judgement of the particular case.  The 
therefore ultimately the result of a contempt for genuine religion and a belief in the 
superior powers of individual human reason.  
 
-individualist, is also highly misleading.  
Although the thinking involved in review, revision and reform of the rules under which 
we are to live, must take place in the brains of individual people, they are by no means 
acting as individuals, as isolated atoms, but rather as members of the community, 
debating with others in ways supervised by the public and according to rules invigilated 
by the public, many individuals contributing factual and analytical material to the 
discussion so that the whole thing is far more complex and profound than any one 
individual could have managed in isolation.  Reform is a truly social enterprise.  It is the 
superior powers of social, not individual, human reason which are being relied upon.   
 
 
 
 ... is primarily a theory of society, an attempt to understand the forces 
which determine the social life of man, and only in the second instance a set of political 
maxims derived from this view of society.  This fact by itself should be sufficient to refute 
the silliest of the common misunderstandings: the belief that individualism postulates (or 
bases its arguments on the assumption of) the existence of isolated or self-contained 
individuals, instead of starting from men whose whole nature and character is determined 
IEO: 6)  
 
Just about everything Hayek says here is false.  Contrary to what he says, individualism is 
indeed primarily a political doctrine, and only secondarily a theoretical underpinning for 
it.  And whatever its status in general, it certainly is primarily political rather than 
the whole nature and character of people is determined by their social being, their being 
in society, is of the essence of the holist standpoint: it is very far indeed from the 
individualism of neoclassical economics, which starts from isolated individuals  
c
statement in CRS quoted by Toynbee, that individuals are but foci in the network of 
relationships constituting society. 
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Smith and Hayek are essentially conservatives
131
, and from this all else flows.  In both 
cases nostalgia for stability plays a key rôle in their psychologies.  Smith wanted to 
preserve the fixed orders and ranks of society; Hayek feels the same about traditions:  
 
been no successful attempt to operate a free society, without a genuine reverence for grown 
institutions, for customs and habits ... [A] successful free society will always in a large 
measure be a tradition- COL: 61).  to undesigned rules and 
conventions whose significance and importance we largely do not understand ... [and] 
reverence for the traditional COL: 
63). 
 
uncomprehending of the world they inhabit as children, voluntarily submit themselves to 
the greater wisdom embodied in tradition, or, failing such voluntary submission, one in 
which submission is brought about by compulsion.  The individualist order requires  
 
often appear unintelligible and irrational .... The willingness to submit to such rules ... is 
IEO: 
 the 
processes by which mankind has achieved things which have not been designed or 
IEO: 32) 
 
 of the 
spontaneous. 
 
sphere of policy, he is indeed an individualist, regarding individual freedom as a 
paramount value.  Just as Smith regarded social order as more important than justice, as 
                                               
131 
 k is a 
conservative most obviously in his veneration of tradition, and in his belief that most of the forms of 
social organisation that exist in capitalist economies are the product of a long process of evolution.  Thus 
private property is not something to be defended purely on intellectual or rational grounds, but also as 
tends to conservatism in social affairs, notable in his attitude to religion 
1990: viii-ix). 
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face the fact that the preservation of individual freedom is incompatible with a full 
IEO: 22).  On the other hand, there is 
nothing specifically individualist about the methodology which Hayek employs to 
investigate the world.  On the contrary, and again like Smith, and despite equivocation 
and inconsistency, he does recognise the fundamental necessity of a holistic scientific 
methodology to understand the world.  Finally we have seen that the two writers, Smith 
and Hayek, also share a set of authoritarian conservative
132
 social attitudes which are 
extremely thin on respect for the rationality, the autonomy, and the fate of individuals.   
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
Just as Smith faced, and refused to face up to, the problem of how, given that human 
nature is natural, anything that humans do  especially state activity  could be 
unnatural, so Hayek faces a problem of how any human behaviour, including state 
intervention, can fail to be the result of an evolutionary process.  And this is fatal for his 
policy prescription, j
view that everything natural was God-given and hence good, while everything artificial 
was human-made and hence fallible.  Hence his opposition to the visible hand of state 
intervention and his belief in the optimality of the outcomes supplied us by the invisible 
hand of a benign deity.  But if all human strengths and weaknesses alike are themselves 
natural and God-given, then state intervention, too, must play its necessary part in the 
scheme 
evolution of institutions automatically generates optimal outcomes while rationalistic 
intervention is both unnecessary and perverse in its effects.  But the institutions by means 
of which the society as a whole acts to coordinate agent actions, and to improve on the 
inefficiencies of spontaneous outcomes, are themselves the outcome of a spontaneous 
process of evolution  and thus, in a consistent Hayekian view, optimal.  To intervene on 
principle to prevent them from doing their job, without regard to the actual content of 
                                               
132 
no intention ... of making a fetish of democracy.  It may well be true that our generation talks and thinks 
t
often been much more cultural and spiritual freedom under an autocratic rule than under some 
 RTS: 52). 
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what they were doing, would be a clear instance of the rationalism which he has spent his 
life combating.   
 
Appendix: Bibliographical note 
 
everal editions and papers are reprinted in various collections.  
Navigating his works can be confusing.  This appendix will set out a bibliography of 
not a comprehensi
ambitious task, but an indication of what has been consulted for this chapter, an 
explanation of the abbreviations used in the text, and an explanation of which version 
page numbers of works by Hayek cited here refer to.  For fuller bibliographical 
information, refer to:  
 
a Machlup (1977: 51-59).  Although only going up to 1977, this gives details of 
173 publications by Hayek;   
b e: 1986) 
Hayek on Liberty Oxford: Blackwell; 
c a more brief but up to date listing contained in the bibliography to Hodgson 
(1993: 325-326). 
 
Only items referenced in the text are included.  Each of the following items is preceded 
by the abbreviation used for it in the text, where relevant. Only the books are included in 
the bibliography at the end of the thesis.   
 
Books by Hayek  
 
RTS 1944 The Road to Serfdom London: George Routledge & Sons 
 
IEO 1948 Individualism and Economic Order Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 
(reprinted, 1949, London: Routledge).  References are to the 1949 reprint. 
 
TSO 1952 The Sensory Order. An Inquiry into the Foundations of Theoretical 
Psychology London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.  Originally drafted in approx 1920. 
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CRS 1e: 1952 The Counter-Revolution of Science. Studies on the Abuse of Reason 
Glencoe, Illinois (second edition, 1979, Indianapolis: LibertyPress).  Reprinted articles.  
References are to the second edition of 1979, which contains additional prefatory 
material. 
 
COL 1960 The Constitution of Liberty London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
 
SIP 1967a Studies in Philosophy, Politics and Economics London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul.  Reprinted articles. 
 
NSP 1978a New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas 
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.  Reprinted articles. 
 
TBT 2e: 1978b (ed SR Shenoy) A Tiger by the Tail London: Institute for Economic 
Affairs.  An edited collection of extracts from other works.   
 
LLL (1982) Law, Legislation and Liberty. A new statement of the liberal principles of 
justice and political economy 
s comments.  One-volume version with 
corrections and revised preface of: Law Legislation and Liberty (1973-1979) in three 
volumes:  
Vol 1 (1973) Rules and Order  
Vol 2 (1976) The Mirage of Social Justice  
Vol 3 (1979) The Political Order of a Free People   
 
KES 1983 Knowledge, Evolution and Society London: Adam Smith Institute.  Four 
lectures given in the United States in the late 1970s, plus prefatory essays by Eamonn 
Butler and Arthur Shenfield. 
 
Journal articles and lectures 
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 Collectivist 
Economic Planning 
Calculation I: The Nature and History of the Problem IEO: 119-147.  References 
are to the 1949 reprint of IEO. 
 
1 - Economica.  Reprinted as Part II of CRS: 
183-363.  References are to the 1979 edition of CRS. 
 
1942- Economica.  Reprinted as Part I of CRS: 
17-182.  References are to the 1979 edition of CRS. 
 
published, 1946, Dublin: Hodges, Fidges & Co, and Oxford: Blackwell; reprinted as Ch 
1 of IEO: 1-32.  References are to the 1949 reprint of IEO. 
 
Measure June.  Reprinted as Part III of CRS: 365-400.  
References are to the 1979 edition of CRS. 
 
Mandeville Proceedings of the British Academy Volume 
LII: 125-  read 23 March 1966) 
London: Oxford University Press.  Reprinted as Ch 15 of NSP: 249-266.  References are 
to the Proceedings version.. 
 
Imprimis Vol 7 No 7 (Hillsdale College, Michigan).  
Reprinted in KES: 17-27.  References are to the KES version. 
 
Reprinted in KES: 28-37.  References are to the KES version. 
 
tanford 
University. Reprinted in KES: 38-44.  References are to the KES version. 
 
KES: 45-57.  References 
are to the KES version. 
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Chapter 6 icy 
prescription 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapters of this thesis I have tried to show two things: Firstly, that in a 
world of partially overlapping and partially conflicting interests there is good reason to 
doubt that self-seeking behaviour at the micro-level will spontaneously lead to desirable 
social outcomes at the macro-level.  And, secondly, that some sophisticated economic 
writers who would like us to rely on the spontaneous interaction of self-seeking agents, 
writers advocating a laissez-faire 
Smith, I 
scope to the unfolding 
 the expression not of 
divine order but of fallible human reason.  Hayek, adopting a similar policy stance, based 
it in an evolutionary process in which those institutional forms best adapted to 
reconciling individual interests would, he believed, spontaneously be selected for in the 
inter-group struggle for survival. 
 
The purpose of the present chapter is to cast a light on this issue from another direction 
by displaying an example of the policy consequences of adopting an alternative 
methodological stance.  The argument of the chapter is that (a) staying within the holistic 
framework of Smith and Hayek, but (b) rejecting their invisible hand mechanisms, leads 
(c) to the rejection of their reductionist laissez-faire policy stance as well.   
 
historical role of capitalism and his analysis of its pathology, rooted in what we would 
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significance of his methodological standpoint.  This lays the basis for a consideration of 
his policy prescription in the following two sections.  Section 6.3 looks at two very 
exactly what he meant by this.  Before doing so however  and this is the other key 
aspect to the question  the section class standpoint, showing the 
bourgeoisie
policy prescription, drawing out the distinction , but also the intimate connection, 
between, on the one hand, micro-
the other, the macro-
6.5 concludes by considering Keynes in relation to the themes of the thesis  Smith and 
Hayek, holism, reductionism and the invisible hand.   
 
6.2  
 
Whereas, for Smith and Hayek capitalist individualism is the terminus of an ontogenetic 
process, for Keynes it is something transitional, something with a historical and 
phylogenetic evolutionary stance.  Laissez-faire 
historical role, carrying us from an Era of Scarcity to an Era of Abundance.  It was 
precisely because it had substantially fulfilled that role that it had become counter-
capitalist 
5, and n1).  
The purpose of this section is to show that Robinson was right, and Pilling wrong
133
, on 
                                               
133 It has been argued (Geoffrey Kay, personal communication) that both Robinson and Pilling were 
talking about the 
 ie the assertion that Keynes viewed capitalism as a 
phase in historical development (Pilling, 1986: 57).  On this latter point Pilling was clearly wrong and 
Robinson right.  However, one might wish to go further and argue that there was a sense in which 
Pilling was right about Keynes being unhistorical because he, Keynes, had a notion of capital which was 
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 though 
not, I should emphasis, necessarily to defend it.   
 
In order to 
laissez-faire, we must say something about his conception of the historical context, that 
is, about his periodisation of history.  I  
I 
of the General Theory GT: 313-384). 
 
EP: 304) production is overwhelmingly production for the sake 
le for 
subsistence, always has been hitherto the primary, most pressing problem of the human 
race  not only of the human race, but of the whole of the biological kingdom from the 
EP: 326-7).  During the Era of Scarcity, 
there is an overwhelming obstacle to the accumulation of capital in the form of 
uncertainty driving the marginal efficiency of capital (MEC) below the rate of interest (i): 
 
y-preference was the 
outstanding evil, the prime impediment to the growth of wealth, in the ancient and 
medieval worlds.  And naturally so, since certain of the risks and hazards of economic life 
diminish the marginal efficiency of capital while others serve to increase the preference for 
liquidity.  In a world, therefore, which no one reckoned to be safe, it was almost inevitable 
GT: 351) 
 
At  so to speak  the other end of history from the era of scarcity, in the near future, lies 
EP EP
EP
within sight of solution, within a hundred years ... the economic problem ... is not the 
EP: 326).  The essence of the era of abundance 
is that needs are satisfied in the sense that we prefer to devote our further energies to 
non- EP: 326).  Thus, we may note in passing, production here, too, 
                                                                                                                                         
in some sense timeless.  But this goes beyond the question of whether Keynes had a historical view of 
capitalism, and slides over into another question, namely whether he had what one believes to have been 
the correct historical view of capitalism.  That is not an issue I am addressing here. 
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man will be faced with his real, his permanent problem  how to use his freedom from 
EP: 328). 
 
The following year, in the Preface (dated 1931) to Essays in Persuasion (EP), a 
collection of essays spanning a dozen years, this approaching liberation from economic 
economic problem will take the back seat where it belongs, and that the arena of the 
heart and head will be occupied ... by our real problems  the problems of life and human 
EP: xviii).  This messianic strand, 
though expressed in more sober language, still plays a central, and, indeed, even more 
urgent, role in the General Theory quasi-
GT: 
GT: - GT: 
324).   
 
EP: 304) in 
self-sufficient character of the other two epochs, but is simply the period of transition 
from the one to the other.  As such it is not an end in itself but a means to an end lying 
capitalism must refer, not to how pleasant or otherwise it may be, but to its efficacy in 
achieving that end: 
 
objecting to capitalism as a way of life, argue as though they 
part I think that capitalism, wisely managed, can probably be made more efficient for 
attaining economic ends than any alternative system yet in sight, but that in itself it is in 
EP: 294)  
 
and, for Keynes, the rate of capital accumulation is the measure of the rate of our 
approach to the economic paradise.  To denote the motives to this accumulation of 
EP EP: 329).  
money-making as an 
end in itself, saving, ostensibly for future consumption, but actually for the sake of 
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accumulating claims on future production; saving not in order to enjoy the deferred 
consumption later, but in order to secure a stream of unearned income.  Keynes analyses 
actions into an indefinite future by means of an infinite regress: 
 
 the remote future results of our 
actions than with their own quality ... the purposive man is always trying to secure a 
spurious and delusive immortality for his acts by pushing his interest in them forward in 
EP: 330) 
 
Just as Marx, in the Communist Manifesto, for example, was outspoken in his praise for 
the achievements of capitalism (Marx and Engels, 1976: 489), Keynes, too, paid tribute 
victories of laissez-faire EP: 304)  The accumulation of capital 
depended upon the freedoms of laissez-faire  in particular, private properly in the means 
of production and unrestricted scope for the operation of market forces: 
 
, throughout Europe, with an extraordinary success and facilitated the 
growth of wealth on an unprecedented scale.  To save and invest became at once the duty 
and the delight of a class.  The savings were seldom drawn on, and, accumulating at 
compound interest, made possible the material triumphs which we now all take for 
granted.  The morals, the politics, the literature, and the religion of the age joined in a 
(EP: 62) 
 
In one of his essays on Liberalism, whe
EP -fashioned individualism and laissez-faire ... 
contributed to the success of the nineteenth-century ... I should have belonged to this 
party [sc the Liberal Party] if I EP: 300-301). 
 
While recognising the historical necessity and legitimacy of the laissez-faire system, and 
subversion of moral
EP: 329)  Keynes is here protesting against the fact 
that capitalism requires, and laissez-faire permits, the transformation of the economy 
from production for the sake of consumption to production for the sake of profit, for the 
sake of the accumulation of wealth.  Saving for the sake of future consumption Keynes 
GT: 376) is 
morally reprehensible. 
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That mankind has had to depend on this sort of egoistic materialism in order to raise 
itself from scarcity to abundance had, according to Keynes, had widespread deleterious 
 
capitalism is absolutely irreligious, without internal union, without much public spirit, 
EP I think that Capitalism 
... in itself is in many ways extremely object EP: 294).   
 
appeal to the money motive in nine-tenths of the activities of life, with the universal 
striving after individual economic security as the prime object of endeavour, with the 
social approbation of money as the measure of constructive success, and with the social 
appeal to the hoarding instinct as the foundation of the necessary provision for the family 
EP: 268-9) 
 
The ultimate problem with Capitalism, however, was when it became ineffective as a 
Capitalism ... is not intelligent, it is not just, it is not 
virtuous  CWXXI: 239).  Nevertheless, despite these 
criticisms of capitalism, Keynes was anxious not to throw out the baby with the 
bathwater: 
 
I believe this is a wildly mistaken 
interpretation of what is happening to us.  We are suffering, not from the rheumatics of 
old age, but from the growing pains of over-rapid changes, from the painfulness of 
(EP: 321) 
 
The fundamental, underlying problem in this period is that production is not directly 
production for the sake of consumption, as it is in the two great eras of scarcity and 
abundance, instead we have production for the sake of profit, of accumulation, for the 
sake, tha
GT shows it in two diametrically opposed rôles.  Consumption today is consumption for 
production: it does not matter what it is consumption of so long as it contributes to 
aggregate demand and hence keeps the accumulation of capital going.  In the future, in 
co EP: 328), 
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(EP: xviii).  The critical importance of this view of consumption, and its methodological 
implications, will be taken up in the next section. 
 
arising from its transitional nature.  The MEC is falling precisely because it has fulfilled 
its purpose.  Its purpose was to promote the accumulation of capital and, in general, the 
wealth of society: the falling MEC (and marginal propensity to consume, MPC) are the 
inevitable result of that accumulation.  Indeed, for Keynes, the definition of the 
MEC has fallen to zero.  There is nothing pathological 
about this  on the contrary, it is to be expected and desired. 
 
The trouble arises from the institutional context within which the transition was taking 
place, namely that of laissez-faire.  Under laissez-faire, Keynes believed, and believed he 
had demonstrated, the MEC falls faster, and further, than the rate of interest (i).  This is 
due to a peculiarity of money that it can act as a store of value for the individual but not 
for the community  what is true for each individual taken separately is not true for all 
GT: 155).  If the community tries to convert part of its 
aggregate income into a hoard of money, total income simply declines to the point where 
the community no longer tries to do so. 
 
MEC to decline with increasing 
abundance of capital and MPC to decline with increasing income.  i should therefore 
decline pari passu: the opportunity cost of investment  that is, the foregone or 
postponed consumption  should fall to zero, since that portion of income is saved 
anyway.  Given an adequate institutional framework this is what will happen.  The MEC 
can then decline to zero without falling below i and hence without investment being 
brought to a standstill.  Once the MEC has fallen to zero, capital goods are essentially 
free and we have entered the economic paradise.   
 
However, the institutional framework is not adequate: the laissez-faire system introduces 
an intolerable level of uncertainty.  If every agent were in some way linked up to every 
other so that they could act in concert, each would realise that it is in the interest of all to 
make sure that their saving and investment correspond.  No-one could have any interest 
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in a beggar-thy-neighbour policy of hoarding money.  But laissez-faire means, precisely, 
that this coordination is lacking.  Every agent must now be in ignorance as to what his 
fellows are going to do. Instead of assessing real economic conditions each agent must 
now devote himself to guessing what all the other agents think of those conditions, or, 
rather, to guessing what each other agent guesses every other agent guesses...  A rational 
saver may know that it would be best for all if he (and everyone else) were to restrain 
himself from hoarding money; he may even assume that everyone else knows this in 
theory, but he cannot be certain that everyone will have the necessary restraint not to 
increase the liquidity of his assets a little.  But if he, as a rational agent, finds that 
necessary, then so presumably do other agents.  Every increase in the demand for money 
(or liquidity preference, as Keynes calls it) is a reduction in aggregate demand (AD).  A 
reduction in AD means a fall in the MEC.  The agent must now believe, correctly, that a 
severe economic recession is on the way, and would be foolish not to build up as large a 
pool of liquid wealth as possible, thereby driving up i yet further.  Even if the agent is 
fully conscious that he is contributing to the crisis, exacerbating it, there is absolutely 
nothing that he, as an isolated individual, can do about it
134
. 
 
ignorance ... these ... factors are ... the cause of un-employment ... Yet the cure lies outside 
the operations of individuals; it may even be to the interest of individuals to aggravate the 
disease.  I believe that the cure for these things ... would involve Society in exercising 
EP: 291-292; my emphasis) 
 
partially overlapping and partially conflicting interests rationally but without 
collaboration.  It shows how rationality at the individual (micro) level necessarily leads to 
irrationality at the collective (macro) level under these conditions.  The essence of 
Keynesian opposition to laissez-faire is that by artificially dividing economic agents from 
each other it compels them, in individual self defence, to act in a manner detrimental to 
                                               
134 
amazing and disturbing slide from certain restraint ...  It is a cascade, a stampede, in which the tiniest 
flicker of doubt has become amplified into the gravest avalanche of doubt.  That is what I mean by 
qu (Hofstadter, 1985: 753). 
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themselves as a group.  Keynesian agents thus find themselves in what we in retrospect 
-shot game, but an indefinitely 
repeated one.  As we have seen, players in an indefinitely repeated game may under 
certain circumstances  a sufficiently large probability of further rounds of the game 
together with a sufficiently low rate of discount of future payoffs  find their way to a 
cooperative outcome.  However, as we have also seen, while this is the case for two-
player games, the achievement of such desirable outcomes rapidly becomes extremely 
difficult as the number of players rises above two.  With any significant number of 
players, it becomes impossible to discriminate between cooperators and defectors, 
leading to the collapse of reciprocity: defection is once more the dominant strategy.  And 
in the Keynesian case we have a multi-player game with the number of players being the 
number of wealth owners who need to determine the proportions of money  and other 
assets to hold in their portfolios.   
 
(GT: Ch 22: 313-  
 
ents, which would in fact yield 2 per cent in conditions of full employment, 
are expected to yield less than nothing; and the resulting collapse of new investment then 
leads to a state of unemployment in which the investments, which would have yielded 2 
pe  (GT: 322)   
 
individual investors: they expected yields 
to fall by more than two percentage points and that is exactly what happened; their 
as a whole: it 
was sheer insanity for them to be pessimistic as it was precisely that pessimism which led 
to the collapse in new investments, the consequent unemployment and hence the collapse 
in yields. The institutional framework of laissez-faire dictates individual decision-making 
on an issue which is fundamentally not an individual matter. 
 
Laissez-faire divides economic agents from each other and leads to uncertainty; 
uncertainty leads to increased liquidity preference; raised liquidity preference leads to 
one in which changing views about the future are capable of influencing the quantity of 
(GT: 
(GT: 235).  Because of this irreducible uncertainty associated with the laissez-faire 
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system, Keynes believed that capitalism would settle down to a normal condition of 
under-
excitement is associated  and in my opinion, inevitably associated  with present day 
GT sition 
GT: 254). 
 
This outcome has two particularly deleterious consequences, other than the obvious one 
that unemployment and a fall in aggregate income is in no-
regular fall in the MEC towards zero, and what that is an index of, namely, the 
accumulation of capital up to the desired level of intensity, is broken off.  For as long as 
MEC is below i
) puts it, is postponed for as long as we remain in this 
rut of under-employment. 
 
Secondly, and this is critical for Keynes, unemployment may lead to damaging, 
that GT If 
[income deflation] occurs, our present regime of capitalistic individualism will assuredly 
be replaced by a far- (TM: 346).  On another occasion, he took 
comfort from a general willingness to drop the philosophy of laissez-faire for similar 
reasons to his own  fear that the existing institutions would otherwise be jeopardised.  
a general conviction that the stability of our institutions 
absolutely requires a resolute attempt to apply what perhaps we know to preventing the 
Times: 65). 
 
Keynes thus wants reform in order to forestall revolution.  Things must change so that 
things may remain the sam
methodological holism which laid the basis for his policy prescription, and subsequent 
sections examine what Keynes believed had to change, what he wanted to retain, and 
how it should be done.    
 
6.3 Keynes and holism 
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In the previous section, I argued that, for Keynes, the underlying problem with capitalism 
was that production was not for the sake of consumption, but for the sake of production 
itself.  To elucidate the relation between production and consumption in Keynes, we need 
to consider a number of passages from the General Theory and early drafts.  In a draft 
chapter of the General Theory (Sup
commodity circulation and capitalist circulation, C  M  C' and M  C  M'.  The first 
says that a commodity, C, is exchanged for money, M, and the latter used to purchase 
another commodity, C'.  The difference between C and C' is qualitative: they are different 
commodities.  The second says that a quantity of money, M is invested in commodities, 
C, and the latter sold for a quantity of money, M', greater than the original quantity (M' = 
M + M, M > 0)
135
.  The mistake of the classical economists, Keynes says, was to 
assume that money has the role only of means of exchange, as it does in simple 
commodity circulation, rather than store of value, as in the circulation of capital.  In 
simple commodity production, production is still for consumption: the original 
commodity is produced in order to sell it and with the proceeds purchase the commodity 
desired for consumption.  In capitalist production, the purpose of production is to 
this end.  In the one case, money is a convenience allowing the commodity owner to 
translate his commodity, produced only for the market, into the one he wants to 
consume.  In the other, money is money capital, money is the goal and criterion of 
production.   
 
ion in the actual world is not, as 
economists seem often to suppose, a case of C  M  C', ie of exchanging commodity for 
money in order to obtain another commodity.  That may be the standpoint of the private 
consumer.  But it is not the attitude of business, which is a case of M  C  M', ie of 
Sup: 81) 
 
and the structure of incentives under capitalism, 
contradictions: although we might behave as though production were carried out for its 
                                               
135 In Marx, the second formula is true of merchant capital, which buys cheap in one market and sells 
the same commodities dear in another market; in capitalist production proper the original money capital 
is invested in means of production  constant and variable capital (c, v)  which are then consumed in 
the process of production, generating new commodities which are subsequently sold for more than the 
value of the means of production: M  C: MP (c, v  M' (Marx, 1974: 25). 
 201 
-subsistent entity existing apart 
GT ation of consumption is the only  
GT  to repeat the obvious  is the sole end and 
GT: 104).  The point Keynes is insisting on here is that 
production has to be validated by consumption to count as production: output must be 
sold to convert it back into money, and, indeed, more money than was started with.  The 
subordination of consumption to production implicit in classical laissez-faire capitalism 
sets up a continually re-emerging barrier to accumulation in the form of under-
consumption and failures of aggregate demand.   
 
classical economists, from Ricardo to Pigou.  For the individual hous
C  M  C': consumption is the immediate 
goal of economic activity.  So does this mean that C  M  C' is valid for society as a 
reductionist: it is 
M  C  M': economic activity is directed 
towards the accumulation of claims on future production.   
 
General Theory, cited 
in the Introduction to this thesis, and in the Conclusion to the present chapter, Keynes 
(GT: xxxii).    
 
The same line of criticism is apparent in Chapter 2 of the General Theory.  Here Keynes 
criticises Ricardo for focusing on microeconomic problems concerning relative prices 
and the allocation of resources between different uses, and his denial of the desirability, 
indeed possibility, of macroeconomic analysis of the level of economic activity as a 
 
 
 I think it 
should be called an enquiry into the laws which determine the division of the produce of 
industry amongst the classes who concur in its formation.  No law can be laid down 
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respecting quantity, but a tolerably correct one can be laid down respecting proportions.  
Every day I am more satisfied that the former enquiry is vain and delusive, and the latter 
GT: 4) 
 
Later in the same chapter he criticises the classical school for its reductionist approach to 
ostulates of classical economics: 
wage when a given volume of labour is employed is equal to the marginal disutility of 
t firms are optimising in the labour 
market, the second that households are.  Keynes conceded the first but denied that the 
second held as a rule.  Classical economists who assumed it to be true forgot, he claimed, 
firstly, that the relationship between real and money wages was different for the 
individual industry and the whole economy:  
 
real wages to be in the same direction as the change in money wages.  But in the case of 
GT: 10) 
 
Keynes is clearly reiterating the point that the whole cannot be understood as the sum of 
its parts: the relationship between real and money wages is transformed as we change 
levels.   
 
Secondly, according to Keynes  and this is really the same point made another way  the 
classical economists forgot that the principle, that unemployed workers can always 
underbid the employed and so bring supply and demand into equilibrium in the labour 
that a single individual can get employment by accepting a cut in money-wages which his 
GT
to accept a cut in wages, this would be relative to a given price level, which would 
remain unchanged by his actions  and so his, or her, real wage would decline in the 
same proportion as the money wage.  The actions of a single worker, in an economy of 
any significant size, have a vanishingly small impact on the general price level.  For the 
actions of the workers as a whole this is no longer true: an attempt to reduce the general 
in the general price level of about the same magnitude, leaving real wages where they 
were (GT: 12).  Again, it is clear that Keynes is making a point about the relationship 
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between phenomena at the system and substrate levels, and criticising the classical 
economists for failing to see it.  At the substrate level, the general price level is a 
parameter, at the system level it is a variable.   
 
Numerous further examples from Keynes could be cited.  At the risk of labouring the 
point, just two more instances will be considered here, both from the General Theory.  In 
 
impermissibly transferring unexceptionable micro statements to the macro context: 
 
ustry relating 
transferred without substantial modification to industry as a whole; and it is supposed by a 
parity of reasoning, that we have a demand schedule for labour in industry as a whole 
[S]urely [this] is 
fallacious.  For the demand schedules for particular industries can only be constructed on 
some fixed assumption as to the nature of the demand and supply schedules of other 
industries and as to the amount of the aggregate effective demand.  It is invalid, therefore, 
to extend by analogy its conclusions in respect of a particular industry to industry as a 
whole, it is wholly unable to answer the question what effect on employment a reduction in 
GT: 258-260) 
 
Finally, and for exactly the same reasons, we may note that in the chapter of the General 
Theory GT: Chapter 21, 292-309), Keynes rejects the 
GT: 293).   
 
ggest,  between the theory of the individual industry or firm 
and of the rewards and the distribution between different uses of a given quantity of 
resources on the one hand, and the theory of output and employment as a whole on the 
GT: 293) 
 
Keynes is again clearly articulating a holist conception here.  The classical dichotomy 
distinguishes between a real supply side and a purely nominal demand side  a standpoint 
upply must have 
GT: 292).  This 
classical standpoint tacitly  and illicitly  given
namely the quantity of resources which is employed in the economy as a whole, must 
also be given at the macro-level, the level to which monetary theory applies.  This leaves 
money with no real effects (the real and monetary sectors are dichotomous): from our 
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standpoint as observers it is a mere veil over the real workings of the economy.  In 
opposition to this classical dichotomy, Keynes proposes his own micro-macro 
GT: xxxii), and a macro sphere to be analysed as 
a whole, as a system, and in which money attains critical importance for real outcomes.   
 
6.4  
 
the pathologies of capitalism, and of his clear sighted articulation of the micro and macro 
levels in economics, lays the basis for an understanding of his policy prescription.  Only 
Haye
we live in a world endowed with providential, pro-human qualities.  His standpoint is 
entirely consistent with that of A.E. 
Dawkins, 1995:155).  If good is to be found in the world, it must be the results of our 
own activity.  In such a world, a policy of laissez-faire is a non-starter.   
 
 and, moreover, who was to execute it?  A 
careful reading of Keynes makes it quite clear what he was prepared to sacrifice, and 
what he was determined at all costs to retain  
GT: 247) which he thought worth 
keeping.  What Keynes was concerned to defend was the liberties, the privileges, the 
prestige, the security, the standard of living, and in short the whole mode of life of the 
I am going to pursue sectional interests at all, I shall 
pursue my own.  When it comes to the class struggle as such ... the Class war will find 
me on the side of the educated bourgeoisie (EP: 297).  Far from expressing any narrow, 
sectarian point of view, however, Keynes was able to take this stance because of the 
universality 
universal class in the sense that, by following its own interests, it would lead the whole 
 
 
own activities made him part of  business management and public administration, and 
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the worlds of academia and the arts.  It excluded the actual owners of the means of 
production, 
EP: 328).  Keynes invented a rather grotesque raison 
 for this stratum, which runs as follows. The big problem with the approach of the 
ordinary people will not know what to do with themselves: 
 
I think with dread of the adjustment of the habits and instincts of the ordinary man, bred 
into him for countless generations, which he may be asked to discard within a few decades 
EP
and no people, I think, who can look forward to the age of leisure and abundance without 
a dread ... It is a fearful problem for the ordinary person, with no special talents, to occupy 
EP: 328). 
 
 
 
e, who can keep alive, and cultivate into fuller perfection, the art of 
life itself, and do not sell themselves for the means of life, who will be able to enjoy the 
abundance when it comes ... the wealthy classes in any quarter of the world ... are, so to 
speak, our advance guard  those who are spying out the promised land for the rest of us 
and pitching their tent there ... those who have an independent income but no associations 
EP: 328). 
 
Keynes immediately takes the opportunity of castigating the idle 
(EP: 328).  Keynes is attacking them for failing to live up to the role he ascribes to the 
rich  the development of a good life of culture and consumption, rather than 
 and thereby undermining the of the class 
their money, take it off them.  He regarded the inheritance of fortunes as a specially 
pernicious, feudal institution, and favoured high death duties to counter its effect on the 
MPC (EP: 299; GT: 95, 372-3; Times: 72).  Meanwhile, to the rest of us he addresses 
I feel sure that with a little more experience we shall use 
the new-found bounty of nature quite differently from the way in which the rich use it 
EP: 328). 
 
 in the importance of class distinctions comes out clearly when he states 
his differences from communism : 
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I adopt a creed which, preferring the mud to the fish, exalts the boorish 
proletariat above the bourgeois and the intelligentsia who, with whatever faults, are the 
quality in life and surely carry the seeds of all human advancement ...  It is hard for an 
educated, decent, intelligent son of Western Europe to find his ideals here ... It exalts the 
(EP: 258-259) 
 
We should be quite clear, here, what Keynes means by the bourgeoisie.  Just as he 
in a completely different  almost opposite  sense
136
, his use of the term bourgeois has 
the means of production, the capitalists per se (whether holders of debt or equity).  
When he explicitly sides with the bourgeoisie, by no means is Keynes erecting an apology 
for the rentier.  The latter he regards as a parasitic excrescence on the productive 
apparatus of society, and one which is in the course of quiet liquidation by the 
spontaneous development of the economy itself: 
 
done its work ... the euthanasia of the rentier, of the functionless investor, will be nothing 
sudden, merely a gradual but prolonged continuance of what we have seen recently in 
GT: 376) 
 
society (GT: Ch 24 passim), he is not referring to private property in the means of 
production.  Indeed, the question of private or public ownership of the means of 
production was a non-issue as far as Keynes was concerned.  
 
(GT: 378)  -called important political question so really 
                                               
136  ie economics which, he felt, 
tried to explain, rather than to explain away, the nature of capitalistic production  from Petty in the late 
17th century on, and culminating in Smith and Ricardo.  Subsequent mainstream economists Marx 
examples (GT -classic
(GT: 213).   
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unimportant, so irrelevant to the reorganisation of the economic life of Great Britain, as 
(EP: 290) 
 
Nationalisation was a non- s in 
fact taking, or had already taken, control of the bulk of industrial  and, indeed, non-
industrial  institutions.  This theme in Keynes  the separation of ownership and control, 
leading to the hegemony of the managers in industry and state  has since become a 
major tradition in its own right.  The theme originally had two aspects, distinguishing 
Investment System, in these terms: 
 
loped during the nineteenth century, arrangements 
were devised for separating the management of property from its ownership ... Contracts 
to receive fixed sums of money at future dates must have existed as long as money has 
been lent and borrowed ... But during the nineteenth century they developed a new and 
increased importance, and had, by the beginning of the twentieth, divided the propertied 
classes into two groups   with partly divergent 
interests ... business men might be investors also, and investors might hold ordinary 
(EP: 61-62) 
 
shares, too, and leave the managers without any ownership stake in the enterprise. 
 
the shareholders, are almost entirely dissociated from the management, with the result that 
the direct personal interest of the latter in the making of great profit becomes quite 
EP: 289) 
 
(EP: 289), and 
privat EP: 290).  A significant example cited 
by Keynes in this context, and  significantly  prior to its nationalisation, is that of the 
there is no class of persons in the kingdom of whom the Governor of 
the Bank of England thinks. less when he decides on his policy than of his shareholders.  
Their rights, in excess of their conventional dividend have already sunk to the 
EP: 290). 
 
This conception of what has since been se
policy framework for 
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deliberately aims at controlling and dir EP: 305).  He 
GT
(Times CWXXVII: 387).  He 
was enthusiastic about the proposals for a national plan contained in the Mosley 
Manifesto The central debate in politics, he [sc Keynes] wrote, was 
between planning and laissez- (Skidelsky, 1975: 241).   
 
But what sort of planning does Keynes want?  Planning by whom?  For whom?  We have 
.  He is even less 
sympathetic towards those at the opposite pole of the social spectrum.  Keynes clearly 
believed that Jews were over-represented, to put it no more 
strongly than that, among the rentier capitalists
(Keynes,  Russia ... is the fruit of some 
EP: 270), and in the same article 
remarks that the Russian Revolution has failed to make the Jews any less avaricious (EP: 
259).  In a highly sinister passage, Keynes daydreams about the fate of Jewish financiers 
in the economic paradise to come:  
 
disgusting morbidity, one of those semi-criminal, semi-pathological propensities which 
one hands over with a shudder to the specialists in mental disease ... Perhaps it is not an 
accident that the race which did most to bring the promise of immortality into the heart 
and essence of our religions has also done most for the principle of compound interest and 
EP: 329-330)137 
 
Jewish) rentiers on the other.  While expressing no particular desire to dispense with 
parliamentary democracy, he clearly regards it as simply irrelevant: 
Government will have to take on many duties which it has avoided in the past. For these 
(EP: 301-302). 
                                               
137 
no endorsement of their stance, but so that there should be no possibility of misinterpreting my motives 
here, I completely dissociate myself from his racist remarks and standpoint 
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initiati GT: 380), I have argued that Keynes is 
their dual 
GT determine what in 
particular is produced, in what proportions the factors of production are combined to 
GT: 
individual owner of wealth, the individual as vehicle for capital, and in every other 
truly efficacious, who enjoys freedom, opportunity 
bourgeois  
 
It seems semi-
 quangos and quagos linked together and to the national bank by a 
board of public investment: 
 
-autonomous bodies within the 
state ... bodies which in the ordinary course of events are mainly autonomous within their 
prescribed limitations, but are subject in the last resort to the sovereignty of the democracy 
(EP: 288-289) 
 
Now, even the private enterprise firms of the laissez-faire 
-
say very little.  In practice, what we have is a new laissez-faire, differing from the old in 
being collective rather than individualistic. The managerial class, which has quietly 
triumphed in both the formally private and the formally public sectors, is to be allowed to 
get on with it, free  in the ordinary course of events  of effective parliamentary 
supervision, regulation or restraint. 
 
 210 
The Times in January and March, 1937, provide perhaps the most 
explici -
-  
 
plans are prepared.  The railway companies, the port and river authorities, the water, gas 
and electricity undertakings, the building contractors, the local authorities, above all, 
perhaps, the London County Council and the other great corporations with congested 
population, should be asked to investigate what projects could be usefully undertaken if 
capital were available at certain rates of interest  3½%, 3%, 2½%, 2%.  The question of 
the general advisability of the schemes and their order of preference should be examined 
next.  What is required at once are acts of constructive imagination by our administrators, 
engineers, and architects, to be followed by financial criticism, sifting and more detailed 
Times: 72) 
 
This is one half of the strategy. The other half is to ascertain from the mass of 
information obtained in this, and every other conceivable way, what rate of interest 
would be compatible with a flow of new projects just sufficient to absorb what the nation 
chooses to save: 
 
the figure that the new projects can afford.  In 
special cases subsidies may be justified.  But in general it is the long-term rate of interest 
which should come down to the figure which the marginal project can earn ... We have the 
power to achieve this.  If we know what rate of interest is required to make profitable a 
flow of new projects at the proper pace, we have the power to make this rate prevail in the 
(Times: 73) 
 
There are three points worth noting here, as to why Keynes is so confident about the rate 
of the success of a merely monetary policy directed towards influencing the rate of 
GT: 164).   
 
The first point is that the Bank of England had already been cited by Keynes as a 
-
entirely of administrators and economists. The two institutions could therefore be 
depended upon, once Keynesian ideas had made themselves felt, to take the side of the 
electorate via parliament, on the other.   
 
The second point is that due to the institutionally powerful position in the market of the 
-term rate of 
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(Times: 73).  The channelling of savings 
through the national bank, too, would give the state additional leverage against the 
rentier class and undermine the ability of the latter to dictate absolutely the rate of 
interest on borrowed capital (Times: 73, GT: 376). 
 
Thirdly, the plan has been drawn up by the business community themselves, and in a 
collective rather than individualistic way. Everyone knows what the rest of the economy 
is doing and no-one has any incentive to increase his liquid reserves. Consequently, there 
is nothing to force i up above MEC at full-employment.  Uncertainty has been eliminated 
at the outset by removing the artificial isolation of economic agents imposed by the 
anachronistic laissez-faire approach to policy.  The payoffs to holding money and bonds 
 
 
6.5 Did Keynes reject laissez-faire?   
 
In conclusion, it is worth addressing the vexed question as to whether Keynes rejected 
laissez-faire.  In the past three answers have been given  yes, no, and yes and no  all of 
them false.  The first has tended to be associated with more left-wing interpreters of 
Keynes. such as Joan Robinson, and the second both with more conservative 
interpreters, and with left-wing anti-Keynesians, such as Geoffrey Pilling.  The third 
alternative, that Keynes was inconsistent in his attitude to laissez-faire, has been a very 
common one, and in the 1930s cartoons used to appear in the press of Keynes as a 
double-jointed man supporting, for example, both free-trade and protection.  
 
These approaches fail to do Keynes justice.  It is true that Keynes did not make the final 
break with classical economic theory, until around 1933, and he himself aptly 
GT: xxiii).  In spite of 
this, his general social and political philosophy was consistent throughout his productive 
life and, I would argue, the changes in his economic theory were designed specifically to 
The field of social 
philosophy is the field in which Keynes remained consistent throughout 
(Lambert, 1963: 344). 
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General Theory 
earlier views.  In fact the General Theory can be viewed as giving an economic theoretic 
(Minsky, 
1975: 145) 
 
While they can thus agree that Keynes was consistent, commentators are anything but 
agreed on what it was that Keynes was (s Keynes [is] 
essentially an economic liberal arguing for specific non-liberal measures solely in periods 
savings are not run to waste in agenda [of 
government], it seem as if there is precious little non-agenda  
 
The reason why these views are mistaken is that they take the supposed Keynesian 
rejection of laissez-faire (whether they assert or deny that rejection) to be a rejection a 
limine.  It is not.  An implication of the present chapter is that it is a critique  a concrete 
laissez-faire is not absolute but 
conditional and historical.  His call for state intervention to equilibrate saving and 
investment is, in his own view by no means timelessly or universally valid.   
 
The difference between himself on the one hand, and, on the other, the old-fashioned 
Liberals as well as the classical neoclassical schools whose theories underlay the laissez-
faire 
attributed to the unchanging and universal character of natural law, in terms of positive 
and therefore changeable laws and of the particular conditions obtaining at a given time 
 
 
Indian Currency and Finance 
(1913), written when Keynes was still, in terms of economic theory, entirely within the 
neoclassical school.  The point is that even where, as in his work prior to World War I, 
Keynes obtained results formally consonant with the neoclassical and liberal traditions, 
such as the correctness of the laissez-faire approach to the economic policy framework 
in the nineteenth century, these results were obtained on the basis of a different more 
concrete and more historical methodology.  It was this methodology which enabled him 
to develop a vision of what was wrong with laissez-faire, when his contemporaries could 
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only see that something was wrong (Pigou, for example, in the 1930s), and hence 
enabled him to develop a theoretical account of the economic problems of his time.   
 
*     *     * 
 
of the functions of government involved in the task of 
adjusting to one another the propensity to consume and the inducement to invest, would 
seem to a nineteenth- century publicist or to a contemporary American financier to be a 
terrific encroachment on individualism, I defend it, on the contrary, both as the only 
practicable means of avoiding the destruction of existing economic forms in their entirety 
GT: 380)  
 
This passage, from the final chapter of the General Theory, is a concise statement of 
laissez-faire.  Yet taken out of context, it could be extremely 
expansion in the role of the existing state.  This is concerned principally with the 
adjustment of the propensity to consume by manipulation of the rates of income tax and 
death duty, and by deciding how sharply progressive should be the former, channelling 
savings through a national savings bank, and a programme of emergency public works in 
severe recessions.   
 
nature of the state.  What he wants is an extra- or non-
parliamentary state consisting of a central bank and a national planning board linking 
together the enterprises (in the broadest sense) of the country into a single organisation. 
This organisation would, through discussion, draw out a consensus of the whole of the 
by the principles of laissez-faire, would eliminate the uncertainty which gives rise both to 
damaging fluctuations in economic activity and to the under-employment equilibrium 
around which the economy oscillates. 
 
d 
GT: 377) in its implications.  The (revolutionary) 
introduction of central controls and planning to achieve full employment at the macro 
level is to provide the necessary environment in which the (conservative) micro-level 
GT: 378-379).  Keynes wants to combine 
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micro-level individualism with the macro-level planning required to preserve it.  To put it 
another way, individual self-seeking behaviour at the micro level will generate desirable 
social outcomes at the macro level when the institutional framework ensures that the 
payoffs to individual actions are such as to avoid prisoners dilemmas.   
 
The transition from the Era of Scarcity to the capitalist epoch required central controls 
on production and distribution to reduce uncertainty and the rate of interest, and raise 
the marginal efficiency of capital.  This was the age of mercantilism and absolutism.  
problems call for similar solutions: a latter-day mercantilist policy (GT: Chapter 23), 
(GT: 203). 
 
Appendix: Bibliographical note 
 
The works of Keynes consulted are as follows.  Books  all in the Collected Writings 
series  are listed first, then articles and letters.  Each is preceded by the abbreviation 
used in this thesis, where appropriate.  Since all the shorter items are contained in the 
Collected Writings, only the books are included in the bibliography at the end of this 
The Times, where the versions 
reprinted in Hutchison (1977) are used here.   
 
a Books by Keynes 
 
John Maynard Keynes The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes (eds: Austin 
Robinson, Elizabeth Johnson and Donald Moggridge), London: Macmillan, for the Royal 
Economic Society: 
 
TM Vol VI  (1971) [1e: 1930]  A Treatise on Money Vol II 
 
GT Vol VII (1973a) [1e: 1936] The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money  
 
EP Vol IX (1972a) [1e: 1931] Essays in Persuasion  
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CWXIII Vol XIII (ed Donald Moggridge) (1973b) The General Theory and 
After. Part I. Preparation 
 
CWXX Vol XX (ed Donald Moggridge) (1981) Activities 1929-31. Rethinking 
Employment and Unemployment Policies  
 
CWXXI Vol XXI (ed Donald Moggridge) (1982) Activities 1931-1939. World 
Crises and Policies in Britain and America 
 
CWXXVII Vol XXVII (ed Donald Moggridge) (1980) Activities 1940-1946. 
Shaping the Post-War World. Employment and Commodities 
 
Sup Vol XXIX (ed Donald Moggridge) (1979) The General Theory And After: A 
Supplement  
 
b Shorter works by Keynes  articles, letters, reviews 
 
EP: 
59-75 
 
Laissez-faire nted in EP: 272-294 
 
EP: 253-271 
 
I EP: 295-306 
 
Nation and Athenæum, 13 December; reprinted 
in CWXX: 473-476 
 
EP: 321-332 
 
- Yale Review, and New Statesman and Nation, 8 and 15 
July.  Reprinted in CWXXI: 233-246 
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1935 letter to GB Shaw.  Reprinted in CWXIII: 492-493 
  
Times The Times, January; reprinted in Hutchison (1977)  
 
Times The Times, March; reprinted in Hutchison (1977)  
 
Road to Serfdom.  Reprinted in 
CWXXVII: 385-388 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 
 
 
1 Retrospective: Keynes and providentialism 
 
In a holist view of the world, the individual agents composing an economic system are, 
and are primarily, components of a social totality: their life process is determined by 
their mutual relations, the totality of which is the economic system.  Under capitalism, 
however, the individual agents are divorced from each other and their relations are 
refracted through their sole link with society: the money nexus.  This gives them the 
appearance of independent, asocial, biological totalities, and hence gives the real social 
totality the appearance of a mere congeries.   
 
It is in a sense immaterial where the economist commences his study of society, whether 
efrom the nature of the whole, or vice versa.  
(Friedman, 1976: 316).  That makes no difference
but where you end up: do you understand the economy as a totality  with Keynes, 
Marx, Hayek, and Smith  or as a congeries  with Friedman, Lucas, and the neoclassical 
school.   
 
the methodology of those neoclassical writers, such as Friedman, who re-assert the 
claims of pre-Keynesian economics post-Keynes.  The agent is a rational, utility-
maximising being; since society is merely a mass of like individuals, the results of the 
analysis of his behaviour can be applied directly to society as a whole.   Thereby the 
latter is shown to be a rational, welfare-maximising aggregate of many individuals.  
Protracted, general, involuntary unemployment is not possible: no rational individual 
would under-utilise scarce resources, so humanity in the aggregate must necessarily be 
just as rational.  On the other hand, the appearance of unemployment can be explained 
away as false appearance concealing the intrinsic rationality of the system: irrationality 
on the level of the system cannot be the fault of the system but only of the individuals 
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comprising it  so apparent unemployment must in fact be voluntary, caused, for 
example, by wage rigidity or other micro-irrationality.   
 
Keynes, summarising his whole approach in a passage to which I have already drawn 
attention, goes straight to the heart of this question: 
 
general theory.  I mean by this that I am chiefly concerned with 
by extending to the system as a whole conclusions which have been correctly arrived at in 
GT: xxxii) 
 
Keynes is saying that the principal differentia 
are not isolated from 
each o
for instance, has consequences for other individuals who are not party to the relevant 
transaction and hence unable to affect its outcome.   
 
In this clash between the private form and public consequences of the decisions to 
consume,  and to save, to hold money and to invest, we see again the combination of 
independence in form and interdependence in content of those decisions, which lies at the 
heart of the prisoners dilemma.  Keynes sees this clash between private action and public 
consequence as remediable only by the removal of the anachronistic private form of 
decision- laissez-faire and his demands for social 
control of the propensit
GT: 378, 376).   
 
agency representing it, to control saving and investment, there would need never be any 
discrepancy between the two.  The desirability of the marginal unit of investment would 
be equal to the sacrifice involved in the marginal unit of saving, and with the 
accumulation of wealth, both would decline to zero.   
 
The problem is the presence of an anachronistic institutional framework  laissez-faire  
which fragments the decision-making process without mitigating the social consequences 
of the decisions made.  The community can only do two things with its income: consume 
 219 
it or invest it.  The individual acting on the basis of self-interest, however, has third 
alternative: he can hoard part of his income as money.  Indeed, if he foresees any 
slackening of aggregate demand, he would be unwise not to, even if he realises the 
inevitable transfer of wealth to him who saves, though he in his turn may suffer from the 
GT: 212)  Hence hoarding, which is the cause of the economic 
EP: 318).  Though in practice 
the matter might be highly complex, the solution is in principle simple: that individuals 
should act no longer as individuals but as a collectivity, in so far as quantitative 
investment decisions are concerned.   
 
*     *     * 
 
The assumption standing behind pre- and post-Keynesian mainstream economics is that 
the unintended consequences of individual actions are essentially benign.  This 
providential assumption pervades the writings of Smith and Hayek, Friedman and Lucas.  
Keynes devoted his theoretical life to the demonstration that unintended consequences, 
just because they are unintended, are uncontrolled and liable to be thoroughly malign: 
 
not so governed from above that private and social interests always coincide 
not a correct deduction form the principles of economics that enlightened self-
EP: 287-
CWXX: 474) 
 
full circle.  The episodes in the history of economic thought considered in this thesis have 
shown that the combination in decision-making of independence in form and 
interdependence in content is an issue which continually re-emerges in political economy.  
At every stage there is a clash between the scientific and the vulgar, the desire to 
understand and explain, on the one hand, and fear of the consequences of doing so, on 
the other.  Providentialism plays a key role here.   
 
A relatively unsophisticated strategy of simply ignoring the disparity between levels has 
been noted but given little explicit attention: it has been assumed that for present 
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purposes the reductionist methodology of the monetarist and new classical schools can 
be dismissed a limine.  The bulk of the thesis has focused on two sophisticated attempts 
to underpin a reductionist laissez-faire policy prescription with a holistic methodology.  
Smith and Hayek, though separated by two centuries, have proposed very similar 
invisible hand mechanisms to mediate between the holistic nature of the world and the 
reductionist character of their desired policy framework.  Consideration of Keynes has 
shone a light on their attempts: his account gives us an outstanding example of the fate 
of laissez-faire political economy if a holistic approach is not supplemented with the deus 
ex machina of an invisible hand.   
 
The precise content of the two invisible hand mechanisms considered  the will of a deity 
in Smith and a group-evolutionary process in Hayek  was perhaps of less interest than 
the sheer fact of their existence.  We were obliged to explore these propositions in detail 
to check their scientific status.  Though from a systems perspective a default injunction, 
always to do nothing, is inherently implausible, there would be no justification for an a 
limine rejection.   It might well have turned out that one or other of these proposed 
mechanisms grasped some unexpected aspect of the world.  On the basis of that 
examination we may now see that that was not the case.  Both turned out to be 
essentially ideological constructs, providential assertions which assumed what was to be 
demonstrated, namely the desirability of spontaneous outcomes.   
 
reductionism, on the one hand, and holism plus an invisible hand, on the other, is perhaps 
of less interest than its existence.  Keynes had a particular view of the class of which he 
was part  he saw it as a universal class in a Hegelian sense, leading humanity from 
darkness into light.  He was also, in my reading, a virulent racist with very strong, deeply 
ambiguous feelings about Jews.
138
  I believe that all of this shaped and coloured his 
reading of writers such as Ricardo and Marx, his positive analysis, and his policy 
prescription.  So from the perspective of this thesis, the details are less important than 
the fact that he showed that there was an escape route: the economy is to be studied as a 
system and not as a congeries, and our default is to act, not to do nothing.  Against the 
                                               
138
 This was mixed up in his mind with sexual questions  passages in his essays on Einstein and Dr 
Melchior being particularly remarkable expressions of this potent mixture of racial and sexual issues.  It 
would be inappropriate, however, to develop this theme further here.   
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against the providentialism of the invisible hand theorists he simply and clear-sightedly 
denies that any such providential mechanism exists, and shows in detail the implications, 
positive and normative, of that denial.   
 
So for Keynes, the invisible hand ensuring that desirable social consequences flow from 
self-seeking individual behaviour is a myth: but the job it was supposed to do, the 
reconciliation of partially conflicting and partially overlapping interests, still needs to be 
done.  This reconciliation is to be achieved in Ke
educated bourgeoisie, and, in particular, by the extra-parliamentary state which it will 
build, based around a board of national planning linking all the enterprises of the country 
to the central bank.  For Keynes it is precisely the educated bourgeoisie which will take 
the place of the invisible hand.   
 
2 Results and prospects 
 
This thesis has thus used a review of some episodes in the history of economic thought 
to illuminate the ways writers have viewed the relationship between micro and macro 
ase made for planning by John Maynard 
Keynes.   
 
A number of themes have emerged.  Firstly, we saw that in a world of agents with 
lead optimising agents spontaneously to suboptimal social outcomes.  The appropriate 
policy prescription, the case for state action or otherwise in the economy, depends on the 
importance we attach to such suboptimalities.   We have seen that the extent to which 
writers adopt a holistic or reductionistic approach is of great importance in appraising 
their overall standpoint and the policy prescription they promote.  Nevertheless, we have 
also learnt that there is no strict relationship such that reductionists and only 
reductionists will support laissez-faire, and holists intervention.  On the contrary, we 
have seen two towering examples of holists advocating laissez-faire: Smith and Hayek.  
The argument has been made that laissez-faire is essentially a reductionist policy 
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prescription; that those advocating it face severe difficulties in what is in fact a holistic 
world; and that invisible hand mechanisms constitute an attempt to reconcile the two.  
We examined two examples: the invisible hand of an omnipotent, omniscient and 
beneficent deity in Adam Smith, and the group selection theory of the evolution of 
institutions in Friedrich Hayek.  By contrast, in the case of John Maynard Keynes, we 
saw that when an explicitly holist standpoint is adopted, along with the explicit rejection 
of invisible hand mechanisms, then the logical result is a call for far-reaching reform and 
state activity in the economy.   
 
The research begun here has opened many doors to further investigation.  One example 
is the struggle with providentialism to be observed in the various editions of works by 
Thomas Malthus and his disciple, Charles Darwin (Poovey, 1998: 283; Darwin, 1928: 
19-20, 462-
shown in the evolution and hypostatisation of the auctioneer through the first four 
editions of his Elements (Mirowski, 1989: 252).  Lastly, there is the current resurgence 
of evolutionary ideas in political economy shown by Hodgson (1988, 1993) and Vromen 
(1995), to give just three examples of a burgeoning literature.  These will constitute the 
starting points of future research in this area.  Perhaps the most important underlying 
theme not so far explicitly addressed, but highly relevant for these proposed future 
studies as well as this thesis, is the continuing and fundamental importance of the 
Darwinian evolutionary theory of Richard Dawkins for an understanding of the key 
issues in political economy.   
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Glossary 
 
 
Agent.   An agent is an entity which carries out some action of interest, such as 
surviving, transmitting an impulse, buying a good, processing information or allocating 
resources between its functions.  An agent can in principle exist at any level, micro or 
macro.  A macro-level agent, then, is the aggregate or complex of all the micro-level 
agents composing it.   
 
Aggregate.   See under Micro and macro. 
 
Apologetic.   Of the nature of a formal defence or vindication.  In the chapter on Smith, 
I identify an apologetic aspect to his work.  Essentially, Smith is trying to defend two 
potentially incompatible things: the existing system of ranks and orders of society in 
 
 
Borda counts.  A system of ascribing numbers to preferences such that in addition to the 
ranking of alternatives, some information on the intensity of preferences is impounded.  
third choice.  Then, instead of majority voting, one would arrive at a social choice by 
adding up the points scored by each alternative.  Such a procedure defeats both the 
paradox of voting (qv
with a purely ordinal ranking of individual preferences.   
 
Cardinal one, two, three  but note 
that cardinals can take any value, positive, negative, fractional, etc, while ordinals can 
only have positive integer values.  The older, cardinal approach to utility assumed not 
only that the consumer ranked consumption bundles, but that it was meaningful to speak 
of the magnitude of the utility yielded by these bundles, in terms of the (cardinal) number 
ordinal.   
 
Classical  of much confusion; it is much used in 
economics and, in particular, in the history of economic thought, and indeed in highly 
inconsistent senses.  It seems to me that there are at least three meanings of the term in 
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general use.  Marx originally divided p
classes, with Smith and Ricardo representing the pinnacle of the scientific or classical 
group and, roughly, everyone after Ricardo being consigned to the apologetic, or vulgar 
trend (Marx, 1972: 501).  Keynes then 
from Marx  and proceeded to use it in a completely different  almost opposite  sense. 
 that is, 
economics which, he felt, tried to explain, rather than to explain away, the nature of 
capitalistic production  from Petty in the late 17th century on, and culminating in Smith 
considered to be only interested in explaining away the undesirable features of capitalism.  
Edgeworth and Pigou as examples (GT: 3).  Hence, for Keynes, the labour theory of 
- GT: 213), though logically Ricardo and 
Marx, incidentally, while designating Ricardo a classical economist, identified the 
contribution (Marx, 1968: 468, 502).  Finally, in standard History of Economic Thought 
nerally taken to refer to the principal economists  principally 
Smith, Ricardo, Malthus, the Mills, and Marx  up to the marginal revolution of the 
 
 
Compatibilism.  The view that causal determinism and moral responsibility are not 
mutually exclusive. 
 
Connation.  Sharing the same route into a subsequent generation.  All a biological 
 
they thus share an interest in cooperating to ensure the success of those gametes.  
Parasite genes do not share a route to subsequent generations and thus are at liberty to 
damage host interests if it aids their own survival and reproduction.  Memes and meme 
complexes do not share a route into the next generation with their human hosts and 
hence may have interests quite antagonistic to those hosts.   
 
Congeries.  A collection of things merely heaped together.   
 225 
 
Consequentialism.  The view that what gives our actions their moral character is their 
consequences.  The claim that the deliberate killing of one innocent person in order to 
save the lives of more than one other person is a morally justified act would be a 
consequentialist claim.  The end can justify the means.  The opposite of deontology (qv).   
 
Coordination.  In an ensemble of interacting purposive elements coordination arises 
when the actions of the individual elements are consistent rather than chaotic and 
mutually defeating.   
 
Cyclical preferences.  Suppose three individuals, A, B, and C, and three possible 
policies or states of the world, x, y and z.  Suppose also that the pattern of preferences is  
 
A: x > y > z 
B: z > x > y 
C: y > z > x. 
 
Simple majority voting on each pair of alternatives will elicit the social preference that x 
is preferred to y, y to z, and z to x: we are left going round in circles and each policy is 
preferred to both of the others by a 2-to-1 majority: 
 
S: x > y > z > x  
 
See also, transitivity and transitive closure.   
 
Decisiveness.  In social choice theory, the preference of a decisive individual or group on 
some specific alternative about states of the world that we can bring about, is 
Decisiveness refers only to one alternative while dictatorship (qv) refers to all 
alternatives on which the society must choose.   
 
Deontology.  The view that some actions are right and others wrong by virtue of their 
intrinsic nature, regardless of the consequences of those actions.  The end cannot justify 
 226 
deontological standpoint.  The opposite of consequentialism (qv). 
 
Dictatorship.  An individual, or a group of individuals with identical preferences, is a 
dictator if its preferences over every possible state of the world that the society can bring 
members of the society.   
 
Dominant strategy strategy (qv) in which the rationally optimal moves are 
independent of the moves made by the other player(s).   
 
Emergence.  Emergence is the idea that features of an entity at a particular level may 
ubstrate of 
the entity.  Emergence is therefore a characteristic of holist modes of thought.  See also 
holism and reductionism.   
 
Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS).   An ESS is a strategy such that, if all members of 
a population adopt it, then it is immune from invasion by any mutant strategy (Smith, 
1982: 10).  ESS is a close biological analogue of the concept of Nash equilibrium (qv). 
 
Fallacy of composition.  The fallacy of composition asserts that what is true of the parts 
taken in isolation is true of the whole.  Thus Plott claims that the concept of social 
involves an illegitimate transfer of the properties of an individual to the properties of a 
collection  
 
Genotype
1989b: 287).  See also phenotype.   
 
Idealism.  A philosophical standpoint in which the phenomenological world which we 
observe is seen as the product of a reality standing behind it, and the substance of that 
ory of Forms is 
held to be a species of idealism: we see a variety of forms of appearance, but they are all 
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products of and reducible to a few abstract geometrical forms.  A materialist would say 
the forms are obtained in our minds by abstraction from the things we see, an idealist that 
the things we see are obtained by an obscure process of materialisation of the pre-
existing forms or ideas.  See also materialism.   
 
Holism.   The view that phenomena at one level can be understood as emergent at that 
level, that a higher level entity can be understood as a product of the interrelationships 
between its component parts.  The opposite of reductionism (qv).  See also micro and 
macro, and micro-macro dichotomy.   
 
Materialism.  The philosophical standpoint in which the fundamental nature of the 
world we see is taken to be matter in motion.  Thoughts, ideas, forms, are all held to be 
reflections of the material world, by a material, physiological process of abstraction, in 
brains which are themselves just one particular part of that physical world.  See also 
idealism.   
 
Meme.  The units of selection in biological evolution are genes, the corresponding units 
of selection in cultural evolution are cultural traits or features with the capacity to be 
adopted, consciously or unconsciously, by human beings (Dawkins, 1989a: 192, 1989b: 
290).   
 
Micro and macro.   Micro and macro just mean small or lower-level and big or higher-
level.  They are relative concepts.  An atom is a macro level phenomenon as far as 
electrons, protons, quarks, neutrinos and so on are concerned; it is a micro concept as far 
as molecules, cells, organisms, etc, are concerned.  Similarly, in economics, a market is a 
macro level concept when discussing the behaviour of agents within it, and a micro 
concept when looking at the whole economy.  I also use the terms substrate and 
aggregate to refer to micro and macro level phenomena, respectively.   
 
Micro-macro dichotomy.  The putative failure of rationality at the micro level, the level 
of the individual agent, to guarantee rationality at the macro level, the level of the whole 
society.   
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Monism.  The view that ultimate reality consists of only one kind of stuff.  Consistent 
idealism (qv) and materialism (qv) are monist, since they hold that reality consists 
exclusively of ideas, or matter, respectively.  The opposite of pluralism, which holds that 
there are many kinds of stuff in the world.  Cartesian dualism, in which there are material 
bodies but also souls, is a species of pluralism.   
 
Nash equilibrium.   An equilibrium in which each agent is doing the best it can, given 
what all the other agents are doing.  Closely related to the concept of an evolutionarily 
stable strategy (qv).  
 
Natural law.  The conception that there are certain divinely appointed principles of 
human conduct, awaiting discovery by human reason, with which human law must 
conform if it is to be valid  (Hart, 1961: 182, 152).   
 
Neoclassical.  Mainstream economists since the marginal revolution of the 1870s.   
 
Ontogeny.  The process of development of the individual organism from foetus to 
sexually mature adult.  See also phylogeny.   
 
Ordinal first, second, third
1973: 1460).  Opposite of cardinal (qv).  In the ordinal approach to utility, we only 
assume information on whether a bundle of commodities yields more, less, or the same 
utility to the consumer than (as) an alternative bundle.   
 
Paradox.  A statement or condition that in some sense seems self-defeating.  In the 
strong or logical sense, a paradox is the bringing together of two (not necessarily 
version of the Epimenides or Liar Paradox, used in the Gödel indecidability theorem.  In 
the weak sense, a paradox is a statement merely contrary to orthodox belief.  The parable 
of the Good Samaritan is paradoxical, not because it was logically incoherent for Jesus to 
posit such an entity, but because he knew his audience would have strong negative 
paradox of thrift is in this latter category, 
as is the paradox of voting.  In the latter, individuals with cyclical preferences (qv) 
between a number of alternative actions are unable to reach a coherent decision by 
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simple majority voting on each pair of alternatives.  This result is unexpected, rather than 
logically self-contradictory.   
 
Pareto efficiency.  An outcome is Pareto-efficient if it is impossible to make an agent 
better-off without making any other agent worse-off.  A change in behaviour causing a 
change in outcome which improves the welfare of at least one agent without worsening 
that of any other agent is a Pareto improvement.  Pareto efficiency is a minimal 
requirement of social welfare that most observers can agree on  although a normative 
rather than a positive statement about the world, it is a relatively robust one.  It might 
not be possible to agree what would constitute maximising social welfare, but still be 
possible to agree that Pareto-inefficient outcomes show that social welfare is not 
maximised.  
 
Peripatetic.   Aristotelian. 
 
Phenotype
1989b: 292).  See also genotype.   
 
Phylogeny 1989b: 292)  
the sequence of forms taken by the species over long periods of time.  See also ontogeny.   
 
Providentialism icent care and government of 
 
 
Quago.  Quasi-autonomous governmental organisation.  See also quango.   
 
Quango.  Quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisation.  See also quago.   
 
Rationality.   Given an objective function to maximise, rational behaviour comprises just 
those actions which do in fact systematically maximise that function, within the 
constraints the agent is subject to.  For example, an agent who fails to derive the 
maximum satisfaction from consumption because of systematic errors in forecasting the 
satisfaction to be gained from a particular class of commodities is acting irrationally.  
One mode of procedure would be to regard the problem  t of 
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underestimating the enjoyability of a product, for example  as a constraint.  The agent 
can then be defined to be acting rationally, given the constraint.  This would be to define 
the problem away, and hence is a fundamentally uninteresting approach.   
 
Reciprocity.  The ability of players in a game to influence the behaviour of other players 
by the moves they themselves make.   
 
Reductionism.   The view that an entity at one level can be understood as an aggregate 
of entities at a lower, substrate level, that the properties and behaviour of higher level 
entities can be understood in terms of the properties and behaviour of its constituent 
lower level parts, taken in isolation, taken, that is, as a congeries (qv).  The opposite of 
holism (qv).  See also micro and macro, and micro-macro dichotomy.   
 
the revenues to the factors participating in production, hence we can only have offsetting 
over- and under-production in different sectors, but not generalised over-production.  
Suppose national income is Y.  Now new output of Y is produced.  All the factors 
combining to produce Y receive some compensation for their contribution.  With this 
new revenue they demand additional products  perhaps some of the new product, 
perhaps some of the previously produced output.  Now it may be that the demand for Y 
is greater than or less than this value, but that is an allocative matter: it just means that 
resources should be redirected towards this product and away from others, or vice versa.  
It has no meaning in this view to say that total demand is too high or too low.   
 
Social welfare function (SWF).  A measure of social happiness; a putative algorithm for 
reconciling and aggregating the preferences of members of society so that states of the 
world that we can bring about by our actions may be unambiguously ranked in terms of 
better and worse.   
 
Solipsism.  The view that only oneself exists.   
 
Strategy.  List of (or algorithm generating) all the moves that a player will make in all 
the different circumstances that can arise in the course of a game.   
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Substrate.   See under micro and macro. 
 
Teleology l 
explanations attempt to account for things and features by appeal to their contribution to 
optimal states, or the normal functioning, or the attainment of goals, of wholes or 
 
 
Theodicy.   A 
existence of evil.  The Theodicy of 1710 was the only book on philosophy Leibniz 
published in his lifetime.  He argued that we necessarily live in the best of all possible 
worlds, since it was the one world, of all logically possible ones, which a necessarily 
morally perfect god had chosen to actualise.  Hence any apparent imperfections in the 
world must be logically necessary ones.   
 
Transitive closure.  Cyclical preferences (qv) generate the preference ranking  
 
S: x > y > z > x  
 
This violates transitivity (qv): x is preferred to y and y to z, but z is preferred to x.  Hence 
preference ranking with the statement that  
 
S: x = y = z = x 
 
Which retains the salient fact that society is indifferent between the three alternatives, but 
restores transitivity.   
 
Transitivity tive: 
that Jane is older than Anne, and Anne is older than Jill, implies that Jane is older than 
mother of Jill, does not imply (indeed, in this case it precludes), that Jane is the mother of 
Gill.   
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Utilitarianism.  A family of consequentialist views in which it is held that aggregate 
social welfare is an operational concept, a measurable entity which it is our duty and 
interest to maximise.  The utilities of individual members of society feed into that 
aggregate, but it may be possible to trade off the utility of one member against that of 
another.  A view fiercely opposed by the deontological standpoint, which argues that 
utilitarianism is an ideological cover for unjustified and immoral incursions into the 
freedom of members of society.  See also social welfare function, consequentialism and 
deontology.   
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